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ABSTRACT 
  
Opposition to an international organisation with legal powers to protect human rights 
describes both the legal process of non-compliance with an organisation and political attacks 
on the organisations legitimacy. Opposition is caused by an organisation’s legal structure, in 
particular the powers that organisations have to encourage compliance with international 
human rights law. This study examines anti-imperialist opposition – which is opposition 
broadly predicated on the notion that human rights law and its enforcement are a 
continuation of colonial-imperialism or a form of neo-imperialism. When analysing 
opposition from the Third World bloc and other postcolonial states within the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and treaty bodies, it is possible to discern a distinct form of 
anti-imperialist opposition. This was in part because of international law’s origins in the 
colonial-imperial era and the perpetuation of inequalities between different states after 
decolonisation. But forms of anti-imperialist opposition continued in regional organisations, 
such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, created outside of this 
broader imperialist context. This study concludes that there common elements in the legal 
structure of human rights organisations which are predicated on an imperialist form 
domination. This explains the persistence of anti-imperialist opposition which is a major 
factor affecting the functioning of international human rights organisations.  
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Introduction 
 
“What right have you to tell these lies?” yelled the High Commissioner of Papua New Guinea 
at the assembled delegates throwing down a report from the Commonwealth Secretariat. It 
was a Tuesday afternoon in 2009, at the Democracy and Human Rights session of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting‘s (CHOGM) – a pre-meeting forum for foreign 
ministers to discuss various human rights issues. Polite awkward mummers from the massed 
foreign secretaries, officers of Non-Governmental Organisations, and bureaucrats greeted the 
High Commissioners outburst.1 Marlborough House in Mayfair created suitably luxurious 
surroundings for an impressive-sounding-but-otherwise-boring meeting of the organisation. 
The High Commissioner continued lambasting the report (which criticised some aspects of 
Papua New Guinea’s criminal justice system) calling it “colonialist.” Feet shuffling and coughs 
greeted this and the Chairperson diplomatically tried to move the meeting on. 
 
What was going on that rainy Tuesday afternoon was an example of anti-imperialist 
opposition to a supranational organisation with a mandate to protect human rights. A 
supranational human rights organisation is an organisation with legal powers to protect 
human rights within sovereign states. It can exist at either a regional or an international level 
but the most important feature is that its legal authority is independent from its member 
states. Opposition broadly describes the process where a member state of an organisation 
attempts to impede its operation. Sometimes a state’s refusal to cooperate with a human 
rights organisation is an attempt to promote a particular ideological cause. In other cases, 
opposition is a reaction by the non-cooperating state to the perceived encroachment of an 
organisation upon their sovereignty. 
 
Imperialism is an important cause of the seeming dysfunction of international law and explains 
why some states oppose the application of international human rights law and the 
organisations created to enforce it. To understand imperialism it is necessary to distinguish 
inherent imperialism from the imperial context of international human rights law. The 
criticism that human rights organizations are imperialist is often made by postcolonial states - 
countries that came into being through the legal process of decolonization in the twentieth 
century. International law evolved in the context of sixteenth century colonial-imperialism and 
                                                          
1 The author of this work was one of those NGO delegates. 
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was formalised into system of law that bound states in the late eighteenth century. 
International law in this period excluded those entities that weren’t states and justified 
colonial rule. International organisations, which emerged as distinct entities in international 
law in the early twentieth century, preserved the powers of many colonialist states building on 
its colonial-imperial foundations. This is the imperial context of international law and was the 
basis of much of the criticism from postcolonial states that international organisations with 
the power to protect human rights were imperialist. Their legal structure preserved colonial-
era inequalities and enforced a set of laws that predominantly reflected the interests of 
formerly colonialist states. But even when postcolonial states attempted to construct regional 
human rights instruments, outside the imperialist context of international law, anti-imperialist 
attacks on these organisations continued. This is because human rights organisations utilise an 
inherently imperialist legal structure, one which envisages a legal relationship of dominance of 
the organisation over a state’s law making powers, which whilst in practice is often not 
effective, is akin to imperialism. 
 
There have been numerous studies on compliance with international and regional human 
rights organisations, what this study seeks to do is to broaden the scope and direction of this 
enquiry by analysing opposition to human rights organisations.2 Opposition covers both 
instances of legal non-compliance with an organisation and political attacks made upon 
organisations by state parties, either during the process of its formation or during its 
operation. The first two chapters of this study theorise the nature of opposition itself before 
going onto to look at anti-imperialist opposition. This is opposition premised on the notion 
that a human rights organisation, by fulfilling its mandate to protect human rights, is engaged 
in a form of imperialist dominance. Anti-imperialist opposition was not just a reaction to the 
content of international law but rather is a response to the fact that any attempt by a 
supranational organisation to enforce human rights law in a sovereign state is inherently 
imperialist. Whilst it is possible to decolonise human rights law, separating it from the 
imperialist context of its origins, it is not possible to decolonise its enforcement. The legal 
structures required to enforce human rights law at the supranational level require a 
relationship of legal dominance over the state akin to forms of imperialism. This study argues 
that this is at the root of some instances of opposition. This introductory chapter outlines this 
study’s main concepts before detailing the structure of future chapters.  
                                                          
2 Some of the studies on this point discussed in later chapters include Sonia Cardenas Conflict and Compliance: 
State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010). Emilie Hafner-
Burton Making Human Rights a Reality (Princeton University Press 2013). Courtney Hillebrecht Domestic Politics 
and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance (CUP 2014).  
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Supranational Organisations and Opposition  
For present purposes, a supranational organisation is taken to be an inter-governmental body 
that possesses its own form of legal identity and restricts its membership to entities 
recognised as states. An international organisation is open to all states to become members 
whereas regional organisations are restricted to states in a specific geographic location. As 
Chittharanjan Amerasingh notes, supranational organisations possess their own independent 
institutions that can (to an extent) act independently from the decision-making organs of the 
governments of member states.3 Human rights organisations, as discussed in this study, are a 
subset of organisations with legal powers to protect and international human rights law in 
states which are members of the organisation. This term includes both organisations that are 
constructed solely for the purpose of protecting human rights and organisations constructed 
for another purposes but possessing legal powers to protect human rights. 
 
An example of an international human rights organisation, which is discussed in chapter one, 
is the Human Rights Committee (HRC) – the treaty body of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Under the ICCPR states are expected to submit periodic reports to 
the HRC concerning their implementation of the rights contained in the ICCPR. The HRC then 
uses these reports as a basis for reviewing a state’s compliance with the substantive rights 
protected by the ICCPR.  States can also sign up to Optional Protocol One of the ICCPR, which 
gives individuals the right to petition the HRC if they believe their government has abused 
their rights under the ICCPR.4 The HRC is comprised of experts serving in an individual capacity 
but also works closely with other bodies comprised of state representatives, such as the UN 
Human Rights Council. The powers that the HRC has to review reports, make 
recommendations to states and decide on individual petitions are collectively the HRC’s 
protection mandate.  
 
A protection mandate is the set of legal powers that a human rights organisation has to make 
states comply with international human rights law. This can include the power to take some 
form of action against a member state that is in violation of international human rights law. It 
can also involve exercising political pressure on the state to change its laws; taking action such 
as suspending the state from the organisation; or in extreme cases, placing measures on the 
state such as diplomatic or economic sanctions. A protection mandate can be distinguished 
                                                          
3 Chittharanjan Amerasinghe Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (CUP 2002) 10. 
4 Optional Protocol One of the ICCPR 1966 171 UNTS 999. 
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from a purely promotional mandate, which is where an organisation sets out the standards of 
international human rights law but makes no comment and takes no action over a state’s 
practice in implementing those standards. The ability to require a member state to change its 
laws in order to bring them into line with international human rights law is an essential part of 
an organisation’s protection mandate. This power directly conflicts with a states sovereign 
prerogative to make and unmake laws which has been the defining feature of sovereignty 
since the seventeenth century. However, another vital component of sovereignty is the ability 
of states to restrict their future actions by way of international agreements. In a sense, 
Magdela Martinez argues, all supranational organisations represent “the erosion of the 
traditional notion of state sovereignty”. 5  However protection mandates empower an 
organisation to make a normative claim about the content of a state’s laws that is both wide 
ranging and on-going. Human rights organisations with a protection mandate explicitly 
attempt to assist the citizens in a state by putting external pressure on that state’s 
government to change its laws – a process which implicitly challenges the state’s monopoly on 
law making over their citizens and has relatively few direct benefits for them.6  
 
The legal obligation upon states to comply with a human rights organisation differs if the 
organisation is a UN based organisation rather than the product of an international treaty.7 In 
the former case the legal obligation upon states will be rooted in the political and legal 
structures of the UN Charter. Organisations that are treaty based are subject to the 
international law of treaties. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
requires a signatory state to interpret a treaty in “light of its object and purpose” and take into 
account “subsequent agreements” indicating that a state is required to comply with the 
decisions of an organisation created by a treaty to interpret its provisions.8 The existence of a 
legal obligation upon a state to comply with an organisation’s decisions however does not 
automatically confer legitimacy on that organisation, as the existence of an obligation means 
that there is a requirement to do something, not that the requirement is itself legitimate.9 
Judgements about the legitimacy of international regimes, Allen Buchanan argues, cannot be 
simply “reduced to statements of legal fact” or coercion, in the same way arguments about 
the legitimacy of the law in general cannot be reduced to the fact that the citizen is coerced 
                                                          
5Magdela Martinez National Sovereignty and International Organisations (Martinus Nijhoff 1996) 8. 
6 Beth Simmons terms this the inverse legitimacy conundrum; Simmons Mobilizing for Human Rights International 
Law in Domestic Politics (CUP 2009) 126. 
7 See Nigel Rodley ‘United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the Commission on 
Human Rights: Complementarity of Competition?’ (2003) 25 HRQ 882, 883.  
8 Article 31(1) and (3)a Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 115 UNTS 331. 
9 See Dapo Akande ‘International Organizations’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.) International Law (2nd ed. OUP 2006).  
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into obeying the law.10 The legitimacy of law is usually predicated on some wider normative 
justification, such as the democratic mandate of lawmakers. Supranational organisations often 
maintain that their legitimacy arises out of their ability to protect individual’s rights and 
maintain a higher form of justice.11 This has broad traction because as Jack Donnelly notes 
human rights provides a “global script” of legitimacy for states in their international 
interactions.12 Every state in the world has now signed up to at least one human rights treaty, 
most of which explicitly state that a state’s adherence to the treaty can be open to some form 
of review by a human rights organisation.13   
 
There is therefore, chapter one argues, an advantage for states to appear favourable to 
human rights and to seek membership of human rights organisations.  This does not however, 
create an equivalent incentive towards compliance with that organisation. Opposition 
describes the process of states impeding the operation of an organisation’s attempt to protect 
human rights. It can either come as a direct manifestation of non-compliance, such refusing to 
implement a decision of an organisation, defying a ruling made against the state by an 
organisation’s tribunal or, in some cases, a direct political attack on the legitimacy of the 
organisation. In some cases it can be pre-emptive - in that in the process of constructing an 
organisation states will seek to remove or limit the capacity of an organisation to enforce 
rights within a state. Cumulatively this behaviour is designed to eliminate future instances of 
opposition and make the organisation less likely to find against state parties in its decisions 
and less likely to criticise a state’s human rights policy.   
 
Institutional opposition is opposition based on arguments that the organisation is 
overstepping its legal powers and interfering in a state’s sovereign decision making powers, as 
Lawrence Helfer terms it becoming “over-legalized”.14 The dissemination of the norms of 
international human rights law has led to human rights organisations growing in importance 
and expanding the type of cases they examine. Jose Alvarez observed that the expansion of 
human rights regimes required the acceptance of “teleological interpretations” of 
organisation’s charters leading to organisations expanding their remits beyond the scope 
                                                          
10 Allen Buchanan ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.) The 
Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 80. 
11 Lynn Dobson ‘Legitimacy, institutional power and international human institutions: a conceptual enquiry’ in 
Andreas Follesdal, Johann Schaffer and Geir Ulfstein The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes: Legal 
Political and Philosophical Perspectives (CUP 2014). 
12 Jack Donnelly ‘Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization’ (1998) 74 International Affairs 1,1.  
13 Emile Hafner-Burton ‘International Regimes for human rights’ (2012) 15 Annual Review of Political Science 265 
14 Laurence Helfer ‘Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean 
backlash against Human Rights Regimes’(2002) 102 Columbia Law Review  1832, 1835.  
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“their creators intended.”15 The tension between the authority of a sovereign state and an 
autonomous organisation which attempts to exercise legal authority over a state’s laws can be 
notionally reconciled by the fact that states enter agreements agreeing to be legally bound by 
organisations. Yet, the expansionist tendency of human rights organisations makes the 
consent argument difficult to maintain. Institutional opposition occurs where the state 
symbolically reasserts its sovereignty by refusing to comply with a decision of an organisation 
on the basis that it represents an intrusion into its sovereign law making capacity. It is 
important to understand institutional opposition as a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum 
there is an on-going process of disagreement between a state and an organisation, in manner 
not entirely dissimilar from the way that a government may disagree with their domestic 
supreme court over the judicial review of their decisions.  At the other end of the spectrum 
institutional opposition involves governments actively trying to abolish international human 
rights organisations. 
 
The second type of opposition, ideological opposition, focuses less on the organisation’s legal 
capacity over sovereign states and more on the law that the organisation applies. It is built on 
an argument that the content of existing international human rights law represents a specific 
ideological programme which the state objects to. This indirectly attacks an organisation’s 
protection mandate, as it is an argument that the rights that the organisation enforces are in 
some way illegitimate. It requires a philosophical objection to the content of international 
human rights law, which forms the basis for criticising an organisation that is in the position of 
protecting those rights. The content of international human rights law reflects a process of 
political compromises as to both the type of rights protected and the relative normative 
hierarchy of those rights. Chapters one and two respectively analyse the origins of institutional 
and ideological opposition before going onto examine case studies of opposition towards an 
international organisation in chapter three and a regional organisation in chapter four. What 
both chapters one and two make clear is that postcolonial states often collectively engaged in 
acts of collective opposition that were motivated by anti-imperialism.  
 
Defining Imperialism  
Anti-imperialist opposition is institutional or ideological opposition underpinned respectively 
by either an anti-imperialist analysis of postcolonial states sovereign weakness or an anti-
imperialist analysis of international law’s imperialist origins. Imperialism needs to be 
                                                          
15 Jose Alvarez ‘International Organizations: Then and Now’ (2006) AJIL 324,328.  
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distinguished from colonialism; the latter Michael Doyle argues refers to the practice of 
physically settling territories whereas the former refers to the practice of political dominance 
over another polity.16  Colonial-imperialism describes the process of imperial conquest of 
overseas territories in order to construct an empire that controls overseas territories from an 
imperial centre.17 The domination of territories from the colonial centre, whilst sometimes 
informal in nature, resulted in a system of economic and political control that created a power 
asymmetry between the coloniser and colonised. 18  The colonial-imperialist process of 
permanently settling and formally demarcating European empires as a matter of international 
law began around the start of the eighteenth century.  European colonial-imperialism began to 
decline in the mid-twentieth century due to a variety of different historical factors. The term 
postcolonial state, as used in this study, describes the states in Africa and Asia that emerged 
out of the legal process of decolonisation from 1945 onwards. Formerly colonialist states 
refers to those states that engaged in the practice of colonial-imperialism. What differentiated 
postcolonial states from other states, as Antony Anghie notes, was that they were created by 
international law – whereas other states had had the opportunity to create international law.19 
Postcolonial states were created in a legal environment where there was a presumption that 
territories ought to become independent states although it wasn’t until General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 in 1960 that colonial-imperialism was expressly prohibited in international 
law.20  
 
There were two types of imperialism that continued after the legal process of decolonisation 
in the 1960s. Residual imperialism is a form of imperial dominance contained within the 
framework of international law and it literally describes the remainder, or residue of colonial-
imperialism found in the structure of international law. As formerly colonialist states created 
the legal template for many international organisations during the era of colonial-imperialism, 
international organisations had a residually imperialist structure. This allowed formerly 
colonialist states to preserve their dominant position at the UN and resist Third World 
initiatives designed to rectify the imbalances in international law that were detrimental to 
their own interests, such as the creation of a New International Economic Order that 
promoted wealth transfers from formerly colonialist states to postcolonial states. Neo-
imperialism is different as it describes the use by Western powers of the language of legality 
                                                          
16 Michael Doyle Empires (Cornell University Press 1986) 30-34. 
17 Ray Kiely Rethinking Imperialism (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 45-90. 
18 See John Tully Public Philosophy in a New Key Volume 2, Imperialism Civic Freedom (CUP 2008). 
19 Anthony Anghie 'The Evolution of International law: Colonial and Postcolonial realities' from Richard Falk et. al 
(eds.) International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (Routledge 2008) 
20 A/RES 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. 
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and rights as a justification for imperial force over weaker states.  Anti-imperialism was a 
response to these two forms of imperialism and inferred that the dominance of formerly 
colonialist powers over the legal and economic structures of the international order was seen 
as proof that imperialism had continued after the legal process of decolonisation in the 1960s. 
Imperialism, and opposition to alleged forms of imperialism, remained important in 
international politics long after decolonisation and in the late 1990s and early 2000s the 
revival of different concepts of imperialism illustrated its continuing relevance as theme in 
international politics.21  
 
Imperialism in this study means a form of external political dominance over the independence 
of a nation state in a way that undermines its sovereign capacity to decide its own laws. It can 
manifest itself in the two forms described above or be a reference to its colonial era form but 
external dominance is the key feature in all of its different manifestations. Central to anti-
imperialist thinking was the idea of legal, political and economic dominance from an imperial 
centre over states in the periphery that had to be resisted in order to defend the sovereignty 
of postcolonial states. The three different forms of imperialism described above, describe both 
different eras of imperialism and different ways in which imperialism is manifested. 
Imperialism matters as an analytic tool in international law, not least because it can help 
understand some of the power dynamics that operate within it and can contribute to the 
marginalisation of individual states. John Hobson notes in his account of hierarchy in 
international relations theory that the legacy of colonial-imperialism helps explain the 
different “gradations of sovereignty” in international law.22 The distinction between imperial 
context and inherent imperialism, outlined at the beginning of this chapter, is important for 
assessing the source of imperialism. If the imperialism of a particular legal instrument is 
contextual then there is the possibility that it can be extracted from this context. If however 
the imperialism of a particular legal process is inherent then that legal instrument is 
predicated upon a form of imperial dominance which cannot be removed from its juridical 
form.  
 
As R.P. Anand argues, the legal structure of international organisations reflected the assumed 
“monopoly” of formerly colonial states “to govern inter-state conduct” and collective 
                                                          
21 Kiley (n 17) 1-8. 
22 John Hobson ‘The Twin Self-Delusions of IR: Why ‘Hierarchy’ and Not ‘Anarchy’ is the core concept of IR’ (2014) 
42 Millennium Journal of International Studies 557, 561.  
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opposition from postcolonial states was often underpinned by anti-imperialism.23 The UN was 
residually imperialist as at its formation in 1945 it preserved the colonial-imperialist power 
hierarchies between states and perpetuated the colonial era dominance of formerly colonialist 
states. Through its legal structure it reinforced the relative inequality of postcolonial states. In 
1963 in order to maintain equal representation at the UN, in the wake of rapidly increasing 
membership - the largest wave of new entrants to the UN came between 1959 and 1962- a 
system of regional groupings was established. The system, which is still in existence today, 
divides UN members into five geographic blocs – African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean, 
Eastern Europe and the Western European and Other bloc (a designation that includes North 
America). Members from these blocs would each get a proportion of voting positions on UN 
bodies and would often act collectively, voting along common ideological lines in the General 
Assembly. Postcolonial states mostly belonged to the African and Asian blocs and formerly 
colonialist states generally belonged to the Western European and Other bloc. From the early 
1960s the African and Asian blocs, along with members of the Latin American and Caribbean 
bloc formed an issues based coalition known as the Third World bloc. Empirical studies on 
voting patterns at the General Assembly note that the areas where there were the strongest 
levels of cohesion between the different geographic blocs containing postcolonial states was 
over matters relating to independence from colonial rule and action against apartheid South 
Africa.24 Carlos Rangel noted that, many of the countries included in the Third World bloc had 
“more divergences than similarities” but that “a lack of confidence ... within the world 
capitalist system” among Third World states meant they were inclined to accept “imperialism 
and dependence” was at the root of their problems.25 
 
Vijay Prashad described the Third World as “not a place” but “a project” which enabled 
postcolonial states to “[dream] of a new world.”26 The behaviour of blocs in the General 
Assembly and at the UN Commission on Human Rights (later the Human Rights Council) can 
give an indication of the shared philosophy groups of states have on matters of international 
human rights law. The Third World bloc was the principal vehicle for postcolonial states to 
advance their interests in organisations that were residually imperialist in nature. As a 
consequence the Third World bloc’s collective votes and resolutions give an insight into the 
                                                          
23 RP Anand ‘The Influence of History on the Literature of International Law’ in Ronald Macdonald and Douglas 
Johnson (eds.) The Structure and Process of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) 342.  
24 Erik Voeten ‘Data and analysis of voting in the United Nations General Assembly’ in Implications’ in Bob Reinalda 
(eds) Routledge Handbook of International Organisations (Routledge 2012) 54-66.  
25 Carlos Rangel Third World Ideology and WesternReality: Manufacturing Political Myth (Transaction Books 1986)  
43-5. 
26Vijay Prashad The Darker nations: A People's History of the Third World (The New Press 2007) xv. 
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collective philosophy of postcolonial states towards international human rights law and the 
organisations designed to protect them. Even after the decline of the Third World bloc in the 
1990s postcolonial states continued to group together collectively in the UN Human Rights 
Council and act in ways that reflected a shared ideological commitment on specific human 
rights matters. For matters of definitional clarity this study uses the term Third World bloc to 
describe the issues based coalition, consisting chiefly of postcolonial states, at the UN rather 
than other terms. After about 1995 the fragmentation of the Third World bloc’s made alliances 
in international organisations a little harder to identify on strictly ideological lines, 
nevertheless the African and Asian regional groupings often worked together on acts of 
collective opposition. In chapters two and three it is shown how some of the anti-imperialist 
ideological opposition from the Third World bloc involved the promotion of reforms to 
international human rights law to create an alternate decolonised conception of human rights 
law. 
 
Decolonised or decolonial thought is defined by Walter Mignolo as a way of thinking that 
“delinks” from existing epistemology and tries to find a “common ground or vision of the 
future.”27 The concept of the decolonial is not caught by same temporal constraints as the 
postcolonial, in that it does not define its theoretical approach with reference to the past, and 
instead seeks to construct a vision of the future which has definitively broken with colonialism. 
As chapter four argues the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights was a genuinely 
decolonial human rights instrument in that it broke with Western centric assumptions of 
human rights and was created by postcolonial African states, independently of residually 
imperialist international organisations. However, forms of anti-imperialist opposition 
continued against the African Commission and other bodies enforcing rights under the African 
Charter. The persistence of anti-imperialist opposition raises wider doubts as to whether it is 
possible to arrive at an enforceable decolonial system of international human rights law and 
demands a more rigorous consideration into the role of the legal structure of human rights 
organizations in generating anti-imperialist opposition.  
 
 
Are supranational human rights organisations inherently imperialist?  
Given that organisations with protection mandates have the legal capacity to protect human 
rights they should prioritise the constituent power of individuals within the state rather than 
                                                          
27 Walter Mignolo ‘Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing: On De (Coloniality) Broader Thinking and Epistemic 
Disobedience’ (2011) 14 Postcolonial Studies 273.   
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the constituted power of state governments. In a statement to the UN in 1980 Michel Foucault 
noted that state governments claim “to be concerned with the welfare of society [and] 
arrogate to themselves the right to pass off as profit or loss the human unhappiness of their 
decisions.”28 States hold the power in international law to control and speak for individuals 
living under their authority, thus making it vital for human rights law to give them a voice. 
Protection mandates attempt to do this. Foucault’s argument was criticised by Jessica Whyte 
for implicitly supporting a broader right to intervene in sovereign states that would in turn 
serve to reinforce the importance of the state as the protector of biological life – something 
that Foucault had criticised extensively elsewhere.29 This is however, a criticism of a particular 
application of Foucault’s argument and it can also be read as a call for international law to be 
aligned with the constituent power of individuals in states. RB Lillich, in a similar vein, argued 
that international law had not been fulfilling its “primary function” which was the 
“development of the human dignity of the individual.”30  
 
Whilst this brings human rights into tension with the concept of state sovereignty it gives 
those who William Simmons terms the “marginalised other” – individuals that are traditionally 
marginalised through the process of domestic law-making in states - a voice and protects 
some of their interests.31 It also notionally offers these individuals some protection in 
international law – a sphere traditionally dominated by the constituted powers of state 
governments. Hannah Arendt was highly critical of the concept of universal human rights in 
part because as an idea universal human rights failed to offer protection that could supersede 
the nation state.32 This is what a protection mandate, with its cluster of legal powers to 
enforce human rights in a sovereign state, attempts to do. Protection mandates however are 
the legal component of an international organization that specifically generates anti-
imperialist opposition. 
 
Direct accusations of imperialism by states are now relatively rare, but manifestations of anti- 
imperialist opposition are quite complex. The direct anti-imperialism of the Third World bloc in 
the 1970s was overt and attacked organizations for being engaged in a form of neo-
                                                          
28 Michel Foucault ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’ in James Faubion (ed) Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984 Vol 3: Power (Robert Hurley tr. Penguin 1994) 474. 
29 Jessica Whyte ‘Human Rights Confronting Governments? Michel Foucault and the Right to Intervene’ in Matthew 
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30 RB Lillich “Sovereignty and Humanity: Can they Converge?” quoted in Louis Henkin et al. International Law: Cases 
and Materials (St Paul West Publishing 1993) 19.  
31 William Simmons Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other (CUP 2011) 2. 
32 Hannah Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest Books 1976) 291-3. 
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colonialism and ignoring their concerns about apartheid and underdevelopment. However, 
since the early 2000s pre-emptive opposition, where states create human rights regimes with 
intentionally weak or non-existent protection mandates, has become the dominant mode of 
anti-imperialist opposition. Anti-imperialist opposition also involved states mobilising other 
states from the Third World bloc to defend them in international human rights organisations. 
One case raised in both chapters three and four is Sudan, which was successful at opposing 
attempts by the UN Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the African 
Commission, to investigate its human rights abuses. It was able to do this by rallying the Third 
World bloc (latterly the African and Asian blocs) in international organisations, to its defence. 
The imperialism of an organisation is not an esoteric question – in a world where colonial-
imperialism created meaningful inequalities between states the imperial context of 
international law facilitates the perpetuation of some of these inequalities.  Regardless of 
whether one believes in the political importance of imperialism or an anti-imperialist analysis 
of international society - understanding both the context and inherent nature of imperialism 
within the legal structure of human rights organisations can help explain why they are prone 
to dysfunction and fail in their stated purpose of protecting human rights.  
 
Anti-imperialist politics towards supranational human rights organisations, of which anti-
imperialist opposition is a manifestation, is only possible because protection mandates utilise 
a juridical construction of a state that is non-compliant with international human rights law. 
This is inimical to whole idea of human rights which, as Alain Badiou argues, requires a 
common “consensus regarding what is barbarism” to construct an “evil” against which the 
universal “good” of human rights can be defined.33 The existence of a human rights abusing 
state is the “evil” needed to define human rights. By juridically inferring the existence of what 
Jacques Derrida described as a rogue or outlaw state, which does not comply with 
international human rights law, a protection mandate legitimises an international 
organisation’s attempts to compel all its member states to comply with international human 
rights law.34 The existence of a human rights abusing state is therefore a necessary feature of a 
protection mandate as it legitimises the juridical potential of a protection mandate and allows 
an organisation to make a normative claim about the content of a state’s laws.  
 
It is easy to frame this process as another form of imperialism by a system of law that was 
already marginalising postcolonial states. This had the effect of putting the defence of that 
                                                          
33 Alain Badiou Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (Verso 2012) 8.  
34 Jacques Derrida Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Pasacle- Brault tr. Stanford University Press 2005) 78-85.  
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state by the Third World bloc, and concomitant attacks on the organisation, into an anti-
imperialist context. Some international organisations have the power to enforce human rights 
by the exercise of some coercive function over the state, such as the imposition of sanctions, 
but most human rights organisations do not have any direct legal powers of coercion. Absent a 
legal framework that gives an organisation the legal powers to directly coerce states into 
compliance, an organisation needs to rely upon harnessing the political forces to mobilise 
state compliance. This involves trying to create a sense of stigma around a state for non-
compliance with human rights law or, shame a state for its lack of compliance. As chapter five 
argues, this has a direct effect upon a state’s external claim to sovereignty.35 During the 
process of colonial-imperialism the expansion of empires created what Carl Schmitt termed 
the nomos of colonialism, a public international order that divided the globe into civilized and 
uncivilized territories.36  In a similar fashion a protection mandate implicitly envisages dividing 
its member states into categories of human rights violating and human rights compliant states. 
A protection mandate also specifies how a state can move states from the category of human 
rights violating states to the category of human rights compliant states by prescribing to states 
the changes that they need to make to theirs laws to become human rights compliant. The 
organisation is thus able to utilise their ability to potentially delegitimise a state’s external 
sovereignty as leverage over a state in order to change their laws.  
 
A protection mandate is predicated on an imperialist relationship of dominance as it envisages 
a source of law external to the state having the right to determine the validity of a state’s 
domestic laws. This framework of dominance exists outside of the residual-imperialist context 
of international law, in that regardless of whether the organisation is regional or international 
a protection mandate requires an organisation to legally dominate a state by attempting to 
indirectly coerce human rights compliance. Whilst this process can be unsuccessful - and the 
high prevalence of instances of opposition in many organisations indicates that it often is – the 
fact that the legal structure of an organisation attempts to do this is what generates anti-
imperialist opposition. In some organisations, chapter five argues, this process is considered 
legitimate by the organisation’s member states because, whilst the operation of the 
organisations protection mandate is inherently imperialist, this can be seen as necessary for 
the pursuit of shared organisational goals. For example the European Court of Human Rights 
relies upon states viewing its powers to judicially review their domestic legislation for 
                                                          
35 On the concept of external sovereignty see; Stephen Krasner Sovereignty: An Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton 
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36 Carl Schmitt The Nomos of the Earth: The International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (GL Ulmen tr. Telos 
Press Publishing 2006) 67-9.  
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compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as being necessary for the 
continued promotion of democracy in the region. This is a shared interest among many state 
parties to the ECHR and dates back to their collective experience at the time of the ECHR’s 
drafting during the cold war. Crucially what a collective shared interest of this nature does is 
allow the organisation to function in spite of the inherent imperialism of its legal structure but 
as chapter five concludes this process is not readily adaptable to all human rights 
organisations.  
 
The structure of this study 
The basic thesis of this study is that the structure that allows a supranational human rights 
organisation to protect human rights in a sovereign state is inherently imperialist. This explains 
the persistence of anti-imperialist opposition. Critics, such as Balakrishnan Rajagopal and 
Antony Anghie, have often neglected institutional theory in their analysis of international law’s 
imperialism.37 Whilst their works provide a thourough account of the imperialist context of 
international law’s creation and its appropriation by neo-imperialism there has been little 
consideration of the law of international organisations and whether the legal mechanisms of 
organisations are themselves imperialist. Equally organisational scholarship in international 
relations and international law has often considered instances of anti-imperialist opposition 
through the prism of legal compliance and the political forces that motivate non-compliance.38 
The nature of the processes envisaged in the text of the legal instruments underpinning 
supranational organisations has received little attention. Laurence Helfer’s work on the 
legalisation of tribunals and Johan Schafer’s work on legitimacy has analysed whether the legal 
structure of organisations themselves may be at the root of opposition but neither directly 
considered the role of imperialism in shaping opposition.39  
 
In part this is due to a general lack of theorisation of the causes of different types of 
opposition. The first two chapters of this study provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding opposition to supranational organisations, and the subset of opposition that is 
anti-imperialist opposition. The next two chapters critically consider how anti-imperialist 
opposition functioned before the final chapter specifically analyses the legal structure of 
protection mandates to show how they are inherently imperialist. This study takes the rational 
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design theory of organisations, which maintains that states shape organisational power to 
achieve specific aims and ends, as its starting point and demonstrates that the construction of 
human rights organisations, with the stated aim of protecting rights in states, relies of an 
inherently imperialist juridical framework.40 This study also utilises some of the work of the 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement, on the reform of 
international human rights law, but draws a distinction between the theoretical project of 
analysing the imperial origins of international law and the state practice of anti-imperialist 
opposition.41 
 
The first chapter outlines a general theory of the causes of institutional opposition. 
Institutional opposition is common to all states in human rights organisations as protection 
mandates are in tension with conventional notions of sovereignty in international law. In 
particular the capacity of an organisation to make decisions over the validity of domestic laws, 
as part of the process of assessing their compliance with international human rights law, 
allows them to make what can amount to a rival claim of sovereign authority. Institutional 
opposition is where states engage in an act of opposition – such as non-compliance, or making 
a political attack on an organisation – justifying it as a defence of their sovereignty. Anti-
imperialist institutional opposition was institutional opposition inspired by the notion that the 
sovereignty of postcolonial states was weaker than other states and was therefore 
exceptionally vulnerable to outside interference. Chapter two analyses the foundations of 
ideological opposition and argues that anti-imperialist ideological opposition was either 
focused on the ideological reprioritisation of the content of human rights law or on opposing 
human rights being a justification for neo-imperialist policies. There were three specific types 
of anti-imperialist ideological opposition, each of which is explored with reference to a specific 
case study. Anti–hegemonic resistance opposed human rights organisations because of the 
association of human rights with neo-imperialism. Attacks by African states on the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) demonstrate how this form of ideological opposition did not 
propose an alternate conception of international human rights law but served as vehicle for 
protecting heads of state from prosecution at the ICC. The other two instances of ideological 
opposition, developmentalism and cultural relativism, were part of a broader campaign to 
reprioritise the content of international law to meet the needs of postcolonial states. These 
                                                          
40 For an overview of rational design theories see Barbara Koremenos et al. The Rational Design of International 
Institutions in Barbra Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (eds.) The Rational Design of International (CUP 
2004) 4-6. 
41 Makau Mutua and Antony Anghie ‘What Is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 31.  
21 | P a g e  
 
two instances of ideological opposition are examined by looking at the campaign for a right to 
development in international law and the Asian values debate in the 1990s. 
 
Defending sovereignty, as a form of collective anti-imperialist institutional opposition, was 
central to the Third World bloc’s opposition at the UN Commission on Human Rights and as 
chapter three argues there was only a limited attempt to engage in anti-imperialist ideological 
opposition aimed at the reprioritisation international human rights law. Opposition as a form 
of counter-hegemonic strategy against Western imperialism resulted in the Third World bloc 
adopting extreme double standards on human rights as it defended postcolonial regimes, even 
when they were engaged in wide scale human rights violations. Chapter four shall argue that 
the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights represented a definitive ideological 
reprioritisation of the content of international human rights law to reflect the needs of 
postcolonial states. This was the literal realisation, albeit on a regional rather than 
international scale, of some of the Third World bloc’s anti-imperialist ideological opposition 
detailed in chapter two. In spite of this, there was continued anti-imperialist opposition from 
some states to the work of the African Commission. These forms of opposition also appeared 
in other bodies that applied the African Charter such as the African Court of Human and 
Peoples Rights and sub-regional tribunals. This study is highly sceptical of some of the claims 
made by states engaging in anti-imperialist opposition and follows on from the work of Roland 
Burke and Daniel Wheelan, arguing that anti-imperialist opposition was often far more 
focused on the protection of sovereignty from supranational organisations than advancing an 
alternate conception of human rights.42 In both chapters three and four it is shown that anti-
imperialist opposition is specifically triggered by an organisation’s protection mandate by 
either by its development triggering pre-emptive anti-imperialist opposition or by its exercise 
leading to direct anti-imperialist opposition.  
 
Chapter five argues that what makes anti-imperialist opposition inevitable, even in 
organisations formed outside of the residual-imperialist frameworks of international law, is the 
structure of protection mandates. Their inherently imperialist legal structure helps explain why 
even organisations that utilise decolonial human rights instruments, which seemingly rectify 
the imperial context of international human rights law, still face forms of anti-imperialist 
opposition. This chapter draws upon postcolonial theory to show how protection mandates 
construct an alterity, in the form of a rights abusing state, to define the universality of the 
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rights they seek to protect. Understanding inherent imperialism also helps explain why 
organisations with intentionally weak protection mandates are created, as states seek to 
balance a desire to conform to the global script of legitimacy by belonging to a human rights 
organisation with sovereign vulnerabilities and a dearth of incentives to comply with human 
rights law.  This study aims to give a concrete theory of how the legal structure of an 
organisation can give rise to opposition and how imperialism figures within that process.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Understanding Institutional Opposition to Human Rights Organisations 
Introduction 
 
 
All human rights organisations with a protection mandate have one key element in common: 
they all make an explicit or implicit claim to authority over the content of a sovereign state’s 
laws and state practice regarding the protection of human rights. This chapter analyses the 
concept and origins of institutional opposition, arguing that the juridical inequalities of 
postcolonial states explain how anti-imperialism came to underpin postcolonial states’ 
collective institutional opposition to international organisations. Anti-imperialism, as the term 
is used in this study, describes the resistance of postcolonial states to the perceived and actual 
imperialist nature of the international political and economic system and their marginalisation 
at the hands of international institutions. A state’s opposition to a supranational human rights 
organisation can include both legal non-compliance with that organisation and also political 
protests at the organisation’s perceived and actual powers. As outlined in the introductory 
chapter, there are two forms of opposition to a human rights organisation: institutional 
opposition, which disputes the powers of organisations and the effects they have on state 
sovereignty; and ideological opposition, where is where there is a philosophical attack on the 
content of the human rights law the organisation enforces. Institutional opposition is 
fundamentally a dispute about the power that an organisation has over a sovereign state 
through its protection mandate – the collective term for describing the legal powers of an 
organisation to realise international human rights law within the nation state. 
A state that becomes a member of an organisation with a protection mandate is required to 
accept a set of legal obligations, which differ in nature according to the type of organisation, 
but all involve potentially making changes to a states domestic law.  Therefore a human rights 
organisation with a protection mandate, by claiming to protect individuals within states, has 
the potential to pose as an alternate legal authority to that state. In so doing the organisation 
is claiming ipseity – what Jacques Derrida defined as the legitimate power of a sovereign to 
give “itself its own law ...its own force of law.”1 This creates a tension between the authority of 
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the sovereign state and the authority of the organisation, which can manifest itself in 
institutional opposition. This can be an act of legal non-compliance or a political act, such as 
leaving the organisation, which is justified as a defence of sovereignty.  This is direct 
institutional opposition. Or, the organisation can have its legal structure pre-emptively shaped 
by state parties so as to weaken its protection mandate - this is pre-emptive opposition. 
In the first section of this chapter, the concept of state sovereignty and the membership of 
international human rights organisations are explored. There are a variety of incentives and 
theories as to why states become members of human rights organisations, however these 
theories do not necessarily extend to the operation of protection mandates which, as the 
second section argues, give the organisation a claim to sovereign-like authority that generates 
institutional opposition. The third section of this chapter examines this process in relation to 
collective institutional opposition from postcolonial states, arguing that the imperialist context 
of international law’s creation led to juridical inequalities between postcolonial and formerly 
colonialist states and is responsible for anti-imperialist institutional opposition. This is a 
specific form of institutional opposition, which often makes more extreme claims; taking the 
view that because of juridical inequalities, postcolonial states’ sovereignty is more vulnerable 
and international human rights organisations should focus on colonialism and colonial human 
rights abuses. Anti-imperialist institutional opposition is not the only extreme form of 
institutional opposition. American exceptionalist forms of institutional opposition, discussed in 
the second section, argue that the United States should be exempt from any form 
supranational scrutiny of their human rights record because of the exceptional democratic 
nature of the US constitutional system. In subsequent chapters it is shown how anti-imperialist 
institutional opposition has persisted in regional organisations created outside of the 
imperialist context of international law. This, as the final chapter argues, is caused by the legal 
structure of protection mandates; regardless of the context of their operation, they involve 
enhancing the power of an organisation over a sovereign state. This makes it impossible for 
the protection of international human rights law, through a supranational organisation, to 
ever be truly decolonised. 
(1) Sovereignty and the question of why states join human rights organisations?  
Louis Henkin’s description of sovereignty as “a mistake built upon mistakes” captures the way 
that the concept of sovereignty has often been seen as a bar to the protection of human 
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rights.2 Sovereignty has, Henkin argues elsewhere, a dark history because states accept human 
rights obligations “if they wish to” and otherwise cite the protection of their sovereignty as a 
justification for non-compliance. 3  This is the conventional view of the obstacle that 
sovereignty poses to membership of a human rights organisation. HLA Hart’s classic definition 
of the “sovereign state” as one “not subject to certain types of control” and capable of 
conducting itself in an “autonomous” manner is difficult to reconcile with the idea of 
supranational human rights scrutiny which seemingly diminishes the capacity of a state to act 
with complete autonomy.4 Yet recently, scholars such as Brad Roth have argued that whilst 
human rights and sovereignty are distinct concepts, they are both are in a mutually important 
relationship.5 Hart’s approach to the question of sovereignty would make membership of a 
human rights organisation with a protection mandate principally problematic, if not 
impossible; whereas Roth’s approach would see membership of such an organisation as a 
logical extension of a state’s operation in the international sphere. 
To understand institutional opposition it is necessary to unpack the meaning of sovereignty. 
This section does this in three parts; firstly the nature of sovereignty and its different legal 
meanings will be analysed before looking at how this relates to the different forms of 
organisational protection mandate. As the second part of this section outlines the legal 
doctrines underpinning organisational membership give an insufficient explanation of that 
organisations legitimacy.  Legitimacy in this context means the recognition and acceptance of 
the organisation’s powers as evidenced by broad compliance with its decisions. This form of 
legitimacy can be either content dependent (where the organisation is assessed on the 
outcomes it produces) or content independent (where the organisation is considered 
legitimate regardless of the outcomes it produces).  This is a conflation of both a descriptive 
and normative account of legitimacy, but this is important as this captures how a state may 
view an organisation as being a legitimate source of legal authority.6  The third part of this 
section addresses the question about why a state may choose to join an international human 
rights organisation. There are complex overlapping web of incentives that explain why a state 
might join an international human rights organisation but crucially these incentives do not 
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necessarily explain why, having joined a state would recognise that organisations broader 
legitimate authority and then comply with that organisation.  This can be termed an ‘incentive 
to commit but not comply’ and it is this as the second section goes on to argue which 
generates institutional opposition.  
(i) Domestic Legal sovereignty and the act of joining an international organisation  
Steven Krasner argues there are at least four different meanings of the word sovereignty: 
domestic (authority over law within a state); interdependent (the authority to control trans-
border movements); international legal sovereignty (recognition by other states); and 
Westphalian sovereignty (the ability to exclude external forces).7 Westphalian sovereignty – 
named after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years War – is chiefly 
characterised by the capacity of a sovereign to exercise control over their territory to the 
exclusion of all other forms of power, and was the default form of sovereignty in international 
law during its evolution and for much of its history. Samuel Pufendorf’s 1672 theory of 
sovereignty outlined in the book Of the Law of Nature and Nations was the first to utilise the 
language of international law to define sovereignty and in Pufendorf’s work, individual 
sovereigns were the supreme lawmakers in the territory under their control.8 In the Island of 
Palmas Case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration defined sovereignty as the “right to exercise 
therein, to exclusion of any other State the functions of a State”; essentially endorsing 
Westphalian sovereignty as the founding definition of sovereignty in international law.9 
A crucial component of Westphalian sovereignty is the protection of what Krasner terms 
domestic and interdependent sovereignty, as both of these are to an extent dependent on the 
ability to exclude outside sources of power. Domestic legal sovereignty is understood, Michael 
Oakshott argues, in terms of the authority over the law by the single unified figure of the 
sovereign.10 The sixteenth century philosopher Jean Bodin, widely considered one of the 
founding fathers of the modern doctrine of sovereignty, defines sovereignty as the “absolute 
and perpetual power” exercised by a sovereign that is “not subject to the law” – which would 
include laws passed by other sovereigns.11 Richard Joyce notes that a crucial component of 
Bodin’s conception of sovereignty is that the “sovereign [must] hold absolute determining 
power over the law.”12 This puts the sovereign over or above the law, and other conceptions 
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of sovereignty have similar starting point. Carl Schmidt’s definition of sovereignty that “he 
who is the sovereign decides the state of exception” presents the possession of sovereignty as 
control over the law and its creation.13 Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty was positivist, in 
that he envisaged the sovereign being the originator and determiner of the law. As Neil 
MacCormick notes, sovereign absolutism over the law was the founding principle of the 
“political theory” of interstate relations and traces its origins to Bodin and Thomas Hobbes.14 
Wendy Brown argues that the ideas of Bodin, Hobbes and Schmitt collectively form the 
“composite figure” of modern sovereignty, which has as its core tenants supremacy, 
perpetuity over time and the seemingly boundless capacity of decision-making.15 
The conventional assumption in international law is that entry into an international agreement 
that constricts a state’s future actions is a sign of that state’s sovereign capacity. In the SS 
Wimbledon, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) outlined this position, ruling that entering 
into legal agreements that constrained a state’s future actions is an essential “attribute of 
state sovereignty.”16 This would mean that an organisation has as much power as states are 
prepared to confer upon it. Functionalist theories of international organisations, (which focus 
on the organisation’s stated purpose as the basis for analysing their powers), and realist 
theories of international relations, (which views states as essentially self-interested actors), 
both support the notion of conferral of powers in relation to international organisations.17 The 
idea of conferral or consent maintains that international organisations have legitimate 
authority over states because they consent to a legal transfer of some of their sovereign 
powers to the organisation and that such a process is an attribute of sovereignty.18 Jaanika 
Erne argues that the process conferring power is what underpins the legitimacy of an 
international organisation’s authority over the state.19 Jean-Marc Coicaud argues that it is 
useful to view the act of becoming a member of an international organisation as a transaction, 
as it makes it clear that a “commitment to play by the rules” exists for all parties, creating 
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certainty in international relations.20 However, the nature and scope of agreements after 
World War One, in particular the multilateral agreements that created standalone 
international organisations, significantly altered the effect that international agreements 
would have on conventional notions of sovereignty.21 Certainly, after 1945 the institutions of 
international organisations began to acquire legal personality and the capacity to act 
autonomously from member states. This created a potential conflict between the 
international legal authority of the organisation  
The core tension between sovereignty and the membership of international organisations, as 
James Crawford summarises, is that the basic definition of sovereignty within international law 
remained unchanged whilst international agreements evolved.22 However, this need not be a 
problem, as there are numerous different examples of states seemingly reconciling this 
tension when joining international organisations. Karen Alter argues that where there are 
obvious reasons for state coordination in a particular field, such as international trade or 
economic integration, these lead states to cooperate with an organisation’s tribunal even 
when it makes judgements that directly conflict with their interests.23 Additionally, scholars 
note that there is a tendency for states to join organisations out of a desire to lock-in certain 
policy benefits, such as democratisation or economic harmonisation.24 Finally, in terms of 
dispute resolution, there is often a desire to adopt models of strong dispute resolution 
mechanisms that seemingly undermine the notion of delegated powers. As Alter argues in her 
study on international courts (in Helfer’s terminology, judicial review or interpretative bodies), 
compliance is often compatible with notions of sovereignty as states can see broader interests 
in compliance with an organisation or in delegating particular decisions to the organisation.25 
This be described as the reconciled interest school of thought - whilst this does not entail full 
agreement with an international organisation’s every decision, it is nevertheless possible to 
reconcile the competing tensions in the doctrine of sovereignty created by organisational 
membership.  
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(ii) Differentiating International Human Rights Organisations by their legal powers  
When examining the case of human rights organisations specifically, doctrine of conferral of 
powers and reconciled interests are insufficient to abridge the tension between sovereignty 
and the authority of international organisations. The ICJ’s statement in the WHO Advisory 
Opinion that an organization’s power comes from the powers “express statement in [an 
organization’s] constituent instrument” captures the principle of how powers are conferred 
but this poses broader problems for justifying how conferred powers are applied or may 
evolve.26   This creates a broader problem as the failure to reconcile this tension results in the 
organisation lacking legitimate authority when exercising its protection mandate. To fully 
unpack this problem it is necessary to first address the role of different forms of protection 
mandates and the legal obligations they attempt to impose upon states, before examining the 
issue of legitimacy more generally. Lawrence Helfer’s work identifies three types of human 
rights organisations, based on the relative legal power of their protection mandates. In 
descending order of power, these are: judicial review-type organisations, treaty review bodies 
and political bodies.  Whilst not exhaustive this nevertheless provides a useful template for 
understanding the relative claim to power of different organisations.  
 Judicial review-type organisations, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have 
the power to hear cases from individuals within a member state’s jurisdiction complaining of 
human rights abuses. They have partial powers of legislative scrutiny entrusted to them, and 
in some cases, their power is locked into domestic constitutional law. Helfer and Ann–Marie 
Slaughter note that the judicial review model has had the greatest success in achieving state 
compliance with human rights treaties. 27  The legal obligation to comply with these 
organisations is both contained in the Treaties that found them. Judicial review organisations 
in many cases attempt to impose what Başak Çalı describes as strong duties upon states that 
clearly define the role of state discretion in the protection of human rights.28 The idea of 
conferral as the justification for these legal obligations is particularly problematic in the case 
or these organisations. Jose Alvarez describes this as “deceptive”, as it fails to acknowledge 
the development of international institutional law and the capacity of intra-organisational 
                                                          
26 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion, (1996), para.25. See also 
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practice to gain legal status.29 This is further complicated, Mattias Kumm observes, when 
international tribunals review domestic legislation to assess state compliance with 
international law or interpret treaties in an expansive manner, as they are effectively creating 
fresh legal obligations without explicit state consent.30 
Interpretive bodies, or treaty review bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC – 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right’s (ICCPR) treaty review body), are bodies 
that have the power to review a state’s record of compliance with a human rights treaty and 
rule on interpretations of that treaty.31 These bodies don’t always have the power to hear 
individual petitions but do have the power to review states human rights records in other 
ways, such as by reviewing annual reports.32 There are nine bodies of this nature, seven of 
which have the power to accept individual petitions. Four of these are active or have a 
significant caseload – alongside the HRC, there is the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Committee (the CEDAW Committee). Treaty 
bodies, Çalı and Wyss argue, gain their legal and moral authority from normative power of 
their parent treaty as the public acceptance by a state of obligations under a treaty means that 
states establish a relationship of accountability that means they should not become the 
“arbiter” of their “own performance”  in regards to “human rights protection.”33 This means 
that the power of treaty bodies is bound up in the treaty that they are interpreting. In General 
Comment 33, the HRC specifically describes its decisions as “views”, and makes it clear that 
states have an obligation “to respect in good faith” its decisions, echoing the general language 
of treaty interpretation.34 This means that when treaty bodies issue interpretations of the 
treaty that may be described as dynamic or expansive states may object arguing that this was 
beyond the scope of their original act of conferral of powers. Additionally as Oona Hathaway 
observes, consent from states to treaties is often subject to “time-inconsistent-preferences” 
                                                          
29 Jose Alvarez, International Organizations as Law- makers (OUP 2005) 81 
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and different factions within states may be prone to question previous acts of consent made 
on their behalf.35 
Political bodies, such as the Commonwealth of Nations, have no express legal powers to 
review a state’s human rights record, but as international actors, they can generate 
compliance with the standards of international human rights law by the application of political 
pressure.36 This can be achieved through membership criteria by, for example, suspending 
states who fail to comply with human rights norms from the organisation; by functional 
criteria, such as making a state’s receipt of organisational services (i.e. development aid) 
conditional upon adherence to human rights norms; or by exhortatory powers such as 
publically censuring or condemning states.37  Whilst these organisations do not generate 
formal legal obligations as Armin von Bogdandy et al. argue research on patterns of global 
government has quite convincing demonstrated that devices such as ranking and 
condemnation is important in generating public legal authority in an organisation.38 Seen 
through the context of what Andrew Hurrell terms “coercive socialisation” –where are a range 
of overlapping political and material incentives in the international sphere push states toward 
particular courses of action – the exhortatory powers of political  organisations can have a 
distinct effect upon states.39 Therefore even if there is not a direct legal obligation for a state 
to comply with political organisations, there is an incentive to comply with these organisations 
which mimics or shadows a legal obligation.   
What links all of these organisations is that they all make some sort of claim to possess the 
legitimate authority to order a state to alter its domestic laws and practices in order to protect 
human rights within that state and base this authoritative claim within the context of a state’s 
legal obligation. Yet, as a number of scholars have noted, the existence of a legal obligation is 
insufficient to automatically grant that organisation legitimate authority to enter into a form 
of judgment in connection with a state’s lawmaking functions.40 Some such as Jutta Brunnée 
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and Stephen Toope, have argued that legal obligations should be understood in the context of 
legal practices and norms that through interrelated interactions between states create 
obligations upon them.41  This line of argument sees legitimacy constructed within a socialized 
template and the concept of sovereignty in as a broadly relational process.42 A further 
argument advanced by Patrick Macklem is that international law “sorts claims of economic 
and political power” and therefore the legitimacy of a human rights organisation is inherent to 
the structure of international law which validates the “international distribution of sovereign 
powers”.43 Again this theory is dependent on a particular interpretation of the nature of 
sovereignty, which whilst not without merit, tells us relatively little about why states might 
consider the organisation legitimate and therefore be inclined to comply with the 
organisation. To understand this perspective, and thus construct a more detailed picture of an 
organisation’s claim to legitimacy, it is important to look at the international relations 
literature which evaluates why states join international organisations.   
(iii) Why do states join international organisations  
It is important at this point to distinguish human rights organisations, formed solely for the 
purpose of protecting human rights from supranational organisations, formed for another 
purpose, that also have a protection mandate. For example some international organisations 
that exist to promote economic co-operation or trade also have a protection mandate.  
Giovanni Molano-Cruz in a study of the Court of Justice of Andean Community Notes that the 
Court’s jurisdiction to hear human rights cases stems from the first article of Cartagena 
Agreement which states that members of the community aim to bring “about an enduring 
improvement of the standard of living” of people living in member states. 44  These 
organisations need to be distinguished from organisations that exist purely to promote human 
rights as they do not generate direct economic benefits to states. The protection mandates of 
human rights organisations confer benefits upon individuals not states generating what 
Simmons terms the inverse legitimacy conundrum.45 Realist theorists of international relations 
have attempted to look for more tangible motivations as to why states enter into human 
rights organisations, such as membership of an organisation being linked to preferential trade 
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benefits, but there is relatively little empirical evidence that material incentives play a role in 
encouraging state membership.46 Realist theories have a better set of explanations about why 
organisations which were formed for a purpose other than protecting human rights, can 
protect human rights, as human rights can become part of the transactional bargaining 
process for negotiating future gains.47 However, these explanations do not necessarily apply to 
the membership of organisations that are purely designed to protect human rights. The 
analysis of organisational membership of organisations that protect human rights can be 
separated into three broad strands.  
Firstly there is the persuasion model is common among ideational theorists of international 
relations, who argue that membership of international human rights organisation represents 
the “convergence of national preferences” created by domestic political pressures.48 However, 
it is noteworthy that this scholarship is highly Eurocentric in its selection of examples and 
evidence, and whilst potentially providing a persuasive case as to why states become 
members of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it does not necessarily 
translate to into a wider context – something that chapter five explores further.  Secondly 
there is the external legitimacy argument which maintains that states join organisations as a 
part of gaining recognition as legitimate actors from other states. Sovereign states are 
recognised as legitimately sovereign when other sovereigns give them mutual recognition, as 
Michael Fowler and Julie Bunck put it, “a ticket of general admission to the international 
arena.”49  Jack Donnelly encapsulating this argument notes that human rights law provides a 
“global script of legitimacy”.50 This theory is contingent on the assumption that the conceptual 
and legal notions of sovereignty have moved from Westphalian notions towards a more 
relational conception of sovereignty where a state’s legitimacy is determined by whether or 
not it fulfils responsibilities towards its citizens.51 Whilst this line of argument risks overstating 
the significance of human rights law multilateral recognition of a state by an international 
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organisation is, as Duxbury argues, often contingent upon a state demonstrating that they are 
complying with human rights norms.52 
A problem with the legitimacy theory is that it treats organisations capacity to grant legitimacy 
states as a fact and does little to explain why states would conclude that this is the case. The 
third major school of thought, acculturation theory provides some of the context for this 
process. Acculturation theorists maintain that states agree to membership of human rights 
organisations because they are effectively “socialised” through participating in international 
relationships that progressively lead them to adopt human rights norms.53 Organisational 
membership is a symbol of socialisation and is one of several measures that demonstrate that 
a state is complying with human rights norms, making it legitimate in the eyes of other 
international actors.54 Although, as Koskenniemi argues, analyses based on social factors 
shaping the nature of obligation risk the “occasional drift towards a kind of socio-psychological 
eclecticism” as they attempt to capture the relatively complicated nature of international legal 
obligations and the different forces affecting state compliance.55 Acculturation explains why 
almost all states join some form of human rights organisation or enter into treaty regimes that 
allow an organisation to scrutinise a state’s compliance with international human rights law.56 
There is however a distinction between explanations as to why states seek membership of an 
organisation and why states comply with that organisation’s decisions about the content of 
human rights law. A statistical analysis of the ratification of human rights treaties led Hafner-
Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui and John Meyer to the “unexpected” conclusion that states 
committing “acts of repression... are more likely to make strong and many legal commitments 
to international human rights”, seeing these as a way of externally demonstrating their status 
as a legitimate state.57 This leads to what Xinyuan Dai calls the “compliance gap” between 
legal commitment and the actuality of state practice in international human rights law.58 
Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, in a 2005 study of the compliance gap, note that in the 
early-mid 1990s, whilst ratification of human rights instruments that involved organisational 
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membership increased sharply, in the same states documented human rights abuses 
increased.59 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui’s conclusion is that “weak institutional mechanisms to 
monitor and enforce” human rights give states a strong incentive to ratify human rights 
instruments “as a matter of window dressing.”60 
This type of behaviour directly affects the way in which states relate to organisations with 
protection mandates. As Heather Smith-Cannoy notes in relation to treaty bodies, whilst there 
is often little relationship between signing a treaty and human rights compliance, there is a 
relationship between agreeing to be subject to an optional protocol that allows individual 
petition to treaty review bodies and treaty compliance.61 In short, the states that are often 
likely to be the most compliant with human rights treaties are in general more willing to agree 
to be subject to organisations with more powerful protection mandates. The converse position 
is also borne out by empirical evidence; Yvonne Dutton, in a study tracking the correlation 
between the relative power of protection mandates and state compliance, noted that states 
“with poorer human rights ratings more regularly commit to international human rights 
treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms.”62 However, as Smith-Cannoy goes on to 
note, states which have recently engaged in a democratic transition (her research focuses on 
Eastern European states) are often more inclined to see membership of a human rights 
organisation with a strong protection mandate as means of safeguarding the democratic gains 
made during the transition process.63 Courtney Hillebrecht notes, in her study of the Inter-
American Human Rights Court – a judicial review type organisation – that many states in South 
America were keen to join the Court, and explicitly agreed to be subject to its protection 
mandate, in order to lock in the consequences of the democratic transfer they made from 
military dictatorship in the 1980s.64 In chapter five the contingency of protection mandates 
will be explored further; what it is important to note at this point is that where states routinely 
comply with protection mandates, there is often a broader political foundation to that 
compliance. It also noteworthy in the context of “coercive socialisation”, described above, that 
incentives to comply with an organisation’s decisions, even if driven by an underlying political 
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foundation, are not always acts that are taken because a state fully supports the content of 
that organisation’s decision.65 
In order to conclude it is worth summarising the strand of argument running through this 
section; the first part detailed some of the contradictions in the concept of sovereignty but 
concluded that organisational membership was perfectly compatible with the notion of 
Westphalian sovereignty. The second part of this section noted that international human 
rights organisations could be distinguished by the relative legal power of their protection 
mandates but that all of these posed conceptual problems for the notion of state consent. 
Given that, this section sought to address the question of why states would join a human 
rights organisation and concluded that states have a broad set of incentives to join a human 
rights organisation, as this will make them appear a legitimate sovereign. However, the 
evidence shows that accepting an organisation’s protection mandate, which is part of the 
wider issue of compliance, is not necessarily motivated by that same incentive.  
(2) Institutional Opposition: The ipsetic potential of a protection mandate 
 
Institutional opposition to a human rights organisation is where a state either engages in an 
act of legal non-compliance or pre-emptively acts to limit an organisation’s protection 
mandate, justifying their actions on the basis that an organisation is encroaching upon their 
sovereignty. It originates because an organisation’s protection mandate has the potential to 
give the organisation competing sovereign authority to the state in the narrow but ultimately 
important field of human rights protection.  A protection mandate is the collective description 
for the legal powers that an organisation has to realise and protect human rights within an 
organisation’s member states. Protection mandates are what Kal Raustiala terms the structure 
of an organisation; “the rules and procedures created to monitor parties’ performance” under 
the rules that the organisation imposes to fulfil its objectives.66 The protection of human rights 
permeates into many different areas of law- organisations are effectively challenging part of 
the state’s claim to sovereignty. Authority over the law for the sovereign is vital, Joyce argues, 
because it defines their capacity to be legitimately sovereign; yet at the same time the 
“modern sovereign cannot escape its own dependence on law.”67 The first part of this section 
will show how a protection mandate gives an organisation the potential to position itself as a 
rival sovereign, by setting up an alternative and authoritative claim over the content of a 
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state’s laws in the field of human rights protection. This creates a tension between the 
external sovereign incentive to belong to a human rights organisation (outlined in section 
above) and domestic legal sovereignty, which, as the last part of this section argues, manifests 
itself in the form of institutional opposition.  
 
(i) Ipseity and protection mandates  
The protection mandate of an international human rights organisation and its relation to 
sovereignty is best understood as a form of ipseity – a concept Derrida identified as a form of 
power that allows an individual to position themselves as having “the right and the strength to 
be recognised as sovereign.”68 In Rouges, Derrida identifies ipseity as the “principle of 
legitimate sovereignty”; arguing that it is not just the possession of force but the possession of 
legitimate force.69 The sovereign will always contain or possess the possibility of its own self-
governance; which as Brown argues, in Derrida’s thinking means that even the democratic 
sovereign necessarily needs to be hostile to sources of authority or the possibility of outside 
authority.70 The protection mandate of an international human rights organisation and its 
relation to sovereignty is best understood as a form of ipseity – a concept Derrida identified as 
a form of power that allows an individual to position themselves as having “the right and the 
strength to be recognised as sovereign.”71 In Rouges, Derrida identifies ipseity as the “principle 
of legitimate sovereignty”; arguing that it is not just the possession of force but the possession 
of legitimate force.72 The sovereign will always contain or possess the possibility of its own 
self-governance; which as Brown argues, in Derrida’s thinking means that even the democratic 
sovereign necessarily needs to be hostile to sources of authority or the possibility of outside 
authority.73 Ipseity is not just the power to declare self-governance but also to declare one’s 
self-governance legitimate. This, Joyce argues, is important as defining sovereignty in a 
Westphalian sense, purely by its capacity for exclusionary force, does “nothing to stop anyone 
declaring himself sovereignty over whatever self-designated field of authority (a vegetable 
patch perhaps) they thought they had the strength to defend.”74 As Sergei Prozorov notes, the 
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very idea of “being oneself” as a subject is required before any form of claim to sovereignty 
can be established.75  
Derrida argues that when international human rights law is invoked as a source of authority on 
a human rights issue, such as the abolition of the death penalty, “one is calling into question 
the principle and the authority of the sovereign of the nation state” by invoking a humanity 
that is beyond its control or constraints. 76  Supranational human rights organisations 
institutionalise this process of “calling into question” the sovereign act of domestic law-making 
by possessing ongoing legal powers to question the content of laws. The ECtHR ruled in 1993 
that Cyprus had to change its laws and the HRC concluded in 1994 that laws in the Australian 
state of Tasmania criminalising sexual orientation were incompatible with the right to equal 
treatment before the law.77 In both cases, the state government noted that there was no 
popular demand to remove these laws and that there was no one in prison or under any form 
of criminal sanction because of the law. Both the ECtHR and the HRC asserted that human 
rights obligations overrode the other considerations that a state party may wish to make when 
formulating such laws. Regardless of the merits of these decisions, these cases demonstrate 
the capacity of human rights organisations to invoke a higher authority than that of the 
sovereign state to determine the content of a state’s laws. Organisation’s protection mandates 
have what can be best described as a potential towards ipseity or an ipsetic potential – whilst 
not always making a claim to ipseity, the legal structure of a protection mandate and 
organisational practice mean that an organisation has the potential to make a claim to 
sovereign-like authority over a state’s laws. There four ways in which protection mandates 
give an organisation ipsetic potential.  
Firstly, human rights organisations claim expertise in the area of human rights protection that 
often directly conflicts with the sovereignty of nation states. The principle of speciality gives 
human rights organisations the competence to act in specific areas relating to human rights 
protection. Article 28 of the ICCPR states that members of the HRC are to have “recognized 
competence” in the field of human rights protection, indicating that Committee’s competence 
was derived from its members’ expertise. The African Charter empowers the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to “lay down principles and rules” on human 
rights, directly positioning the Commission as an alternate source of expertise and authority 
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on rights protection.78 The ECHR allows the ECtHR to exercise far-reaching powers based on 
the expertise of its judges, including the power to decide disputes on its jurisdiction and 
competence.79 The common theme in all of these provisions is a claim to knowledge and 
expertise as the basis of a claim to authority; it is not a claim to authority based on 
representation or a right to rule such as a democratic sovereign state might make. As one 
former UN Special Rapporteur Justice Abdoulaye Dieye of Senegal noted, it was “the long-
standing practice” of some UN Bodies “[to assume] a wide competence to deal with large scale 
situations of violations of human rights”, which as a consequence meant that governments 
found it difficult to argue that they should not have their human rights records scrutinised.80 
In common with other international organisations, human rights organisations claim their 
expertise results in their overall political neutrality, which justifies their decisions. As Patricia 
Clavin and Jens Wessel note in relation to the League of Nations, the concept of seemingly 
impartial expertise allowed it to take overtly political positions and engage in political 
actions.81 This meant that claims to be exercising expertise often served as a shield for 
organisations to act politically, whilst at the same time denying the possibility of politics by 
claiming political neutrality. International organisations, Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke 
note, “do not operate as parts of polities that include functioning political legislatures” and 
rather rely on the initial decision of a state to enter into an organisation as their source of 
authority and expertise.82 This is problematic for the reasons Hathaway outlines above and, as 
von Bogdandy and Venzke note, it presumes that the possibility of exiting a treaty offers a 
“sufficient escape hatch” ignoring the fact that often “the costs of exit are prohibitively 
high.”83 This gives the expertise, and hence the authority, of human rights organisations a form 
of permanency that is beyond the direct control of states; hence generating two rival claims as 
to the legitimate authority to determine the human rights laws that govern a community. 
Human rights organisations claim to expertise in the area of human rights protection can serve 
as a direct counterweight to traditional sovereign prerogatives, such as security. The ECtHR, 
when ruling on whether an individual could be deported to a state where they faced a risk of 
torture, held that there was no scope to allow a state’s concerns about security into such 
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decisions.84 In this case, the Court’s analysis of the case law on the prohibition of torture under 
the ECHR – in other words their ‘expertise’ – found that the state’s security interest was 
secondary to the protection of the human rights.85 
Secondly, human rights organisations actively try to stand above the politics of the nation 
state in order to seem impartial and scrutinise a state’s human rights record free from direct 
control by any one government. When judges at international tribunals are empowered to 
check a government’s decisions in order to protect rights it can bring human rights law directly 
into tension with the desires of representative governments.86 As Samantha Besson notes, 
imposing rights that constrain the democratic process is complex enough in domestic law and 
even more complex in international law.87 Given the mechanisms for amending the structure 
and substantive jurisdiction of human rights organisations are highly inflexible and opaque, 
often requiring exhaustive deliberative processes and international summits, individual states 
are somewhat limited in their ability to directly create the norms that will constrain their 
capacity of action. This means that there is a disconnect between human rights organisations, 
which are democracy-constraining but rights- protecting, and democratically elected 
governments, who can claim a broader demotic legitimacy for their actions. Derrida argues 
that in the international sphere, when international human rights law questions the actions of 
governments human rights are placed beyond the reach of politics, creating a situation that 
Carl Schmitt described as the end of politics. For Schmitt, nation states were inherently 
antagonistic entities and whilst not in a perpetual state of war, it was the possibility of war 
between states that shaped the potential for interstate politics and the creation of sovereign 
identities.88 Derrida and Schmitt are both sceptical about the possibility of purely disinterested 
and apolitical humanitarian supranationalism. Schmitt is concerned that any such construction 
is simply a Trojan horse for other interests and Derrida cannot conceive of a politics of 
humanism that can exist without reference to the presence of an enemy of humanity.89  
This is part of a broader trend identified by Koskenniemi, who notes that debates about the 
protection of human rights in international law are dominated by a “liberal impulse to escape 
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politics.”90 The structures of international organisations, Koskenniemi argues, have enabled a 
dilution of some of the fundamental questions surrounding basic human rights, in particular 
the question of the legitimacy of a supranational agency in scrutinising states human rights 
records.91 The attempt to escape politics is not an eradication of politics, but rather the 
creation of a new cosmopolitan politics that belongs to international organisations and can 
openly conflict with the politics of its member states. This directly seeks to supplant the 
sovereign state as lawmaker and positions an organisation as a rival political opponent to the 
state government. Sonia Cardenas argues that there are three basic reasons why states violate 
human rights agreements they are party to.92 Firstly, states cite national security, or a form of 
national security-based reasoning, to justify breaching human rights law as a matter of 
national necessity. Secondly, they claim a form of cultural or national exceptionalism that 
means that they are justified in protecting some, but not all rights protected by international 
human rights instruments. Thirdly, they claim that they are violating human rights in the 
interests of a pro-violation constituency. Whilst the terms of Cardenas’ categorisation are 
debatable, it is important to note that all of her categories refer to decisions taken by a 
government on behalf of domestic political constituencies. Therefore, for an organisation to 
decide that a state is in violation of an international agreement often means putting 
themselves in the position of a political opponent to that state’s political decisions. 
Thirdly, human rights organisations have an ipsetic potential as they bypass the governments 
of states to protect citizens in the nation state, which directly conflicts with their sovereignty. 
Supranational organisations suffer from what Johan Schaffer describes as the problem of the 
inverse relation of authority – the principal beneficiaries of the exercise of an international 
organisation’s protection mandate are not states but individuals within states.93 Beth Simmons 
notes the seeming paradox - whilst international human rights organisation’s emerge through 
the process of negotiations between states they “create stakeholders almost exclusively 
domestically”, which seemingly gives states little reason to accept an organisation’s protection 
mandate if they are concerned they will be subject to it.94 Geir Ulfstein argues that from the 
perspective of a state party by explicitly empowering organisations to make rulings against 
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states, protection mandates represent “the most serious interference in state sovereignty”.95 
In ‘Society must be Defended’, Michel Foucault notes that in the “classical theory of 
sovereignty, the right of life and death was one of the sovereign’s basic attributes”, which was 
the origins of biopolitical power in the twentieth century.96 This type of power required direct 
control over the population through the disciplinary apparatus of the state. Human rights 
organisations, by conferring advantages directly upon citizens and bypassing state 
governments, implicitly challenge this type of power. One direct area of organisational 
practice where this can be seen is in the capacity of judicial review type organisations to order 
remedies, which as Diana Shelton argues, are effectively equivalent to domestic judicial 
“procedures against the state” to defend the rights of citizens.97 As Shelton goes on to note, 
human rights cases – as well as providing rights to individual’s to use against the state – have 
also been viewed as a means to uphold human rights law in the wider “interests of the 
international community.”98 Therefore, the capacity of an organisation to issue remedies to 
injured parties not only breaks the control of the state over its citizens, but in doing so also 
situates citizens within a wider international community, further diluting the power of the 
state over its citizens. 
Finally, a human rights organisation’s powers are grounded not just in the positive law of their 
constituent instrument, but also in moral principles, as the organisation exists to prevent 
human rights violations. This is an often-understated element of ideational theories and harks 
back to the political climate in the aftermath of World War Two where, as Mark Mazower 
argues, there was a sense that “civilization needed to be saved” and institutions created to 
accomplish this function.99 Often, the reason for joining a judicial review model organisation is 
located within a particular political event, as was the case with ECtHR, which states joined 
specifically because they wanted to protect their sovereignty from the existential threat of a 
recurrence of fascism or a communist takeover.100 In a speech to the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe in 1949, the French Minister of Information Pierre-Henri Teitgen 
explicitly envisaged creating an interventionist court of human rights when he warned that 
totalitarianism crept into states gradually, weakening constitutional levers and making it 
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“necessary to intervene before it is too late.”101 During the drafting of the ECHR an agreement 
was only secured on the creation of a powerful court of human rights was because states were 
convinced that it would only act against states where there were fundamental violations of 
human rights.102 Appealing to moral authority is a justificatory mechanism for an organisation 
to exercise its protection mandate in areas that were not explicitly envisaged in the original 
agreement underpinning the organisation. To some extent this a problem common to all 
international organisations, as Konstantinos Magliveras notes the terms of a state’s entry into 
an international organisation often do not “reflect reality” and provide an imperfect guide to 
the organisations future functions, the capacity of a human rights organisation to specifically 
invoke transcendent morality gives a powerful rhetorical defence to this practice.103  
Collectively, these four aspects of an organisation’s protection mandate give it an ipsetic 
potential. GEM Ascombe notes that for a state’s law-making authority to be considered 
legitimate it cannot simply rely on coercion or an appeal to a common good; rather, a state 
has to possess a “customary right to obedience”, which can then be enshrined into law.104 An 
organisation’s claim to expertise, political neutrality, protection of citizens and general moral 
mission cumulatively give the organisation an authoritative voice – or at least an authoritative 
claim to tell a state what it’s laws should be in an international sphere that has, as the first 
section of this chapter argued, become more conditioned to view a commitment to human 
rights as a necessary component of sovereignty. This pre-existing claim to authority is 
enshrined into international law by a protection mandate and gives the organisation the 
juridical potential to make a claim as to what a state’s laws should be in order to protect 
human rights. This is what Joyce calls auto-positioning, or making a rival claim to sovereignty, 
as it is a claim to act as the legitimate lawmaker in a particular area.105 As shown in the final 
part of this section, it is a reaction against the ipsetic potential of an organisation that causes 
states to engage in institutional opposition. 
(ii) Gradations of Institutional Opposition 
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Institutional opposition is a reaction to the ipsetic potential of an organisation and a 
restatement of state power; in this sense it is a symbolic reassertion of state power. Oscar 
Guardiola-Rivera notes that a common feature of modern sovereignty in the age of 
globalisation is the tendency to look for symbolic demonstrations of sovereign power and 
invoke symbols of exclusionary Westphalian sovereignty.106 This occurs at a point where, due 
to a number of factors (such as economic globalisation and the growth of transnational judicial 
regimes) sovereignty has become increasingly fragmented and multi-layered.107 Brown has 
argued that the tendency of states to construct walled borders – like Israel’s security wall and 
the US-built fence between itself and Mexico – are attempts by states to define their 
sovereignty and assert their capacity to fulfil the “key characteristics” of Westphalian 
sovereignty. 108  In a similar fashion, institutional opposition demonstrates that a state 
possesses the key attributes of Westphalian sovereignty. 
It is important to understand that institutional opposition exists on a spectrum of intensity. 
This reflects both the powers of that organisation and also the philosophical approach of 
states to defining their sovereignty. This does not entail a perpetually adversarial relationship, 
but one where there is a necessary difference and tension between a state and the 
organisation, in the same way that in a domestic constitutional system the process of judicial 
review engenders a potential tension between the executive and judicial branches of 
government. Brad Roth actively rejects the idea that sovereignty and human rights are always 
in tension with one another, arguing that the two concepts play “distinct and 
incommensurable roles within a single [international] legal order.”109 Costas Douzinas, in a 
critique of international human rights law, argued that when “human rights and national 
interests coincide” governments become their greatest champions, but noted that this was 
often the exception.110 His deeper concern was that government-controlled human rights law 
had the potential to become a “poacher-turned-gamekeeper” in that an institution that had 
been created to resist and oppose governmental power could be used to endorse it.111 
Therefore, some level of institutional oppositional demonstrates that an organisation is 
functioning properly and protecting individuals within states. A complete alignment between a 
state and a human rights organisation could be a sign that the organisation has been subject 
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to state capture. In the same way that in a domestic constitutional system, the government 
would not expect to win every judicial review of an executive decision, states should not 
expect a complete alignment between their interests and the decisions of a human rights 
organisation. Low-level institutional opposition is therefore a necessary by-product of a 
protection mandate, but at the more intense level it represents a definitive attack on the 
organisation by a state party. Rather than divide instances of institutional opposition into 
categories, it is best to illustrate the spectrum of institutional opposition’s intensity with 
reference to some examples at different points along the scale.  
At a low level, institutional opposition involves practices such as a state failing to file annual 
reports on human rights protection within their country. As a report from the UN Secretary-
General outlined, the treaty body reporting process was part of the “obligation of all States to 
promote respect for the rights and freedoms” and they should view it as an opportunity “to 
take stock of the state of human rights protection within their jurisdiction.”112 Failure to report 
can actively weaken a human rights organisation - as Nihal Jayawickrama notes, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has struggled to gain adequate reports 
from some state parties, which has enabled them to obstruct the Committee’s operational 
capacity.113 Systemic failure to follow reporting procedures marginalises the work of a human 
rights organisation. Importantly, the actual expenditure and resources required by a state 
party to engage in the reporting process is minimal; the systemic failure of some states to 
engage in reporting process can constitute opposition if it occurs in a manner that is 
premeditated and systematised.114 Resisting the implementation of an organisation’s decisions 
on technical grounds is another example of low level institutional opposition. The Netherlands 
disagreed with an HRC decision on asylum policy regarding minors, stating that the HRC was 
departing from its previous approach to dealing with asylum cases, but, stressing the serious 
nature of the case, the HRC ordered a remedy on the merits.115 The Netherlands did not 
deport the applicant but refused to alter their law to prohibit a similar case happening again. 
This was not simply a technical dispute, but was a dispute that specifically related to the 
competence of the organisation and the importance of the sovereign state in deciding the 
content of their laws.  
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The most common form of institutional opposition is a demarcation dispute that can often be 
performative in nature. Jessie Allen, in her analysis of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR), notes that its scrutiny processes are often theatrical in nature and that 
the performance of governments when receiving criticism of their human rights records is 
important in shaping the way that the organisations’ power develops.116 Equally, where 
governments reject the recommendations of international organisations on the grounds of 
sovereignty – as the government of Bolivia did when it rejected IACHR findings that its media 
regulations violated the right to free speech – it can also serve to define their sovereignty.117 
The Brazilian government strongly criticised the Convention Against Torture’s review body the 
Committee Against Torture (CAT) after it launched an enquiry into Brazilian prison conditions. 
They focused upon the perceived expansion of the CAT’s mandate to conduct enquiries when 
there was no evidence of a “deliberate plan or policy for the occurrence of the practice of 
torture” insisting that Brazil was willing to investigate prison reform but insisted that the CAT 
was departing from the powers in its protection mandate.118 Generally there is a strong level 
of compliance with the CAT’s decisions, but there has been resistance regarding implementing 
interim protection measures and several states have attempted to extradite individuals to 
regimes where they are at risk of torture.119 Overall, demarcation disputes are given an added 
impetus as in many states domestic courts engage in what Yuval Shany describes as a “shadow 
effect” where expectations about an organisation’s “future performance” affect domestic 
legal institutions.120 Whilst not a direct challenge to a state’s sovereign powers of law-making 
this illustrates how an organisation, particularly judicial review and treaty body organisations, 
can have a direct legal affect within a state. Part of the opposition from the UK toward the 
ECtHR has focused on the way that domestic courts ‘shadow’ its decisions under the 
legislation that brings the ECHR into UK domestic law.121 
At a more intense level, the reaction of a state to the decisions of a human rights organisation 
following a successful individual petition can act as a reassertion of the sovereignty of their 
domestic legal processes in the face of supranational censure. South Korea has consistently 
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refused to implement two HRC decisions relating to decriminalising conscientious objection to 
conscription. It has stated that the overall security situation, the ongoing threat from North 
Korea and strong public opinion in favour of conscription, meant they would not consider 
changing the law.122 In response to the ECtHR’s judgment in Hirst v UK – the decision that held 
the UK’s blanket ban on prisoners voting was disproportionate under the ECHR – the UK 
government argued that the court had become illegitimate and was ruling in areas beyond its 
competence.123 The UK government had expressed concerns about the powers of the ECtHR 
since the early 1970s; but from the late 1990s, after reforms enhanced the power of the Court, 
leading politicians and judges openly questioned its legitimacy and claimed that it had 
expanded its powers beyond its original mandate.124 In a 2012 speech to the Council of Europe 
– the ECtHR’s supervisory organisation – the UK Prime Minister insisted that the Court must 
treat decisions taken “at the national level ... with respect” in a clear assertion of sovereign 
authority.125 This level of opposition, whilst being openly hostile to an organisation’s ipsetic 
potential, does not openly envisage withdrawing from the organisation. 
At its most extreme, institutional opposition seeks to actively remove nations from human 
rights organisations, justify complete non-compliance or, in some cases, abolish them all 
together.  This is often underpinned by a latent political position about the role of state 
sovereignty. Anti-imperialist opposition fits into this category as dose American 
exceptionalism, which is underscored by a belief in democratic exceptionalism of the US.  For 
many years in the US there was a political strong movement, inspired by Senator John Bricker, 
to withdraw from all international human rights treaties because of the implicit challenge they 
posed to the US Constitution as the supreme source of law.126 Senator Bricker framed his 
concern about “international agencies” in terms of legitimacy and democratic control, arguing 
that there was a danger of the “Soviet controlled” UN interfering in the US’ domestic affairs.127 
Commenting on this, John Jackson notes that the argument that a treaty infringes US 
sovereignty in essence maintains that a “set of decisions should be made, as a matter of good 
governmental policy, at the nation- state (US) level and not at the international level.”128 This 
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was not simply an efficacy argument: the hostility behind Bricker’s proposals was in part 
inspired by US exceptionalism and the concern that the UN might exert a rival claim or a rival 
control over the institutions of the US government.129   Although this is the most extreme form 
of institutional opposition, it is linked to earlier forms of institutional opposition by its defence 
of sovereignty in the face of international organisations.  
(iii) Pre-emptive institutional opposition and the role of organisation design 
This type of institutional opposition is explicit – it directly responds to the challenge of the 
ipsetic potential of human rights organisations.  There are however other international 
practices, to use the terminology of – , which are also can be read as acts of institutional 
opposition as they involve a pattern of state action based around limiting the future power of 
protection mandates.  One such example of this is ‘forum shopping’ where states deliberately 
choose organisations with weak protection mandates or place reservations on the operation 
of protection mandates.  Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the First Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR – the instrument allowing individual petitions to the HRC – after a politically 
controversial petition from an individual on death row reached the HRC, and then re-joined 
with reservations to prevent such appeals happening again.130 
In order to avoid the ipsetic potential of a protection mandate, some states have also engaged 
in pre-emptive institutional opposition, where they deliberately shape organisations to have a 
limited or ineffectual protection mandate. Andrew Guzman terms this the “Frankenstein 
problem”, arguing that fear of an organisation expanding its powers – becoming in effect a 
sovereignty-compromising “monster” – leads states to create organisations with deliberately 
weak enforcement powers or dispute resolution mechanisms designed to favour the state 
party.131 Pre-emptive institutional opposition can be explained with reference to the rational 
design theory of organisations outlined in this study’s introduction. States, whilst seeing the 
benefits of organisational membership, can often be risk averse to organisational procedures 
and the perceived future actions of the organisation and therefore may seek to design the 
organisation to reflect these concerns.132  
                                                          
129 John Worth, ‘Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the "Un-signing" of 
the 
Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker’ (2004) 79 Indiana Law Journal 245. 
130 Glenn McGrory, ‘Reservations of Virtue? Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago's Reservation to the First Optional 
Protocol’ (2001) 23 HRQ 769.  
131 Andrew Guzman, ‘International organizations and the Frankenstein problem’ (2013) 24 EJIL 999. 
132 Barbara Koremenos and Others The Rational Design of International Institutions in Barbra Koremenos, Charles 
Lipson and Duncan Snidal (eds.) The Rational Design of International (CUP 2004) 20-24 
49 | P a g e  
 
Pre-emptive institutional opposition is particularly common where states wish to appear to be 
human rights compliant, but want to avoid confronting an organisation with ipsetic potential. 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights is a case in point. The organisation has existed as a loose intergovernmental 
association since 1967 and was for many years committed to non-interference in sovereign 
affairs.133 In 1993, the organisation issued a statement calling for the creation of a regional 
human rights mechanism but this came a few months after the Bangkok Declaration, which 
affirmed ASEAN’s “respect for national sovereignty … and non-interference in the internal 
affairs” of states.134 These two declarations had the potential to be in severe tension with one 
another and for some years, the creation of a rights protection mechanism stalled. The 
organisation only had a legal framework that committed it to the creation of a human rights 
mechanism after the 2007 ASEAN Charter had been adopted.135 However, ASEAN were split 
between states such as Thailand and Malaysia, who argued that the proposed organisation 
should have powers to monitor and enforce human rights standards and states, such as 
Cambodia and Vietnam, who argued that the organisation should be advisory in nature. The 
latter group of states won the day and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) Terms of Reference stated that “non-interference in the internal affairs of 
ASEAN Member States” and “respect for the right(s)” of states were to be core principles of 
the organisation.136 This, as Tan Hsien Li argues, was a way of ensuring that the ASEAN way of 
“consultation and consensus” continued, even though it left the organisation without any 
operational protection mandate.137 This neuters any ipsetic potential that the AICHR could 
have had, and is an example of states pre-emptively engaging in what amounts to institutional 
opposition at the point of the organisations design and creation. 
(3) Anti-imperialism and institutional opposition: the symptoms of sovereign inequality 
The preceding two sections of this chapter identified how competing conceptions of 
sovereignty both cause a state to enter into a human rights organisation, and lead it to engage 
in direct institutional opposition when it exercises its protection mandate or pre-emptive 
institutional opposition to prevent it from gaining a protection mandate. This section examines 
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how the imperialism of international law – in particular, its creation of sovereign inequalities 
between postcolonial and formerly colonialist states – generated the specific form of anti-
imperialist institutional opposition. To understand what is meant by the imperialism of 
international law, it is important to return to the idea of residual imperialism – literally, the 
residue of colonial-imperialist patterns of power within the international law. International 
law’s creation was heavily influenced by the states that engaged in colonial imperialism and as 
BS Chimni notes this meant that new and old forms of imperialism found their home in 
international law.138 Chapter two examines how international human rights law can be utilised 
in the service of neo-imperialism. What is relevant for the examination of institutional 
opposition is how the residual imperialism of international law has created juridical 
inequalities between states, affecting institutional opposition from postcolonial states.  
It is first necessary to briefly outline how sovereignty itself is constructed by international law. 
International law, as a Sundhya Pahuja argues, “produces its own subjects as well as the 
objects of its rule” – meaning ideas such as universality and sovereignty were directly created 
by its structures.139 European conceptions of sovereignty underpinned the development of 
international law during the period of colonial-imperial expansion in the late eighteen and 
early nineteenth century.140 Whilst sovereignty may have come into existence as a political 
concept in Western Europe in the seventeenth century, its expansion and entrenchment into 
international law was interwoven with the process of colonial-imperialism.141 As Frédéric 
Mégret notes, colonialism was justified by the premise that “non-European political entities 
did not satisfy the demands of sovereignty” as it was understood in international law at the 
time, as the sovereign subjects of international law had been constructed with reference to 
the occidental narrative of what constituted a state.142 Even after decolonisation, sovereignty 
was still constructed and controlled by international law; as Antony Anghie notes, the League 
of Nations mandate system – which set up a system for managing the colonies of the defeated 
powers in World War One – constructed a new form of legal infrastructure to manage the 
creation of new states.143 The territorial shape of the postcolonial state, its institutions and its 
political foundations were often effectively constructed by formerly colonialist states during 
decolonisation the decolonisation process in the 1950s and 1960s; as Upendra Baxi noted, the 
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“logic of colonialism” was perpetuated in the postcolonial nation state.144  John Hobson links 
this directly to imperialism, arguing that the 19th century lawyers who first devised the concept 
of a “standard of civilisation” helped construct a distinctly hierarchical system of international 
relations, which still contains Eurocentric assumptions.145 However, he specifically notes that 
“Eurocentric institutionalism” has helped perpetuate many of the assumptions of international 
law from the colonial-imperial era.146 As Gerry Simpson concludes, international law functions 
as a form of “legal hegemony” which perpetuated a regime of unequal sovereigns after 
decolonisation.147  
The first part of this section will argue that the juridical inequality of postcolonial states 
explains the emergence of the Third World bloc as a mechanism for advancing the interests of 
postcolonial states against the imperialism of international law. Anti-imperialism – in part 
directed against the imperialism of international law – was the Third World bloc’s collective 
ideology, and unified postcolonial states as a voting bloc. This, as the second part of this 
section argues, led to a Third World bloc approach to human rights law that saw human rights 
as a tool for advancing decolonisation. Whilst understandable, given that colonial rule was a 
significant source of human rights abuses, this led the Third World bloc to argue that 
international human rights organisations’ protection mandates should not apply to states 
within the Third World bloc. The final part of this section shows how both sovereign 
inequalities and the Third World bloc’s collective approach to international human rights law 
were the presumptions behind anti-imperialist institutional opposition from the Third World 
bloc.  
(i) Sovereign inequality and the formation of the Third World bloc 
  
The way that postcolonial states were structured by international law had an effect on 
postcolonial states external sovereignty. Gaining recognition as a majority-ruled sovereign 
state – what Krasner terms international legal sovereignty – was what most colonial 
independence movements sought.148 Self-determination was already a recognised right within 
international law, but, as John Charvet and Elisa Kaczynska-Nay note, it was often framed in 
“ethno-cultural terms” and groups living under colonial rule were thought to be incapable of 
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governing themselves.149 Postcolonial states that had gained independence prior to the 1950s 
gained recognition as sovereign states from colonial powers because it was political expedient 
for them to do so, not because postcolonial states had a right to be recognised as sovereign. 
Anticolonial activists therefore sought to shape a non-racial interpretation of the right to self-
determination, and at the UN postcolonial states lobbied for the inclusion of a new, 
anticolonial definition of self-determination within international law. The first key legal 
instrument to recognise anti-colonial self-determination was the General Assembly Resolution 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960, which created an 
expectation of full and equal sovereignty for postcolonial states.150 The 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations Between States attempted to formalise the principle of equal sovereignty 
between states.151 Yet this was something of a juridical fiction, based on the position in 
customary international law that if a state had the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations 
they would attain parity with other states.152 Crucially, a postcolonial state’s membership of an 
international organisation did not make their sovereignty directly equivalent to the 
sovereignty of formerly colonialist states. There are three juridical inequalities in international 
law between formerly colonialist and postcolonial states that have led to their relative 
marginalisation in international organisations. 
Firstly, because customary international law emerged out of interactions between formerly 
colonialist states, it principally reflected their interests. The international law of treaties, 
William Coplin observes, has a history rooted within “sovereign prerogatives” as “statehood 
itself was defined in part as the ability to make treaties”, territories under colonial rule could 
not formulate treaties or participate in the shaping of the law of treaties.153 In Portugal v India, 
the ICJ held that a 18th century trading agreement between Portugal and the current Indian 
state of Marathas was not a treaty, but a manifestation of the “feudal authority” of Marathas 
state.154 Even after decolonisation, postcolonial states had to abide by the customary law of 
treaties, which were treated as codified into international law. As Anand describes it, Asian 
states had “lost their personality” during the colonial era and as a consequence “could not 
play an active role in the development of international law during the most creative period in 
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its history.”155 Singh also follows this line of argument noting how “the new family of nations” 
that international law aimed to construct largely excluded postcolonial states from 
participation.156 This was broadly true of the majority postcolonial states, which had had 
relatively little input into the creation of international law, but were expected to be bound by 
it following independence. Even though they possessed notional equality in lawmaking 
international law, functionally that equality operated within a framework where there were 
existing restrictions.157 
Secondly, international law had a role in creating many of the material inequalities 
experienced by postcolonial states. Paul Harrison and Peter Worsely have independently 
produced analysis demonstrating links between international law and the relative economic 
inequality of postcolonial states.158 This has deep roots in colonial-imperialism; as the political 
economies of colonial territories were geared towards the metropolitan centres of colonial 
empires, their relative development as national economies was often bizarrely stunted. This 
was particularly acute in Africa, where upon gaining independence some states did not even 
have telephone and railway lines connecting them to their immediate geographical 
neighbours.159 In their exhaustive study of the causes of state failure, Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson note that patterns of colonialism and the structure of the political economy of 
colonised territories had a direct impact on the economic prospects of postcolonial states.160 
Many of the economic interests that had profited from colonialism by running mines, railways 
and other commercial enterprises continued to do so after decolonisation, because of careful 
attempts by the owners of such enterprises to preserve their economic domination. As 
Sundhya Pahuja notes, formerly colonialist powers, using the mechanisms of international law, 
helped preserve these inequalities by protecting investors when initiatives aimed at enshrining 
the permanent sovereignty over their natural resources were brought before the UN General 
Assembly and the UN Conference on Trade and Development.161 Formerly colonialist states 
often resisted reforms aimed at overcoming the material inequalities experienced by 
postcolonial states, by refusing to support legal instruments proposed by the Third World bloc 
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and arguing that any international instrument to which they had not expressly consented 
could not legally bind them. However, as Anghie notes, postcolonial states were bound by 
international laws, to which they had never consented, such as the laws surrounding property 
rights and the ownership of natural resources, which impacted their material security.162 
Finally, and most importantly in the context of this study, the absence of postcolonial states 
from participation in the formation of international organisations meant that they emerged as 
reflections of the colonial-imperial international order. Prior to World War One, it made little 
sense to speak of the law of international organisations as a distinct branch of international 
law. Most international organisations were simply a reflection of their constituent treaties and 
aimed to preserve the peaceful coexistence between states in designated areas, such as the 
protection of a particular river or form of trade.163 It was only after the creation of the League 
of Nations in 1919 that there was a separate non-state legal personality in the international 
system. The League’s Charter permitted the existence of colonies “inhabited by peoples not 
yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” and set 
up a peer-review process for admission. 164 This effectively preserved the power of colonial 
empires, as they were the ‘peers’ charged with assessing whether an entity could enter the 
League and thus gain recognition as a sovereign state. As Mark Mazower argues, the British 
supported the formation of the League of Nations “as a way to ratify [the post WWI] territorial 
dispensation in Europe and safeguard their empire”, and 27 years later the US supported the 
UN’s creation to preserve “the Great Power understandings reached during the Second World 
War.”165 In particular, the Charter preserved the power of colonialist states by placing the 
Security Council, with its membership dominated by four imperialist powers, in a powerful 
position. The UN Charter acknowledged the existence of colonial empires, although did offer 
the relatively loose promise of eventual independence. This was an act of residual imperialism, 
which as the introductory chapter outlines, was the juridical preservation of imperialism in 
international law. As Mazower notes, the eventual goal of Articles 75 and 76 of the Charter, 
which defined the trusteeship system, was not “independence but something far weaker”.166 
Even when a postcolonial state gained independence, they entered the UN under the 
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membership criteria set by the formerly colonialist powers. Obtaining UN membership 
required “a decision of the General Assembly” and more importantly, a “recommendation of 
the Security Council”, which was dominated by formerly colonialist powers.167 Article 3 of the 
Charter explicitly references “original Members of the United Nations”, as distinct from new 
member states. Thus, on a plain reading of the UN Charter, UN membership continued to 
reflect colonial era inequalities. As W. E. B. Du Bois, the African-American activist and anti-
imperialist, observed in 1945, UN the Charter left “750,000,000 human beings outside the 
organization of humanity.”168 
Collectively, these inequalities placed postcolonial states’ membership of international 
organisations on an unequal footing with that of formerly colonialist states. The comparatively 
weak position of postcolonial states at the UN led to the emergence of the Third World bloc, 
which provided a mechanism for postcolonial states to project their own interests within 
international organisations. The term ‘Third World’ was first used in 1952 by Alfred Sauvy, the 
director of the Institute National d'Etudes Demographiques, and was later popularised by 
Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth.169 The precise meaning of the term has been the 
subject of fierce debate, as it has connotations of underdevelopment and inferiority, and can 
be used as a semiotic endorsement of Western supremacy.170 The term also has a political 
etymology, as postcolonial states voluntarily adopted it to describe a specific communal 
identity. It is used here, as it accurately captures the shared ideological objectives and political 
homogeneity of a large number of postcolonial states in the UN General Assembly and other 
international bodies.171 It gained currency as a political identity after the 1955 Bandung 
Conference. The final communiqué from the Bandung conference contained an early 
statement of Third World ideology when it condemned imperialism and called for the 
independence of territories living under colonial rule. At the conference, the Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that “Asia and Africa must play an increasing role in [the 
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UN’s] conduct and destiny”; the final communiqué called for postcolonial states’ admission to 
the UN and for an “equitable geographical distribution” of Security Council seats.172  
In the General Assembly, the Third World bloc came into being after the UN’s rapid expansion 
in the 1960s. On votes relating to independence from colonial rule and action against 
apartheid South Africa there was a strong level of cohesion between postcolonial states.173 
Other votes from the Third World bloc either followed regional lines or reflected common 
positions on issues such as economic development.174 What linked these different voting 
positions was anti-imperialism, which was a response to the relative marginalisation of 
postcolonial states within international law. As Darryl Thomas notes, Third World ideology 
attempted to challenge the “subservient roles” that postcolonial states had been given 
through “slavery, colonialism [and] dependency upon the Northwest”.175 Louis Althusser 
described ideology as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence” and resolutions supported by the Third World bloc gave an insight into the bloc’s 
shared ideology. 176   General Assembly resolutions, such as the Declaration for the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which aimed to eliminate sovereign 
debt, regulate international corporations and allow states sovereignty over their natural 
resources was an example of the Third World bloc attempting to develop international law to 
reflect their ideology.177  
By the late 1970s, a series of international developments – in particular the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war – had led to the emergence of a much clearer Third World consensus on a number of 
issues, which had spread beyond the General Assembly into other international 
organisations.178 During the 1980s, Third World solidarity over issues such as apartheid and 
the protection of each other’s sovereignty hardened still further.179 As Carlos Rangel noted, 
there were more similarities than differences between states in the Third World bloc, but their 
shared explanation of vulnerability and defensive approach to their own sovereignty unified 
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the group.180 The Third World bloc declined in the early 1990s, as the strategic logic of 
collective action in the General Assembly altered with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
realignment of US strategic priorities.181 After the Cold War, the patterns of bloc voting 
became less clear with only a few states, most notably Laos, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria taking 
consistent anti-Western stances.182 Yet the apparent demise of the Third World bloc did not 
mean that anti-imperial politics ceased, rather, its forms became subtler. The continuation of 
geographic blocs at the UN meant group or bloc voting was still a feature of international 
organisations, and African and Asian blocs continued to vote along the same lines on a number 
of human rights issues. Whilst not a seamless transition between both eras, there was a 
distinct continuity of anti-imperialism; which as Cedric Grant noted, both looked backward to 
past injustices, but also tried to create a common cause around equitable and just 
outcomes.183 
The Third World bloc was, at its core, united in resistance to the effect that international law 
had; both in collectively marginalising postcolonial states and in perpetuating the residual 
advantages of formerly-colonialist states undermining the legitimacy of international 
organisations in what Nathaniel Berman described as the “delegitimizing effects hypothesis”. 
184This, however, identifies the symptom, not the cause, of collective marginalisation. Much of 
the literature on the Third World bloc identifies wider macro-economic forces behind the 
intergroup cohesion. 185  International law’s generation of sovereign inequalities was 
responsible for many subsequent political and economic incidents of marginalisation. Equally, 
as Marc Williams argues, there should be some scepticism of the idea that the Third World 
bloc was solely driven by ideology.186 Rather the bloc sought to carve out a collective identity 
in organisations orientated towards continuing the relative power of formerly colonialist 
states.187 The relative marginalisation of postcolonial states by international law is evidenced 
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in the writings of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement. TWAIL, 
Pooja Parmar argued, intended to insert the “lives and struggles” of Third World peoples into 
international law.188 This view is echoed both by early scholars on the Third World; such A. A. 
Fatouros, who argued that international law needed to evolve to meet the needs of the Third 
World; and scholars such as Obiora Okafor, writing over 40 years later, who noted that Third 
World claims of marginalisation were often caused by international law.189 This has its 
ideological limitations, and arguably constrained TWAIL’s ability to advance a distinct alternate 
vision of international law.190 This was part of a wider problem facing the Third World 
movement; it was a political coalition formed in opposition to the imperialist structure of 
international law. This meant that its collective political ideology was often geared towards 
opposing the institutions and structures of international law because of their associations with 
colonial-imperialism. The next part of this section will assess how collective anti-imperialism 
led to a contradictory position on human rights, and then go on to analyse how anti-
imperialism shaped collective institutional opposition from the Third World bloc. 
(ii) Third World anti-imperialism and human rights  
It is difficult to unpick exactly what happened to the Third World bloc’s position on 
international human rights law. The Third World bloc initially focused their collective efforts 
on substantive reform of international human rights law to recognise anti-colonialist concerns. 
The Bandung Declaration stated that the conference supported human rights and at the 
conference several delegates spoke in favour of human rights and rights protection.191 The 
Third World bloc’s first major success in shaping international human rights law was the 
insertion of the right to self-determination into the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Self-determination 
was not mentioned in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). In fact, Article 
2 of the UDHR specifically envisaged the possibility of human rights being enjoyed within 
“trust, non-self-governing [territories] or under any other limitation of sovereignty”, implicitly 
endorsing the continuation of colonialism. 192  During the drafting of the human rights 
covenants in 1952, the Liberian delegate to the drafting committee argued that self-
determination needed to be included as it “was an essential right” that “stood above all other 
                                                          
188 Pooja Parmar, ‘TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 363, 365 
189 A A Fatouros, ‘International Law and the Third World’ (1964) 50 Virginia Law Review 783; Obiora Okafor, ‘Critical 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both’ (2008) 10 International and 
Community Law Review 371.  
190 BS Chimni, ‘The World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 International Community Law 
Review 3 
191 Bandung Communique (n. 161) para C1. 
192 Article 2 (7) Universal Declaration of Human Rights text <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml> 
accessed 21 September 2012. 
59 | P a g e  
 
rights.”193 The Saudi Arabian delegate argued that the “cry for freedom and liberation from the 
foreign yoke in many parts of the world” meant that the right to self-determination should be 
considered the “first right”.194 Statements such as these seemed to indicate that the right to 
self-determination was conceived as an interdependent right and would form the basis of 
subsequent human rights protection.  
Another critical early success of the Third World bloc was the rapid advancement of anti-racist 
measures, which culminated in the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD). The 1963 General Assembly Resolution on ‘the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination’ built on the resolution, granting independence to peoples living under 
colonial rule by tackling the underlying racial discrimination of colonialism, and was strongly 
supported by states from the Third World bloc.195 The speed at which CERD entered into force 
– it took less than four years for enough states to sign up for it to come into force – was 
indicative of the concerted campaign run by the Third World bloc to ratify the treaty.196 The 
CERD specifically referenced apartheid, but not other forms of racism, such as anti-Semitism. 
When the campaign against apartheid began in the 1950s, it focused on apartheid as an abuse 
of basic human rights. For example in 1952 and in 1954 the General Assembly condemned 
apartheid as a form of racial discrimination that was contrary to the “higher interests of 
humanity”, and authorised the creation of an expert commission to investigate apartheid.197 
Until well into the 1960s, when the Third World bloc was actively pushing anti-apartheid 
resolutions in the General Assembly, apartheid was framed in terms of a systemic human 
rights abuse. This was a clear example of the Third World bloc’s willingness to use 
international human rights law to advance their priorities. 
Human rights were clearly important for some of the leaders of anti-colonial independence 
movements. The Bandung Declaration supported “the fundamental principles of Human 
Rights” and noted that self-determination was “a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all 
fundamental Human Rights.”198 In a 1959 speech, Julius Nyrere said that independence was a 
fight “for our rights as human beings”, and that it was ludicrous to think that after 
independence Tanzanians were going to turn around and say “to hell with all this nonsense 
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about human rights”.199 The broader problem came with the institutionalisation of human 
rights in organisations with protection mandates. As Roland Burke observes, before and after 
the Bandung conference, representatives from Third World governments displayed little 
awareness of the “potential antagonism between rights and sovereignty.” 200  The 
strengthening of human rights at the UN, something that had been implicitly advocated in the 
Bandung Declaration, would lead to the creation of institutions with a wide-ranging focus and 
the potential to apply their powers to all states, not just formerly colonialist states.  
The conceptual relationship between the right to self-determination and the protection of 
human rights was unclear. When undertaking a closer examination of the decolonisation 
process, Jan Eckel argues that the “language” of human rights was “marginal”, which he 
argues reflected Third World state’s “commitment to universal norms as appropriate for their 
specific anticolonial policies.”201 Initially, when postcolonial states applied for UN membership 
– which was usually the first international act they engaged in after becoming independent – 
much was made of the importance of self-determination, democracy and the protection of 
human rights in the discussion of their membership credentials. As Duxbury notes, however, 
UN membership soon became automatic for postcolonial states as soon as they gained 
independence, under UN General Assembly Resolution 1514. This signalled the start of the 
permutation of the right to self-determination from one of many human rights, to being a 
distinctly anticolonial right independent from other rights.202 Writing in 1962 on the voting 
patterns of African states at the UN, John Spencer observed that many states had “crossed the 
divide” from the dynamics of “self-determination”, which focused on fighting oppression; to 
the preservation of the “status” of the postcolonial state.203 By the end of the 1960s, the right 
to self-determination had been detached from other rights, becoming what Burke described 
as “a one-sided anti-colonial weapon.”204 Samuel Moyn goes further, arguing that anti-
colonialism does not really ‘fit’ into the “historiography of human rights” as the right to self-
determination that was sought by anti-colonialist leaders, whilst a collective right, was not 
necessarily interdependent with other human rights or external rights protection.205 Self-
determination in Third World ideology is best understood as a remedial right against foreign 
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colonialism. As Karen Knop explains, “just as private law requires the restoration of wrongfully 
taken property”, the right to self-determination restored “territory to the rightful owner.”206  
Crucially absent in this version of self-determination is any meaningful appreciation of the 
individual citizens of the state. As Joyce notes, a flaw of colonial independence movements 
was that they rarely conceived of anything other than the national self and the nation state.207 
This understanding of self-determination helps explain one of the puzzles of postcolonial 
statehood identified by Dunstan Wai, who noted in 1980 that “during the heyday of anti-
colonialism and decolonisation the founding fathers of African nationalism emphasised their 
faith in fundamental human rights.” 208 Yet Wai notes that after independence, many African 
states showed a “clear disrespect for human rights”.209 Self-determination was the end of 
human rights concerns for many anti-colonial leaders, as human rights existed to combat the 
evils of colonialism, not to offer wider protection for the citizens in their state.210 Once the 
right to self-determination was decoupled from the protection of human rights more 
generally, international human rights organisations that exercised their protection mandate 
over a postcolonial state could be criticised for undermining self-determination – and from 
there it was relatively easy to conclude that international organisations were attempting a 
form of imperialist dominance over postcolonial states. 
What crucially changed was that after decolonisation, the Third World bloc became 
ideologically hostile to the idea that sovereignty could be subject to international 
organisations. This was coupled with the internal fracturing of the Third World bloc, as the 
post-independence political trajectories of its constituent states began to radically diverge. 
The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) saw the emergence of a more 
extreme form of anti-colonialism, specifically directed against apartheid and white minority 
rule; which differed considerably from the anti-colonialism of Asian states, which focused 
more upon political positioning in international organisations rather than direct anti-colonial 
action. In its first year of operation, the OAU considered launching wars of colonial liberation 
across Africa and some governments openly discussed an invasion of South Africa.211 Growing 
tensions between Asian states – most notably between Malaysia and Indonesia – and the crisis 
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over East Pakistan in the early 1970s led to a breakdown in relations among some of the key 
states in the Third World bloc.212 What continued to provide ideological cohesion between the 
bloc was anti-imperialist resistance to the perceived power of formerly colonialist states at the 
UN. This was apparent in issues relating to the protection of human rights. David Kay noted in 
1967 that for the Third World bloc the UN’s human rights policy had become “but another 
vehicle for advancing their attack on colonialism.”213 Mark Berger goes further, arguing that 
from the late 1960s onwards, the common consensus over the condemnation of all 
“manifestations of colonialism” drove the Third World bloc’s commitments on human 
rights.214 By the beginning of the 1970s anti-apartheid resolutions, reflecting this began to 
refer to apartheid less in terms of a human rights abuse and more in terms of a neo-colonial 
injustice; by 1978 only a third of anti-apartheid General Assembly resolutions contained a 
reference to human rights or human rights law.  
Perceiving the existence of a unified Western power structure operating against postcolonial 
states and peoples was an essential feature of postcolonialism’s intellectual project. As Cheryl 
McEwan argues, what unified a diverse intellectual movement was postcolonialism’s reference 
to a common “commitment to challenging [the] cultural hegemony” of the former colonial 
powers.215 This meant that what unified postcolonial politics was its challenge to the existing 
Western dominated structures of power. As Mahmoud Hussein argued, this meant that when 
it came to human rights postcolonial states contrasted “their identity to that of others, by 
rejecting, helter-skelter, everything they saw as being essentially Western.”216 Many advocates 
of universal rights have noted that conceptions and traditions of rights exist in many different 
societies and that these underpin human rights instruments. 217  Whilst an interesting 
proposition about the theoretical underpinnings of human rights (of which there is more 
discussion in the next chapter); when postcolonial states acted in international organisations, 
universal rights were attacked as being part of a Western legal hegemony, which in other 
areas was responsible for the marginalisation of states, as described in the first part of this 
section. Apart from a common desire to pursue decolonisation, the one thing uniting 
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postcolonial states within international organisations was their shared marginalisation by the 
structures of international law. This exacerbated standard patterns of institutional opposition 
and, as the next part of this section argues, led to the Third World bloc situating international 
organisations as a collective imperial other, which they had to guard against. 
(iii) Anti-Imperialist Institutional opposition  
Anti-imperialist institutional opposition was an extreme form of institutional opposition built 
upon two assumptions: firstly that the juridical weaknesses of postcolonial states meant that 
their sovereignty was exceptionally vulnerable. Secondly, there was a common ideological 
sentiment between states in the Third World bloc that human rights were designed to remedy 
aspects of colonialism in international law, not protect the rights of individuals within states. 
There is no reason that human rights can’t fulfill both objectives – the grant of self-
determination both protected individuals’ democratic rights and remedied aspects of colonial-
imperialism – but the Third World bloc’s anti-imperialist institutional opposition maintained 
that the two things were mutually exclusive. As such, they implicitly, and in some cases 
explicitly, maintained that international human rights law should be concerned with attacking 
colonialism. The following are illustrations of four major ways that anti-imperialist institutional 
opposition manifested itself. 
 
Firstly, there was the general reluctance displayed by many states to following institutional 
procedures for assessing human rights compliance, which was framed as a consequence of 
inequality or underdevelopment on the part of Third World states. The majority of states that 
had late or delayed reports were from the Third World bloc, and as Ann Bayefsky noted in her 
1994 study of state reporting, Africa was the region with the most overdue reports.218 In 2010, 
the HRC singled out the Gambia and Equatorial Guinea for delaying reporting for over 20 
years, and over half of the states that it identified as having delayed reports for over five years 
or more were states from the African and Asian bloc’s.219 This even spread outside the 
reporting procedure. Sarah Joseph noted this in her study of HRC’s emergency procedures; 
Sudan, Zaire and Angola were particularly unresponsive to the HRC, and refused to cooperate 
with it when it was concerned about mass human rights abuses taking place in their 
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jurisdiction.220 Farrokh Jhabvala notes that the HRC did not seriously consider the socio-
economic conditions of many states and how this may impact their ability to protect civil and 
political rights, a problem exacerbated by the separation between the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR.221 A similar point was raised by Angola when the HRC found in Marques v. Angola  that 
their defamation laws violated the ICCPR. The Angolan government did not respond to the 
decision and in the words of the HRC “failed to address the violations ... [or] acknowledge the 
Committee’s findings.”222 When asked by a special rapporteur about their failure to respond, a 
representative from the Angolan government said that they had “limited capacity” to deal 
with the human rights concerns raised by their citizens.223 It is difficult to disentangle 
potentially justified claims of sovereign inequality from Third World states from a wider 
culture of opposition to any human rights organisation. However, as Bayefsky notes, the 
majority of the states that resisted reporting to treaty review bodies were serial human rights 
abusers and had little problem committing economic resources towards repression in their 
own jurisdiction.224 Whilst this is a somewhat cynical comment, it is a response to what was 
often a somewhat cynical argument advanced by states – such as Zaire and Angola – as a 
means of evading their obligations, rather than requesting assistance to improve their human 
rights capacity. 
Secondly, there was an increased hostility towards mechanisms that would encourage 
individual petition, which fused concerns about the ipsetic power of organizations with anti-
colonialism. Delegates from Ghana, Nigeria and the Philippines led Third World bloc support 
for the formation of a Committee on Racial Discrimination with a right to individual petition, 
and there was a broad agreement on the principle of allowing individual petitions in relation to 
abuses. This did not, however, equate to support for an individual petition mechanism for the 
ICCPR.225 Some delegates from the Third World, such as George Lamptey (the Ghanaian 
diplomat), supported the creation of an individual petition and attacked states – such as 
Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates – who, in Burke’s words, “sought to limit the right to 
petition to colonial territories” and allow it nowhere else.226 As the Tanzanian government’s 
representative indicated to the ICCPR’s drafting committee, whilst “newly independent 
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Countries had to ensure respect for the rights of the individual”, their principal concern was 
“above all was the security of the state” which was defined as protection from outside, or neo-
colonial interests.227 This also led to opposition to the creation of new mechanisms for 
protecting human rights. In 1977, Patrick Flood noted that Third World bloc states opposed the 
creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights, after Soviet countries lobbied them 
“[playing] on … sensitivities concerning their colonial past [in order] to portray the High 
Commissioner proposal as neo-colonial Trojan Horse.”228 This demonstrated that a wider fear 
of neo-colonialism could also serve as a rallying point for the Third World bloc against 
protection mandates of any kind. This attitude persisted and in the 1980s, Manfred Nowak 
noted that despite the growing international consensus over the prevention of torture many 
states from the Third World bloc actively opposed the Committee Against Torture.229 
Thirdly, pre-emptive anti-imperialist institutional opposition helped form regional 
organisations that were distinctly anti-colonialist but lacked effective protection mandates. The 
Arab League’s 2008 Arab Charter on Human Rights (the Charter) is an interesting example of 
anti-imperialist pre-emptive opposition. Early attempts by the Arab League to draft a human 
rights charter were driven by anti-colonialism and solidarity with Palestinian refugees; this was 
often the only area of agreement on human rights issues at Arab League summits.230 The 2008 
Charter references the importance of “self-determination” and singles out “foreign occupation 
and domination” as a force that needs to be condemned and resisted.231 It is also the only 
human rights instrument to translate these obligations into a positive provision in Article 2(4), 
which states, “all peoples have the right to resist foreign occupation”.232 Yet, as Mervat 
Rishmawi observes, the Charter contains numerous constraints on the “effective access to 
justice for victims”.233 The Charter contains several provisions to allow states to derogate or 
suspend rights, open-ended restrictions on the limitations of rights and other provisions all 
designed to create a seemingly wide margin of appreciation for state parties. When, in 2014, 
the Arab League announced that they had secured agreement on the creation of an Arab Court 
of Human Rights, human rights activists from Arab states dismissed it as a paper court as it 
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would only allow inter-state actions, not a right of individual petition.234 Implicit within the 
Arab Charter is the assumption that colonialism is the principle cause of human rights abuses, 
and the sovereignty of the state over its citizens needs to be safeguarded. 
Fourthly, institutional opposition from the Third World bloc was often characterised by a 
collective solidarity within the bloc, which protected individual postcolonial states from an 
organisation operating its protection mandate over individual Third World states. This could 
appear in a number of different guises. Firstly, it involved attacking external enemies as 
imperialists to deflect attention from states within the Third World bloc. The separation of 
human rights from the anti-apartheid campaign led to the association in 1974 of Zionism and 
apartheid in a General Assembly resolution on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination.235 In its purest form, Zionism could be racist, but the direction of the resolution 
associating the two was aimed at attacking Israel. During the First World Conference on 
Racism in 1978, this had morphed into a general anti-Israeli position. In 2001, at the Second 
World Conference on Racism in Durban, the Third World bloc blocked consideration of racist 
practices within postcolonial states and the discussion centred on Israel’s racist polices; whilst 
ignoring the racism that was taking place in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe.236 The second form of collective solidarity involved attacking international law 
more directly. When Arab states were criticised for filing excessive reservations to the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women, including reservations 
that would effective emasculate its review body, Belinda Clark noted that “the issue was 
portrayed... as an attack on Third World countries by Western countries” which led many 
states from the Third World bloc to rally to the support of Arab states.237 
Conclusion  
Institutional opposition is a by-product of a tension within the post-1945 sovereignty. On the 
one hand, in order to maintain legitimate external sovereignty it is important to respect 
human rights and join international legal regimes demonstrating that commitment. As Jürgen 
Habermas argues, respect for human rights is an important mechanism for a state to claim 
that both their citizens and other actors ought to recognise their claim to sovereignty and 
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respect their law-making capacity as a sovereign.238 However, domestic sovereignty, since at 
least the seventeenth century, has been defined in positivistic terms, by the capacity of a 
government to be the legitimate and sole lawmaker over a defined territory.239 International 
human rights organisations, due to the legal structure of their protection mandates and the 
wider political context of their operation, can become a competing or rival sovereign as they 
are able to make an authoritative claim as to what the law of a state ought to be. As the 
second section of this chapter argued, this can be described as an ipsetic potential, as it 
describes how an organisation’s protection mandate cumulatively gives the organisation a 
self-hood that allows it to make a legitimate claim to sovereign authority in the area of human 
rights protection. This creates institutional opposition, as the state attempts to symbolically 
reassert their sovereign power. This is inevitable, and does not necessarily pose a threat to an 
international organisation, but more extreme forms of institutional opposition pose a 
definitive threat to international organisations’ capacities to protect human rights. A good 
example of this is pre-emptive institutional opposition, where states create organisations 
without effective protection mandates; so that they can externally appear concerned with 
human rights protection, whilst in actuality not being subject to a protection mandate.  
As the third and final section of this Chapter sets out, the juridical inequalities between the 
sovereignty of postcolonial states and formerly colonialist states meant that collective 
institutional opposition from the Third World bloc was underpinned by anti-imperialism. Anti-
imperialist institutional opposition broadly maintained that human rights organisations posed 
a threat to the sovereignty of postcolonial states (because of juridical inequalities), and that 
formerly colonialist states were the source of human rights abuses and therefore the 
appropriate subject for the attention of a human rights organisation’s protection mandate. 
The persistence of anti-imperialist institutional opposition at the regional level, which will be 
examined further in chapter four with an analysis of the African Human Rights system, seems 
to indicate that it is not just the colonial-imperial context of international law that generates 
anti-imperialist institutional opposition. The core factor behind anti-imperialist opposition, 
chapters three and four demonstrate, is the presence of protection mandates. What the final 
chapter of this study argues is that protection mandates are in and of themselves inherently 
imperialist, which explains why organisations that operate outside of the colonial-imperial 
context of international law will still face anti-imperialist opposition. The next chapter 
examines ideological opposition, and considers the potential for international human rights 
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law to be decolonised. Whilst it is possible to decolonise international human rights law, as the 
next chapter argues, it is not possible to decolonise the protection of international human 
rights by an organisation which, as chapter five argues, is inherently imperialist.  
 
 
 
 
69 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Ideological opposition and anti-imperialism 
 
Introduction  
 
Institutional opposition, which was described in chapter one, is opposition that responds to 
an organisation’s protection mandate. A protection mandate collectively describes the legal 
powers an organisation has to enforce international human rights law, which allow the 
organisation to assert sovereign competences in the area of human rights protection. This is 
an ipsetic potential, as it describes the capacity of an organisation to make a claim as to what 
the law in a particular state ought to be. All states engage in some degree of institutional 
opposition as a reaction to the ipseitic potential of an organisation’s protection mandate. 
Due to the sovereign inequalities between formerly colonialist states and postcolonial states, 
collective opposition from postcolonial states in the Third World bloc was underpinned by 
anti-imperialism. As the introductory chapter outlined, imperialism is best understood as a 
relation of dominance that intentionally subordinates sovereignty to an external power and 
therefore anti-imperialism describes the actions of states, groups and individuals resisting 
this dominance. Ideological opposition is different: it is opposition (state non-compliance, a 
political campaign against the organisations protection mandate or outright attacks on a 
human rights instrument) based upon a specific philosophical objection to the international 
human rights law applied and enforced by a supranational human rights organisation. 
 
International human rights law refers collectively to the major international human rights 
treaties, some of which have been codified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). These include the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
- collectively known as the International Human Rights Bill.1 Whilst states living under 
colonial rule only had a minimal involvement in the UDHR’s creation, many had considerable 
involvement in the creation of subsequent human rights treaties.2 Some of these treaties, 
most notably the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), were the direct product of Third World campaigns on international 
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law reform. 3  However, one important development, which occurred before many 
postcolonial states became independent, was the separation of the two human rights 
covenants. Economic and social rights were confined to the much weaker legal framework of 
the ICESCR, which only required states to "progressively” realise economic and social rights, 
rather than prevent violations of rights.4 This was at the specific instigation of the US and 
was the first move in a much wider campaign to divorce material concerns from 
international human rights law.5 By the late 1970s, the vast majority of post-colonial states 
were members of the UN, and were able to actively participate in the formation and drafting 
of agreements, such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 1984 Convention against Torture (CAT). In 
total, international human rights law consists of nine treaties, and alongside these treaties, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), which enables the prosecution of systematised human 
rights abuses in the form of crimes against humanity.6    
 
These treaties oblige signatory states to follow their terms as a matter of international treaty 
law. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the treaty review body of the ICCPR, has 
interpreted this as meaning that all levels of government are bound by the terms of a human 
rights treaty and are required to make “such changes to domestic laws and practices as are 
necessary” to comply with the ICCPR.7 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner note human rights 
treaties rarely have any independent effect on the behaviour of countries as they tend to 
align with internal domestic political norms.8 Human rights enforcement can also utilise UN 
structures or jus cogens norms The UN Charter requires member states to work towards 
promoting “universal respect for and observance of, human rights”.9 However, organs of the 
UN – such as the Security Council – were dominated by formerly colonialist states, which 
added to the perception that the enforcement of international human rights law by the UN 
was an attempt by former colonialist states to mask an imperialist power grab. 
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Jus cogens are the principles of international law, which, as the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) held in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, are “binding on states, even 
without any conventional obligation.”10 There are some rights – in particular the prohibition 
on slavery, torture and discrimination – that international courts have considered jus cogens 
because of the history and tradition of international legal practice.11 This implicitly referred 
to a colonial history and tradition of international law. Regardless of the importance of jus 
cogens, their creation occurred in an international environment where there were no 
postcolonial states. World War II and the Holocaust led to a cultural sense of guilt, which was 
located in the experience of European states and Western powers. As many jus cogens 
norms emerged from this experience, the process of norm creation located human rights 
within a European experience.12  There was some evidence of Euro-centrism in early 
international human rights law. For example, Article 30 of the UDHR – a rights abuse clause, 
designed to prevent totalitarian political groups gaining political power – reflected concerns 
that were chiefly European, and it was included in the ICCPR because European states 
argued for its inclusion during the drafting process.13 A distinct concern of postcolonial 
states, which was not adequately protected in international human rights law, was 
protection for the material conditions of states. Given the systemic underdevelopment of 
many postcolonial states and the role colonial–imperialism played in generating 
underdevelopment, this could be seen as evidence of international human rights law’s 
imperialism. 
Anti-imperialist ideological opposition emerged as a reaction to the imperialist context 
within which international human rights law emerged and was used. The introductory 
chapter noted the distinction between imperial context and inherent imperialism. 
International human rights law was contextually imperialist because of its origins and 
application, but this context did not preclude its potential decolonisation. Walter Mignolo 
defines decolonialism as a way of thinking that “delinks from the chronologies” of existing 
modes of thought, and tries to find a “common ground or vision of the future.”14 Ramón 
Grosfoguel argues that decolonial epistemology would challenge the “coloniality of 
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power/knowledge”, by seeing the global system from the subaltern perspective and 
reshaping the international order accordingly. 15  Anti-imperialist ideological opposition 
sometimes pursued a decolonial project; as states from the Third World bloc sought to 
advance a radical project in areas such as economic development and the protection of 
culture, that aimed to reprioritise the substance of international human rights law. As will be 
shown towards the end of this chapter, anti-imperialist ideological opposition also involved 
states making claims that any form of international human rights law was either part of a 
wider imperialist hegemony or incommensurable with their own cultures. These arguments 
were used in international organisations as a mechanism to deflect scrutiny of the human 
rights records of some states, or to justify human rights abuses. This was far from a 
decolonial approach to human rights, and as Grosfoguel notes, the decolonial is “critical of 
both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms”.16 Mignolo also picks up this theme, 
arguing that the problem with existing forms of de-westernisation or anti-colonial politics 
was their failure to “question the ‘civilization of death’ hidden under the rhetoric of 
modernization”.17 What this chapter does is give an overview of anti-imperialist ideological 
opposition, and demonstrate that whilst it is possible to decolonise international human 
rights law and address the imperialist context of its formation, the protection of 
international human rights by organisations remains imperialistic.  
This chapter defines ideological opposition and then outlines the different ways in which 
international human rights law can be considered imperialist, and shows how this influenced 
anti-imperialist ideological opposition. The first section of this chapter analyses the nature of 
ideological opposition, by assessing the dominant ideology of international human rights and 
why states having divergent philosophical views about the substance of human rights and 
what they should protect leads to opposition. The ideology of international human rights law 
is different from the way that international human rights law can be used in service of an 
ideology. These two different definitions of ideology provide the framework for the second 
section, which analyses why international human rights law can be considered imperialist. 
International law originated in the era of colonial-imperialism, and the subsequent 
construction of international human rights law at the UN was dominated by formerly 
colonialist states, which meant that its content reflected an imperialist ideology. When the 
idea of universal human rights was used to justify acts of neo-imperialism, such as the policy 
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of humanitarian intervention, this toxified the idea of human rights and subsequently shaped 
attitudes towards international human rights law. In the final section of this chapter, the 
three main strands of anti-imperialist ideological opposition from the Third World bloc – 
developmentalism, anti-hegemonic opposition and defensive relativism – are analysed, and 
are each illustrated by reference to a specific case study focusing on an organisation or type 
of right. These were a reaction to the imperial ontology of international law; they were 
driven by the apparent imperialism of human rights law, but also made claims to reprioritise 
the substance of international human rights law. However, in practice the principal concern 
behind these strands of opposition was not the re-prioritisation of the content of 
international human rights law, but protection of the sovereignty of the postcolonial state 
from human rights organisations.  
As subsequent chapters demonstrate, anti-imperialist opposition to human rights 
organisations was minimally ideological and more concerned with protecting postcolonial 
states’ sovereignty. Chapter three, through an analysis of opposition from the Third World 
bloc at the UN Commission on Human Rights, shows how campaigns for the reprioritisation 
of international human rights law played a relatively minor role in the Third World bloc’s 
anti-imperialist opposition, and defending sovereignty was a much greater priority. As 
chapter four argues, the Third World campaigns for the ideological reprioritisation of human 
rights law described in this chapter shaped the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, 
which was a genuinely decolonial human rights instrument. However, it had an enforcement 
mechanism that triggered pre-emptive anti-imperialist opposition. The core thesis of this 
study is that anti-imperialist opposition persisted against institutions created by postcolonial 
states outside of the colonial-imperial frameworks of international law because the legal 
structure of a protection mandate is inherently imperialist. It envisages the creation of a 
‘human rights violating state’, which is necessary to justify its ipseitic potential, and 
replicates the process used by colonial-imperialism. As outlined in section two of this 
chapter, and developed further in chapter five, colonial-imperialism created an alterity, or 
other, in order to define the values of civilisation. In a similar manner, the legal structure of a 
protection mandate, chapter five argues, creates the categories of human rights violating 
and human rights compliant states. This pressures states into compliance with human rights 
organisations, because, as outlined in the previous chapter, adherence to international 
human rights law is a mechanism for a state to demonstrate that it conforms to the ‘global 
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script of legitimacy’.18 The persistence of anti-imperialist opposition highlights how it is 
difficult to separate supranational protection of human rights from imperialism; whilst it is 
possible to decolonise international human rights law, it is not clear that the protection of 
human rights can be decolonised. 
(1) What is ideological opposition? 
Ideological opposition occurs because the foundations and content of human rights are 
politically contested, and are rooted in particularist traditions; subsequent promotion and 
enforcement of human rights by international organisations is therefore open to challenge 
on the basis that they represent a particular ideology. “The modern language of rights”, John 
Finnes notes, has created a “potentially precise instrument for sorting out and expressing 
what one perceives to be the demands of justice.”19 The normative foundations and subject 
matter of these instruments are open to contestation, as international human rights law has 
developed instruments aiming towards increasingly precise conceptions of justice in a world 
of competing traditions of justice. The conflict between different notions of justice is not just 
an abstract conflict, Jospeh Raz argues; as “human rights are there to be enforced”, they 
explicitly require international human rights organisations to “acknowledge the soundness or 
condemn the unreasonableness or immorality” of particular laws and practices in states by 
reference to human rights law.20 This process involves making a set of ideological choices 
about which rights to protect and enforce that, as Jean Luc-Nancy notes, is itself a form of 
“latent” ideology.21 The legal structure of a human rights instrument, by including some 
rights and excluding others, envisages a limit for human autonomy and human choices, 
giving international human rights law a distinctly ideological dimension. 
There are two important distinctions between ideological opposition and institutional 
opposition discussed in the last chapter. Firstly, ideological opposition is not a reaction to 
organisational power, or necessarily a defence of state sovereignty. It is perfectly possible for 
a state to accept a human rights organisation’s capacity to override their sovereign authority 
while still entertaining fundamental disagreements over the rights that the organisation in 
question is protecting. Secondly, whilst the discussion of ideological opposition often focuses 
on a west versus non-west conflict, it is a mistake to assume this is the only dimension of 
ideological conflict. The fact that there are more instances of ideological opposition coming 
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from states in the Third World bloc (latter the Afro–Asian bloc) reflects the dominant 
ideology of international law, which was rooted in colonial-imperialism. It is not evidence 
that ideological opposition is the sole purview of postcolonial states. Both postcolonial and 
formerly colonialist states can have ideological disagreements with the content of 
international human rights law and oppose human rights organisations on this basis. Equally, 
both sets of states can find areas of common ideological agreement in international human 
rights law.22 
To understand ideological opposition, it is first necessary to understand that membership of 
a human rights organisation does not indicate an agreement with the entire content of 
international human rights law. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ acculturation theory 
maintains that states agree to be bound by and comply with international human rights law 
not because they agree with its content, but because they are socialised through relations 
with other states into compliant behaviour.23 Acculturation, Goodman and Jinks argue, 
should be differentiated from persuasion, which involves “assessment of the content” of the 
human rights message, as acculturation occurs “not as a result of the content of the relevant 
rule or norm but rather as a function of social construction.”24 As Goodman and Jinks have 
noted elsewhere, there are several empirical studies supporting the growth of 
acculturation.25 One of the most significant is Kathryn Sikkink’s analysis of socialisation 
among emerging democracies in Latin America in the early 1990s. Sikkink’s analysis 
emphasises the role the Inter-American Human Rights Commission played in working with 
other social actors to assist democratic transitions in countries such as Argentina.26 This is 
similar to ideational theories of international human rights law, which maintain that states 
commit to international human rights treaties as a means of positioning themselves 
alongside other states.27  
Under the acculturation model, when a state signs up to a human rights treaty that makes 
them a member of a human rights organisation, this can reflect a genuine agreement over 
the protection of some rights. However, it can also represent a pragmatic acceptance, a 
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reluctant compliance or outward acquiescence (but inward non-compliance) on the part of 
that state. Equally, acculturation does not eliminate domestic particularities; as Anthony 
Langlois observes, the consensus behind international human rights law exists “at the level 
of international politics” and is “neither derived from nor easily transposable” onto the 
ethical traditions that exist “’below’ the international regimes of human rights.”28 This 
needn’t be too problematic when it comes to organisational membership, because, as Neil 
Walker argues, different parties “who invest in the language and institutions of universal 
human rights [can] come to find common justificatory ground and influence the shared or 
overlapping meaning attached to human rights.” 29  Yet this assumes a reasonably 
symmetrical bargaining process within organisations, and does not acknowledge that the 
language of universal rights, by virtue of its ontological basis in the European enlightenment, 
is to an extent socially contingent. As Costas Douzinas notes, rights are the basic “building 
bloc of Western law” and can preclude claims or demands from certain groups.30 This often 
makes the language and institutions of international human rights law an imperfect tool for 
balancing different states’ competing claims about justice. Thus, membership of a human 
rights organisation is not the end, but often the beginning, of debates about the content and 
foundations of human rights. Ideological opposition is triggered when states believe their 
own ideological position about the content of human rights is not being recognised or 
registered by an organisation and therefore, through a process of opposition, they present 
their own ideological version of what international human rights law ought to protect. 
As many instances of ideological opposition are either directed at the Western ideological 
features of human rights or its position as an ideology with existing power structures, it is 
easy to ignore two crucial features pertaining to the structure of human rights law that 
generate ideological opposition. Firstly, the content of international human rights law – 
which human activities, needs or desires are protected and codified as rights – is a political 
question. As Michael Perry argues, an “international human rights document represents a 
particular view” of what “it is right or wrong to do or not to do”, but the criteria by which 
“right” or “wrong” are established in a human rights instrument has to be subject to some 
form of agreement.31 Claiming rights are “fundamental”, as both the preambles of the UDHR 
and ICCPR do, does not resolve the question of which rights are fundamental. Theodore 
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Meron notes in his analysis of ICJ judgements involving human rights that whilst for some 
“due process rights are fundamental and indispensible”, for others the right to food would 
take precedence.32 Meron goes onto note that the ICJ’s jurisprudence suggests that “a 
fundamental right must be firmly rooted international law”, and that “claims or goals” would 
not qualify for recognition as fundamental rights or as a Jus Cogens principle. Therefore, 
some rights would have to be designated universal, whereas others would not. As Wade 
Mansell and Karen Openshaw conclude, human rights can “never be a politically neutral 
concept”, and arguments about the content of human rights are often subject to the 
“economic interests and ideology” of those “making or rejecting demands in connection with 
such rights.”33 
The politics surrounding the US’ ratification of the ICESCR illustrates the way competing 
ideologies about what rights are affect international human rights law. Although President 
Franklin Roosevelt had used the language of rights to highlight the importance of economic 
and social security in the 1940s, the US was influential in the separation of the two human 
rights covenants (see below), and by the 1970s there was active hostility from the US to the 
concept of economic and social rights. Whitehouse documents from the 1970s show officials 
insisting that “pet projects” must not be named human rights and that human rights should 
be kept “to mean human rights” – shorthand for a limited conception of civil and political 
rights.34 Later documents contained instructions that the US government needed to move to 
“another label for economic and social progress” that did not involve the term rights.35 At 
hearings of the US Senate on ratifying the ICESCR, economic conservatives, reflecting the 
dominant ideological trend in US politics, argued that economic and social rights were 
antithetical to the free market. In 1988, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of the 
Reagan administration argued that it was a “myth” that economic and social rights were in 
fact human rights.36 These remarks came less than a year after the establishment of the 
Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ICESCR’s treaty body, and were 
indicative of wider US ideological opposition to using international human rights law to 
protect material conditions. 
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Secondly, the universality of international human rights law is open to the criticism that it is a 
series of practices grounded in a particular culture that have been exported universally, and 
as a consequence lacks a truly universal epistemological grounding. To some extent, this is 
inevitable; as Peter Fitzpatrick argues, the universal does not exist in abstract, and the rights 
that are claimed as universal necessarily “correspond to some particular practice 
somewhere.”37 In a similar vein, Judith Butler argues that claims of universality are bound by 
“various synaptic stagings with culture”, which make it impossible to separate features of 
any one given culture from a universalist claim.38 Much attention has been given to common 
conceptions of dignity that intersect different cultures; some, such as Alison Renteln, have 
argued that “empirical research” should be undertaken to “validate universal moral 
standards” as a basis for human rights.39 This is not the project of epistemic universalists, 
who attempt to identify what Charles Bietz terms the “nonparochial core” of human rights, 
and identify the core conditions by which human rights can be established as truly universal 
– applying to all persons equally.40 Alan Gerwith’s analysis of the epistemology of human 
rights reveals that the quest for a universal moral rule that would be acceptable “to all 
rational persons” is ultimately dialectically contingent.41 Gerwith criticises John Rawls and 
HLA Hart’s arguments about the foundations of rights for their reliance upon a hypothetical 
agent being in a particular situation and drawing a specific set of conclusions about the 
importance of human rights.42 The ‘agents’ in these formulations were implicitly located in 
the west or, at least it was possible to infer this from the conclusions about universality that 
these hypothetical agents drew.43  This point is made in Ernesto Laclau’s critique of 
universality, where he notes that universality was in the body of a “certain particularity – 
[the] European culture of the nineteenth century.”44 For Laclau, the idea of western-centric 
universality was an “ontological privilege”, which had been doubled into an “epistemological 
privilege.”45 Therefore, the universality of international human rights law was limited to the 
declarations contained in human rights instruments – such as the preamble to the UDHR, 
which references the “inherent dignity” of members of the “human family”; or the repetition 
of this formulation in the ICCPR, where it is coupled with a legal obligation upon states to 
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“promote respect” for human rights.46 These are not statements acknowledging shared 
universal practices, or statements acknowledging common epistemic foundations to human 
rights, but are rather juridical assertions that the content of an instrument codifying 
international human rights law is truly universal. An international human rights instrument 
makes the protection of rights a duty of a state party to that instrument in a legal sense; it 
does not necessarily reflect their political priorities or conceptions of justice. 
This illustrates how the codification of rights into international human rights law does not 
resolve the politics of rights or their foundations. When drafting an instrument, states 
representing different cultural traditions are able to assert alternate rights or framings of 
rights, but the resulting instrument will not be a true reflection of what is universal in all 
societies. This is what triggers ideological opposition, as when a human rights organisation 
attempts to enforce rights within a state they can be applying rights asserted as universal but 
not seen as universal by that state. When international human rights law is seen as the 
ideological product of the existing hegemony within international relations, in which Chantal 
Mouffe argues the “meaning of social institutions are fixed” and the existing order is 
contingent “on the exclusion of other possibilities”, ideological opposition becomes anti-
imperialist as that hegemony is controlled and defined by the western, formerly colonialist 
powers.47 
It is, however, necessary to examine what is meant by ideology, as there are two quite 
different versions of ideological opposition. The first form of ideological opposition is 
directed against the ideological content of existing international human rights law. 
Descriptively ideologies – to use Louis Althusser’s terminology – are mechanisms for 
representing “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence.”48 When thinking of ideology in relation to international human rights law, it is 
important to understand it terms of what Martin Seliger labels the inclusive conception of 
ideology. This does not confine ideology to a specific belief system, such as the manifesto of 
a political party, but argues that it should be seen as a “group of beliefs and disbeliefs” 
emerging through a multitude of different practices.49 Ideology, Seliger argues, allows groups 
to justify their “reliance on moral norms” and gives “legitimacy” to the “implements” that 
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are required for the “preservation ...or reconstruction of a given order.”50 Crucially, as Laclau 
argues, what turns what would otherwise be a series of practices into an ideology is that an 
ideology has both a sense of closure, fixing a set of meanings to concepts, and the possibility 
of “constituting the community” which possess that ideology “as a coherent whole.”51 As 
argued in the first part of section two below, the dominant ideology of international human 
rights law is Western liberalism, because of the history of international human rights law.52 It 
originated as a distinct discipline in the 1940s, with the creation of the UDHR, and was a 
means of using the enlightenment tradition of the rights of man, developed in Western 
Europe in the eighteenth century, to respond to the humanitarian crisis triggered by World 
War Two.53 This means that ideological opposition can involve the proposal of a counter 
ideology, which proposes a group of beliefs to reconstruct the moral order of human rights. 
This is ideological opposition as reprioritisation, which seeks to create alternate conceptions 
of human rights, and was the intention of the Third World bloc’s advocacy of a right to 
development, detailed in the final section of this chapter. This is ideological opposition 
against the ideology of international human rights law, as it currently exists, leaving open the 
possibility for its reform.  
The second form of ideological opposition sees international human rights law as the tool of 
the existing international political order, and is focused less on the content of rights and 
more on enforcement of universal rights in service of an ideology. The study of ideology, 
John Thompson notes, is often linked to the construction of social imagery and is 
“fundamentally concerned with language”, which he argues is a means of preserving 
structures of domination.54 Althusser is more direct in his analysis of the relationship 
between ideology and the “reproduction ...of capitalist relations of exploitation.”55 Althusser 
principally focuses on explaining the use of ideology, arguing that it “recruits” and “creates” 
subjects, by creating an explanation of reality and a series of rituals affirming that reality.56 
Paul Hirst criticises Althusser for simplifying the complexity of ideology’s relations to 
capitalism, but does not dispute the importance of power in ideology.57 Shirley Scott applies 
this theory of ideology to what she terms “the idea of international law”, arguing that if “the 
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whole international political order is regarded as a power structure”, international law is the 
ideology of that power structure.58 Scott goes on to note that the ideology of international 
law “presents legal norms, principles, rules and negotiating positions as” distinct from other 
norms of international politics, elevating them as “’more than’ or superior” to other political 
norms.59 It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that international law 
works only in the interests of neo-imperial formations. Scott argues elsewhere that 
international law has the power it does in the “international political order because it is a 
source of power to which all states have some degree of access” noting that when the US 
invaded Iraq without express UN authorisation, it was accused of “damaging the system of 
international law.”60 Yet, because of the residual imperialism of international law, discussed 
in more detail below, formerly colonialist states are in more powerful positions in 
international organisations, so have a greater capacity to use international human rights law 
in service of their own ideologies. However, this does not stop other states using the 
available tools of international law to gain power and then use international human rights 
law as a mechanism to justify their power. This is what the Third World bloc was often 
attempting to do in the 1970s when organising tactical bloc votes in the UN General 
Assembly.61 This form of ideological opposition is anti-hegemonic, and arises if the state or 
states in question are not in a position of power in the organisation. 
So to briefly define ideological opposition; it firstly involves an act or series of acts of 
opposition, such as a refusal to follow a legal obligation, or a political attack upon an 
organisation. Secondly, it involves justifying that act of opposition on the basis that either 
the content of human rights law reflects a particular ideology, or because it is being used to 
advance a particular ideology. 
(2) Anti-imperialism and the ideology of international human rights law 
Given the nature of ideological opposition outlined in the preceding section, this section 
outlines how international human rights law’s content represents ideologically colonial-
imperialist priorities, or alternatively could be used as a justification for acts of neo-
imperialism. It is worth briefly reviewing the different meanings of imperialism already 
                                                          
58 Shirley Scott, ‘International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics (1994) 4 EJIL 313, 319-21. 
59 ibid 320. 
60 Shirley Scott, ‘Identifying the Source and Nature of a State’s Political Obligation Towards International Law’ 
(2005) 1 JILIR 49, 59. 
61 This explanation of Third World bloc voting patterns is explored in Stephen David, ‘Explaining Third World 
Alignment’ (1991) 43 World Politics 233. 
82 | P a g e  
 
outlined in this studies’ introductory chapter. Colonial-imperialism was imperialism with 
overseas colonies – territories that did not have an independent legal identity in 
international law. This form of imperialism involved physical domination of the territorial 
periphery from the imperial centre, and was prohibited by the 1960 UN Resolution on People 
Living under colonial rule.62 Colonialism, as Edward Said argued in Culture and Imperialism, 
was not just a “simple act of [territorial] accumulation” but was an “impressive ideological 
formation” which justified ongoing imperial domination.63 Residual imperialism refers to 
states from the developed world utilising some of the juridical advantages gained from 
colonialism and the colonial formation of international law to gain a comparative advantage 
over states in the developing world. An obvious example is the presence of Britain and 
France on the UN Security Council, as their presence was a reflection of their power in 1945, 
a position that was a reflection of their colonial empires. It is possible, as hegemonic 
theorists of imperialism sometimes do, to mistake the existence of residual imperialism as 
evidence of an imperial formation, but residual imperialism in international law is a residue 
of past imperial power, not necessarily evidence of its continuation.64 Neo-imperialism is 
different, as it describes the projection of imperial power, without the presence of an actual 
physical empire. The role of the US in UN-backed post-Cold War military operations 
enforcing international legal norms – such as the operations against Iraq in 1990 and Somalia 
in 1992 – were a form of power projection, and the vast asymmetry of US military and 
economic power in these instances led to numerous associations with colonial-imperialism. 
However, as Martin Shaw argues, the “contradictions of quasi-imperial rule” were so 
numerous that it was difficult to conclude “power networks in the post-Cold War era” 
constituted “an amorphous Empire.”65  
Residual imperialism requires the power of international law, and is only manifested through 
the structures of international law; neo-imperialism does not necessarily require 
international law or organisations, but uses international law, or its principles, as a 
justification for actions involving the domination of weaker territories. Colonial, residual and 
neo-imperialism all had an influence in the formation and application of international human 
rights law, and the ideological strands of opposition detailed in the third section of this 
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chapter originated as response to this. The first part of this section examines the ideology of 
international human rights law and its imperialist ontology, looking at the content of 
international human rights law. The second part of this section examines how international 
human rights law could be used as a justification for neo-imperialism, examining it as an 
instrument used to ideologically justify acts of neo-imperialism. 
(i) The ideology of international human rights law: residual and colonial imperialism 
in the content of international human rights law 
Universal human rights in their juridical form originated in what Carl Schmitt termed the 
nomos of colonialism, which “considered Christian nations to be the creators and 
representatives of an order applicable to the whole earth.”66 José-Manuel Barreto notes that 
the sixteenth century legal theorist Francesco Vitoria used an early version of universality in 
his writings on Central American Indians, which held that whilst they were “barbarians and 
as a consequence slaves”, they should not be excluded from the human race, but protected 
so that they could be converted to Christianity.67 As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, 
Bartholomew Las Casas, a Dominican monk writing in the sixteenth century, created the 
concept of universal jurisdiction in part because he believed that the native population could 
be converted to Christianity and therefore saved.68 This began the association between the 
civilising mission of colonial-imperialism and juridical universality. This permeated into 
eighteenth century thinking, as John Hobson noted, Immanuel Kant’s concept of perpetual 
peace was predicated on the removal of the “threat to civilized states” from “uncivilized 
societies.”69 Whilst, as Howard Williams notes, Kant was often hostile to the practices of 
colonialism at the time he was writing, the concept of Kantian perpetual peace had 
significant implications for the eventual intellectual project of international human rights 
law.70 
The concept of a universal civilising mission found its way into international human rights 
law; Article 28 of the UDHR described the creation of a “social and international order” that 
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could realise human rights.71 This seemed to imply that human rights are a new form of 
civilisation, and inspired the American Anthropological Association’s 1947 declaration of 
opposition to the UDHR, which described the west as “aberrational in its response to cultural 
difference” during colonial-imperialism, and reasoned that international human rights law 
would similarly disregard cultural differences.72 This particular criticism of universality has 
come under some attack, not least because it seemed to suggest that, as the idea of 
universality was colonial-imperialist, any appeal to universal values as a defence against 
oppression was redundant.73 However, the interconnection between universality and a 
standard of civilisation has permeated into the framework of human rights law: the 
preambles to the ICCPR and the ICESCR implicitly reference the civilising mission when they 
refer to creating the “conditions” to enjoy human rights.74 It also permeates into the 
application of human rights in other international instruments, seemingly creating classes of 
civilised and uncivilised in international society. Mukua Mutua argues that international 
human rights law required the construction of savages, victims and saviours, noting that the 
need to search for an uncivilised other had made it difficult for it to gain “cross cultural-
legitimacy.”75 The universalising process was designed, in the words of Homni Baba, to give a 
“hegemonic ‘normality’” to the uneven development of the world.76 
The ideology of international human rights law could therefore be said to be colonial-
imperialist, in part because it reflected a core component of the colonial-imperial civilising 
mission. The priorities and the substantive interests protected in international human rights 
law also reflected a set of ideological priorities that were particular to a liberal, European 
conception of human rights, and this can be seen in two distinct areas. Firstly, the UDHR was 
shaped in a way that strengthened the nation state, or more accurately the Western nation 
state. During the UDHR’s drafting process; the USSR, along with Britain, France and the US 
often worked together to limit the scope of the Declaration. The British delegate managed to 
successfully oppose a proposal from Latin American states recognising the legitimacy of 
revolution against tyranny, because of fears that colonial independence movements would 
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use it as a justification to rebel against colonial imperialism.77 Minority rights were not 
included in the UDHR because of state concerns about their divisive political effect, which, as 
Johanna Gibson argues, was to have a detrimental effect on the protection of indigenous 
communities.78 Article 2 was also opaque in terms of its condemnation of racism, calling for 
equal enjoyment of rights irrespective of race, but making no outright call for states to 
actively prohibit racism or abolish ‘separate-but-equal’ systems of racial segregation, such as 
apartheid. 
Secondly, international human rights law specifically prioritised protecting civil and political 
rights, such as the protection of free speech and the right to elections, over economic and 
social rights. The standard differences between civil and political rights and economic and 
social rights are – as Phillip Alston and Gerald Quinn note – that the former are considered 
“non-political”, whereas the latter “are often perceived to be of deeply ideological nature” 
and “necessitate an unacceptable degree of intervention in the domestic affairs of states”.79 
This was reflected in the ideological position taken by the US, UK and other Western states 
on the role of international law. As Alston noted in his commentary on the ICESCR, it was 
dubbed in some US political circles the “Covenant on Uneconomic, Socialist and Collective 
Rights".80 In the early 1950s, the US had managed, by process of political manoeuvres in the 
drafting committee of the Human Rights Commission, to get socio-economic rights codified 
in a separate instrument to civil and political rights.81 During the drafting process, it was not 
clear that this was an issue that particularly unified postcolonial states – India joined forces 
with the UK in opposing the codification of relatively “open-ended” rights in international 
law.82 Other postcolonial states involved in the drafting process framed the issue in terms of 
self-determination, claiming that human rights instruments would be meaningless unless 
they contained economic, social and cultural rights.83 As Daniel Whelan notes, this allowed 
some postcolonial states to reject international human rights law in its entirety because of 
the lack of protection for economic and social rights. Jack Donnelly argues that the language 
of progressive realisation in the ICESCR does not necessarily limit or render the rights 
contained in it as lesser than the ICCPR, and argued that criticism stemming from the non-
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justiciability of the ICESCR was exaggerated.84 However, this was an unequal formulation, 
intentionally engineered by certain states involved in the drafting process. Even though it 
was not economic and social rights of the sort protected in the ICESCR that were often 
pursued by the Third World bloc, which was more preoccupied with developmentalism and 
economic self-determination, it nevertheless reflected the idea that human rights reflected a 
Western conception of the economy and society.85 
The above illustrates how the content of international human rights law can be seen as 
having an ideological nature that reflects a particular set of interests rooted in a particular 
tradition of rights. Its content utilises concepts that are predicated on a colonial-imperial 
assumption of universal dominance. This is not to say that the content of human rights is 
completely a reflection of colonial-imperialism, but it illustrates how this critique can emerge 
as a result of international human rights law’s residual imperialism. As noted in the 
introduction, decolonisation of human rights law would provide a conception of human 
rights that could be removed from the context of colonial imperialism described above. José-
Manuel Barreto argues that a decolonial conception of human rights would defy the 
“dynamics and prevailing prejudices” of existing human rights law, and would break the 
silence to which the Third World has been “condemned” to in the construction of human 
rights law.86 What Barreto’s critique focuses on specifically is the assumption that the 
European or Eurocentric history of human rights is the only history of human rights. The 
need to reinvent the history of human rights would contribute to what Barreto called the 
“globalization of human rights” – which would involve drawing on different cultures and 
traditions from across the world as the basis of a new form of human rights law.87 A 
decolonised form of human rights would address the residual and colonial imperialism of 
international human rights law. Some instances of anti-imperialist ideological opposition 
detailed in the third section of this chapter ostensibly sought to achieve a decolonised 
conception of human rights law. However, as will be shown, the three main strands of anti-
imperialist ideological opposition often became justificatory mechanisms for states from the 
Third World bloc to protect their sovereignty. 
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(ii) International human rights law as an ideological instrument; the use of 
international human rights as a justification for neo-imperialism 
What distinguishes neo-imperialism from colonial-imperialism is that where territorial 
domination occurs in neo-imperialism, it is temporary, so it does not technically fall under 
the terms of the Resolution 1514 on the Independence of Peoples Living under colonial rule. 
After the Cold War, the ‘New World Order’ effectively treated economic liberalism as the 
default position for states, which, as Manfred Bienefeld argues, was a form of imperialism, as 
it envisaged a monolithic world defined almost exclusively by the US.88 However, these 
theories have struggled to adapt with shifts in power, in particular the enormous rise of 
Asian economic power and quasi-imperialist polices from China.89  Some theorists on 
globalisation in the early 2000s argued that, in tandem with the European Union, the US 
formed a Western state conglomerate.90 Whilst this theory is not without its problems, the 
states in this conglomerate enjoyed the benefits of residual imperialism and seemed to be 
the states benefiting from specific neo-imperialist policies. These states were also all in the 
Western Europe and Others voting bloc at the UN, which gave a geographic and ideological 
basis to the idea of neo-imperialism; if this bloc was the centre, then the African and Asian 
blocs constituted the periphery. Western neo-imperialism, as opposed to Soviet and more 
recently Chinese neo-imperialism, has often used human rights as a justification. It is often 
the rhetoric of rights that is used, rather than any specific provision of international human 
rights law, but this was sufficient to create an association between neo-imperialism and 
human rights law for the purposes of ideological opposition. This is different from what was 
discussed in the first part of this section, as this was how human rights was used, not about 
the content of human rights law. 
The first example of human rights being used as a justification to advance neo-imperialism 
was the use of property rights to foil attempts by the Third World bloc to reprioritise 
international law to advance redistributive interests. The campaign for the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s – a movement launched by the Third World bloc at the 
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UN General Assembly – aimed to realign aspects of international law to improve the material 
conditions of postcolonial states. Aspects of the NIEO movement had been around for some 
time. In 1951, the Chilean delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission raised the issue of 
sovereignty over natural resources during the discussion on the right to self-determination. 
After decolonisation, control of natural resources often remained in the hands of Western 
owned private companies. As Sundhya Pahuja argues, this was essentially a continuation of 
the colonial project, which in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had used the 
control of economic resources as a justification for the occupation of territory.91 By the 
1970s, Prashad argues, the NIEO was needed, as economic development within the Third 
World bloc had reached an impasse and little more could be done “without major 
international transformation.”92 A realignment of international law, Prashad went on to 
argue, was justified, as Western powers had been able to exploit their residual imperialism 
to control the shape of the international economy. For example, the General Agreement on 
Trade Tariffs, by effectively legitimising a range of market distorting practices that directly 
and indirectly benefited Europe and America, became a vehicle for the continuation of 
colonial era imbalances in world trade.93 
A 1973 conference in Algiers of Non-Aligned Movement states supported permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and the reorganisation of world trade rules, but it was at 
the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in April 1974 that the phrase ‘New 
International Economic Order’ was first used. This Session issued two key resolutions; the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. The 
Declaration framed liberation from colonialism both in terms of political independence, by 
affirming the right of peoples under “colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation 
to achieve their liberation” and in terms of economic liberation, emphasising the importance 
of control of natural resources and “international economic co-operation” as a form of 
liberation.94 Both the Declaration and the Charter contained numerous references to the 
nationalisation of industries extracting natural resources. The US Ambassador to the UN 
lambasted the Declaration for its numerous “objectionable features” and lodged several 
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reservations.95 Formerly colonialist states’ objections centred around the need for adequate 
compensation for any nationalisation of resources, which many states in the Third World 
bloc were unable to give.96 By framing it as a right and as part of the injustice of colonial 
wrongs, it was clear that the Third World bloc intended to circumnavigate this requirement 
and hence vitiate the property rights of the Corporations that owned or had claims to natural 
resources in Third World bloc states. Advocates of the NIEO implied as much – for example, 
when Milan Bulajic argued that the economic equality of states demanded that the 
foundations “of the old international legal system [the] ‘law of civilized nations’” needed “a 
new approach” that would correct these norms “to include preferential treatment” for 
postcolonial states.97 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which was drafted under the terms of 
the Programme of Action, contained far-reaching provisions allowing states to “nationalize, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property” and enact controls on Transnational 
Corporations.98 At the time this was heavily criticised by American scholars, who argued that 
this was incompatible with the rule of law and strayed outside the legal scope of 
international organisations.99 Behind these all of criticisms, there was a distinct concern 
about the protection of property rights of corporations against the state. As Pahuja notes, 
from the late 1970s onwards – driven in part by these concerns – Western states used a 
variety of legal blocking moves to avoid the NIEO having any substantive effect.100 This was 
read as a manifestation of imperialism by Third World legal critics, such as Gutto, who 
argued that “all of [the] countries with substantial enriched imperialistic relations to the rest 
of the world” had opposed the reform of international law.101 There were conceptual and 
legal problems with the NIEO, but what was significant was the way in which Western states 
used their residual imperialist advantage, justifying their actions by reference to the 
protection of property rights. Karin Mickelson noted that cases such as these showed how 
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international law, and by implication international human rights law, could be appropriated 
as a “hegemonic instrument of the North.”102 
The second, and most visible, example of neo-imperialism in the post-Cold War era was the 
use of war as a form of rights protection: in the 1999 Kosovo war, the 2001 Afghan war and 
the 2003 Iraq war. Formerly colonialist states were able to use their residual imperialist 
powers on the UN Security Council and membership of NATO to declare legal actions that 
involved a violation of state sovereignty by force, and would otherwise be illegal under the 
UN Charter.103 Humanitarian intervention, Ikechi Mgbeoji argues in somewhat stark terms, 
involves the “vilification of those of us believed to be uncivilized”, a process that is both 
“historically evidenced in European Colonialism” and dependent on modern day “imperial 
delusions.”104 Other authors have more broadly argued that the use of human rights as a 
basis for international action represents the development of liberal imperialism, with human 
rights as a driving imperative.105 Between 1994 and 1995, in policy circles there was at least a 
partial revaluation of the constraints of sovereignty; as the twin tragedies of the massacres in 
Srebrenica and the six-week genocide in Rwanda provided a strong moral imperative for a 
reconsideration of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states.106 In 
1999, when the US and Britain sidestepped international law to intervene in Kosovo, the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention was created.107 Tony Blair, the then British Prime 
Minister, gave a speech in Chicago in 1999 in the midst of the air war in Kosovo, arguing that 
“the principle of non-interference must be qualified” when genocide or internal oppression 
was taking place.108 Blair’s speech advocated the rejection of international legal constraints 
in favour of the transcendent properties of human rights. Shortly after the Kosovo 
intervention, the Bush administration resisted any attempt at US cooperation with the ICC, 
and sought to reverse the trend towards a conception sovereignty bounded by the 
protection of human rights where it did not accord with their interests.109 This seeming 
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double standard seemed to suggest that human rights became transcendent over 
international norms, such as state sovereignty, when it accorded with the interests of 
formerly colonialist states. 
There was considerable criticism of the Kosovo intervention because of its imperialist 
implications, as Jonathon Charney argued it left “the door open for hegemonic states to use 
[it] for purposes clearly incompatible with international law.”110 Yet there is a problem with 
Charney’s line of argument on act-utilitarian grounds as in some cases upholding 
international law and protecting sovereignty could involve many more deaths, and it is 
difficult to see why the norms of international law should logically assume priority. Ann 
Orford has perhaps a more nuanced critique when she notes that the problem with 
humanitarian intervention, especially in the context of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, was that it 
could be read as “part of the history of global imperialism.”111 Orford argues that the 
territorial aspect of humanitarian intervention and the construction of a simplistic and 
primitive narrative of peoples in states where interventions were taking place were 
reminiscent of colonial imperialism. 112  As Mohammed Ayoob argued, humanitarian 
intervention was a “non starter”, because it was either “blatantly politically motivated” or 
was destined to a structural failure, as it could not solve the root causes of conflict and often 
the intervening armies lacked sufficient expertise to rectify underlying political problems in 
the state.113 Ayoob goes on to argue that humanitarian intervention ignores the contributory 
role of Western actions, through the process of decolonisation and exclusionary economic 
policies, in creating long-term instability within postcolonial states that were the subjects of 
interventions.114 Yet humanitarian intervention deserves some defence as a practice, not 
least because in some cases, such as the 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone – which was 
popular in the country itself – it was been successful. As Michael Waltzer notes, there is a 
tendency among some on the left to view all humanitarian intervention as imperialist, but it 
is possible, as Terry Nardin argues, to differentiate between humanitarian and non-
humanitarian, or imperialist, interventions.115 It is also noteworthy that the Constitutive Act 
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of the African Union enshrines a right to intervene in states in “grave circumstances 
namely…crimes against humanity.”116 
Yet, as Costas Douzinas notes, rights undergo a significant shift when “they are turned from a 
discourse of rebellion and dissent” into a mechanism for justifying state action. 117 
Humanitarian intervention appropriated human rights as the justifying logic for the military 
conquest of weaker states by stronger states. Whatever the morality of individual cases, the 
effect that individual interventions had on the discourse of human rights was to associate 
the protection of human rights with military force that had a problematic legal basis. The use 
of human rights as a justification for neo-imperialism has, Balakrishnan Rajagopal argues, 
made it part of the “institutionalised hegemony” of international law and has become an 
instrument for the maintenance of the hegemonic power of Western states.118 This is 
problematic because, as shown below, some governments after 2003 used this argument as 
a justification for the wholesale rejection of international human rights law. As Oscar 
Schachter argued, it would be better to “acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary 
and desirable in the particular circumstances” than it would be “to adopt a principle that 
would open a wide gap in the barrier against unilateral use of force.”119 
(3) Anti-imperialist ideological opposition to human rights organisations 
Ideological opposition, as the first section of this chapter argued, either argues for 
reprioritisation of international human rights law, based on arguments that it should protect 
a different series of priorities; or advances arguments in outright opposition to human rights 
on the basis that they are part of a hegemonic neo-imperial international order. In the 
preceding section, it was argued that international human rights law contained imperialist 
elements, due to its formation through colonial-imperial international law, and that 
international human rights law was also used to justify acts of neo-imperialism. Resistance to 
the imperialist ideological content or application of international human rights law formed 
the basis of ideological opposition from the Third World bloc towards international human 
rights organisations, and this section looks at three case studies of anti-imperialist ideological 
opposition. 
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The first case study looks at anti-hegemonic opposition to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which asserted that the court supported a neo-imperialist hegemony. Anti-hegemonic 
opposition did not attempt to decolonise international human rights law, but rather 
maintained that human rights was an instrument of imperialist power and should be 
opposed outright. The second case study looks at the creation of a right to development, 
which was a form of reprioritisation of international human rights law. The third case study 
examines how states utilise cultural relativism as a form of ideological opposition, in a 
process called defensive relativism, by looking at how the Asian values debate of the mid-
1990s influenced pre-emptive ideological opposition to a regional human rights organisation. 
Significantly, even attempts to reform international human rights law, as detailed in the 
second and third case studies, resulted in the case for reform morphing into arguments in 
favour of enhancing state power against international organisations. In practice, neither of 
these types of anti-imperialist ideological opposition came close to providing what Barreto 
terms decolonised human rights law.120 Collectively. these case studies show how anti-
imperialism developed specific strands of ideological opposition to international human 
rights law, and how in turn this specifically influenced opposition to human rights 
organisations. 
(i) Anti-hegemonic opposition; Anti-imperialism and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)  
Anti-hegemony implies the existence of a hegemonic imperial formation. Antonio Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony provided an explanation of why empires, and their inherent capitalist 
inequalities, persisted. Gramscian methodology was used to construct an explanation of the 
universalisation of class and the transnationalisation of the capitalist hegemony that was 
“forced or imposed on subaltern classes”, who in turn “either resisted” or “capitulated.”121 
Whilst not explicitly referenced by proponents of anti-hegemony, the assumption that 
Western economic power created a globalised class system that allowed the projection of 
Western values was common in the rejection of international human rights law. 
International law’s residual imperialism, which was present in the structure of international 
organisations, gave juridical advantages to former colonialist states. Anti-hegemonic 
opposition was anti-imperial in its outlook, in that it sought to resist manifestations of neo- 
and residual- imperialism of the sort outlined in the second section of this chapter, but 
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crucially, it did not contain any detailed programme for the reform of international human 
rights law beyond the act of resistance. 
Anti-hegemonic ideological opposition maintained that, formerly colonialist states justified 
neo-imperialist actions using either the substance or language of human rights. During the 
1980s, the US justified supporting right wing authoritarian regimes in Latin America because 
they protected property rights and were deemed more likely than communist regimes to 
evolve into democracies.122 In the 1990s, the US had a policy of condemning regimes they 
perceived as human rights violators, which also had a tactical dimension. The condemnation 
of Cuba and action against the government of Panama, where justified on loose human 
rights grounds but were also pursued in the tactical interests of US foreign policy.123 Tactical 
double standards on the application of human rights, David Held argues, led to Western 
powers “being seen as self-interested, partial and insensitive”, and made human rights 
appear to be “just a product of short-term geopolitical or geoeconomic interests.”124 From 
2002 onwards, the vivid association by President George Bush Jr. of the forceful spread of 
democracy and the protection of human rights toxified the concept of human rights; a 
sentiment which was to only grow after the 2003 Iraq war. At a 2004 UN Security Council 
debate on the ongoing Genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, the Pakistani ambassador 
questioned whether human rights concerns “might not be a Trojan horse.”125 A similar 
criticism of US human rights concerns in Darfur came from members of the Arab League, 
who argued that responsibility for the security situation lay with solely with the US. 
This toxification was so totalising that when Non-Governmental Organisations made 
arguments in favour of the protection of human rights during the 2011 Arab Spring, they 
were criticised as being arguments for imperialism.126 Robert Mugabe’s speech to the UN 
General Assembly in 2007 is a poignant example of anti-hegemonic ideological opposition.127 
The colonialist origins of the UDHR were condemned in the speech for being part of the 
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system “which suppressed and oppressed [Zimbabweans].”128 The Iraq war and American 
imperialism were condemned as standing for “civilisation” which “occupied …colonised 
…incarcerated and killed”, and the imperialist nature of the Iraq war was used by Mugabe as 
a deflection mechanism against any discussion of Zimbabwe’s human rights record.129 
Zimbabwe had already been criticised by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD’s enforcement body), and as chapter four details, had also come to the 
attention of regional bodies. Mugabe’s anti-imperialist opposition was not specifically 
directed against any of these organisations, but against any human rights enforcement. This 
line of argument was only able to gain traction because the promotion of human rights was 
widely associated with the US’ neo-imperialist actions, giving credence to the rejection of 
international human rights law by governments when justified by anti-imperialism. As Ian 
Phimister and Brian Raftopolous note, arguments about imperialism have a particular impact 
among governments in Southern Africa that have had a political hinterland resisting 
apartheid.130 This form of opposition is not necessarily linked to a substantive agenda for the 
reform of international human rights law, although some scholars, such as Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, have argued that the intertwining of neo-imperialism and human rights created a 
demand for a new conception of human rights.131 However, demands for substantive 
changes to international human rights law were often absent from anti-hegemonic, anti-
imperialist ideological opposition as practiced by the leaders of governments. 
Since the late 2000s, attacks on the ICC have been the area where anti-hegemonic 
ideological opposition has had its most significant impact.132 The preamble to the 1998 Rome 
Statute of the ICC asserts the existence of a common humanity, but at the same time 
professes to respect national sovereignty in the exercise of its universal jurisdiction for 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.133 Although it was modelled on the 
specialist war crimes tribunals, which had been given international legal authority on an ad 
hoc basis by the UN Security Council, the ICC was intended to be permanent and 
independent of the UN. The office of the prosecutor was intended to be an independent 
office immune from direct influence, but the Security Council retained the power to initiate 
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prosecutions and delay prosecutions – a clear element of residual imperialism. In the early 
2000s, there was a significant controversy over the failure of the US to sign the Rome Statute 
– a decision principally driven by the Bush administration’s hostility to the Court.134 This was 
a naked act of double standards by the Bush administration, who not only used claims of 
American exceptionalism to avoid submitting to the Court’s jurisdiction, but also pressured 
other states into making bilateral immunity agreements so that American personnel in a 
signatory state’s jurisdiction could not be brought before the ICC.135 Anti-imperialist criticism 
of the ICC initially focused on these double standards, and the first indictments in cases from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda drew little criticism.136 
Ratification of the Rome Statute was encouraged by a variety of international organisations, 
and by 2012, 34 African states and 18 states from the Asia Pacific region had ratified the 
statute. In the latter case, it is, however, noteworthy that many large and economically 
successful postcolonial states, such as India, Indonesia and Malaysia, are not signatories to 
the Rome Statute. The particularly controversial element of the Rome Statute was Article 17, 
which stated that where a state was unwilling or “genuinely unable” to carry out an 
investigation, the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction.137 This provision was meant to preserve 
the principle of state sovereignty and treat the ICC as a court of last resort, but in practice, 
the “ability” of a state became synonymous with its economic development. In early 2006, 
the prosecutor officially closed his preliminary investigation into abuses by coalition forces in 
Iraq.138 This meant that military tribunals and the civil justice system in England and Wales 
resolved British war crimes in Iraq, whereas Congolese war crimes were referred to the ICC. 
It is important to put the previous statement into context; only five of the most serious cases 
from the DRC have been referred to the ICC, and the magnitude of the charges in these cases 
is significantly greater than alleged offences committed by British soldiers in Iraq. It is also 
doubtful whether the DRC’s justice system is capable of mounting such prosecutions; a UN 
report in 2010 concluded that its court system was prone to systemic corruption and 
procedural biases.139 That said, material conditions heavily influence the gap between the 
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justice system’s capacity in the two countries, and material imbalances between them stem 
back to the fact that the DRC is a postcolonial state and Britain is a formerly colonialist state. 
Therefore, even though pragmatically there is a strong case for the ICC focusing on African 
states, this in part is a consequence of the conditions generated by colonial-imperialism and 
continued by neo-imperialism. The Indian delegate during the drafting process expressed 
similar concerns about the provision in the draft statute that allowed the UN Security Council 
to initiate investigations. They argued that this would result in powerful states placing 
themselves above the law, and would thus open the door to “neo-colonialism.”140  
The criticism directed against the ICC significantly escalated after the Sudanese president 
Omar Al Bashir was indicted in 2008, first for Crimes Against Humanity and then later in 2009 
for Genocide. At the July 2009 AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government, the then 
Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi urged AU states to sign up to the Sitre Declaration, 
which called for non-cooperation with the ICC.141 Kurt Mills described this as an obviously 
“defensive move responding to a perception that the West was ganging up on Africa” and 
noted that some states were willing to take a much more moderate line or pursue 
alternative regional solutions.142 However, as will be shown in chapter four, the regional 
alternatives were subject to a variety of override mechanisms that would impede an 
independent prosecution. At the July 2010 AU summit in Kampala, resolutions were adopted 
calling for member states to refuse to cooperate with the ICC over Darfur. The Malawian 
President Bingu wa Mutharika, the then President of the AU, condemned the ICC for issuing 
indictments that undermined “African solidarity and African peace and security that we 
fought [for] for so many years.”143 Indictments against Said Gaddafi in 2011 also prompted 
charges that the ICC was acting in an imperialist manner, as the indictment had been issued 
under Article 13(b) of the statute, which allows the Security Council to exercise its powers 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and request the prosecutor to begin an investigation 
into an ongoing situation. Libya was not a signatory to the Rome Statute, but the Security 
Council resolution overrode this legal barrier, leading to claims that the ICC had become 
imperialist, represented a new imperial order and supported Western military 
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interventions.144 When in 2013 the ICC issued charges against the President of Kenya, Uhurh 
Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, this led to an aggressive political campaign within 
Kenya condemning the ICC as imperialist, which prompted the Kenyan parliament to vote to 
withdraw Kenya from the organisation.145 
Security Council politics precluded action in states such as Sri Lanka, where the Defence 
Minister was suspected of committing crimes against humanity at the conclusion of its Civil 
War in 2009. This all contributed what Mahmood Mamdani described as the perception that 
it was a “Western court to try African crimes against humanity.”146 This has led to anti-
imperialist opposition, seriously damaging the ICC, as many powerful political leaders have 
defined inter-state solidarity around non-cooperation with the Court. When Al-Bashir 
attended a ceremony in Kenya in honour of their new constitution in August 2010, the 
Kenyan government refused to fulfil their obligations under the Rome Statute to arrest 
him.147 In December 2014, the prosecution against Kenyatta collapsed; the Chief Prosecutor 
blamed the lack of co-operation from the Kenyan government, including a media campaign 
attacking the ICC as imperialist, for making the prosecution impossible.148 Significantly, the 
anti-hegemonic criticism of the ICC highlighted the potential for it to align with the interests 
of the elites within postcolonial states. It is very important to distinguish general anti-
hegemonic critique of international human rights law from the practice of anti-hegemonic 
ideological opposition to human rights organisations. The former can serve to highlight the 
residual imperialism in international law and provide a template for reform, along the lines 
that theorists – such as Rajagopal – advocate. However, the latter is a political tool used by 
the elites in certain postcolonial states to strengthen their own power whilst simultaneously 
weakening the power of organisations to protect their own populations. 
(ii) Developmentalism and the Third World bloc: The Right to Development in 
International Law 
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Third World ideology had a distinctly material component in the form of Developmentalism. 
Althusser notes that the relationship of ideology to “conditions of existence” establishes a 
relationship between ideology, production and class relations, which endows the “imaginary 
relationship” of ideology “with a material existence.”149 Developmentalism is the ideological 
pursuit of state-driven projects to achieve economic advancement in postcolonial states. At 
the time of independence, there were vast disparities between the economic statuses of 
First and Third World countries, giving foundation to the notion that juridical independence 
was not real independence. As detailed in the first and second sections of this chapter, 
material concerns – in particular economic and social rights – were marginalised in 
international human rights law. The right to development emerged as both a way of 
recognising human capacities in development and a mechanism for realising economic self-
determination to compliment political self-determination.150 In the 1960s, the idea that 
planned development could radically alter the material conditions of states was one that was 
taken seriously, as the rapid post World War Two recovery of the Soviet bloc offered an 
economic model that appeared to deliver results and was not directly associated with 
European colonial-imperialism. 
Developmenatlism and scrutiny of a state’s human rights record by an international 
organisation were not in principle incompatible, but in practice there were tensions. It was at 
the First World Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968 that the Third World bloc 
began to use arguments for economic development to deflect human rights scrutiny. 
Princess Ashraf of Iran, the conference president, stated in her inaugural address that she 
had developed her “own ideas about what the most fundamental human rights were: the 
rights to food, shelter, clothing work …and a basic education.”151 Even though, as Roland 
Burke noted, many of these rights were contained in the UDHR, Third World bloc delegates 
at the Tehran conference attacked the UDHR for being irrelevant or imperialist.152 The 
rhetoric on economic and social rights at the conference, and subsequently at the UN, 
framed human rights and developmentalism as being completely incommensurable.153 
Developmentalism thus subordinated individual rights (both civil and political, and economic 
and social rights) and had the potential to generate incidents of systemic state oppression.154 
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After the Tehran conference, several states from the Third World bloc continued to maintain 
that developmental priorities should outweigh the protection of human rights; Senegal’s 
representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights argued that citizens of the Third 
World bloc had “neither the material, nor the intellectual, nor the physical capacity” to enjoy 
human rights.155 Burke described this type of argument as “destroying rights in order to save 
them”, and it gained currency amongst some postcolonial states at the Commission.156 
The 1976 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, sometimes known as the Algiers 
Declaration, was drafted by the Third World bloc and was part of the wider cannon of NIEO 
proposals. It posited that the “Economic Rights of Peoples” were necessary to act as 
remedies against “new forms of imperialism” which “oppress and exploit the peoples of the 
world.”157 As Richard Falk notes, the declaration does not contain a single reference to 
international human rights law, and overlooked human rights abuses that could occur within 
Third World societies.158 One significant problem of developmentalism, and one that may 
explain its seeming incommensurability with the protection of human rights, was that it was 
essentially concerned with protecting the material condition of the state, not the individual. 
A good example of this is the relative lack of consideration that individual economic rights 
received from the Third World bloc. The non-justiciable status of the ICESCR had been 
opposed by Pakistan and Egypt during its drafting in the 1950s, but in 1966, when many 
more postcolonial states were involved in decision-making processes, states within the Third 
World bloc opposed the creation of a review body for the ICESCR.159 Arguments about the 
importance of state development were often implicitly projected against a liberal model of 
economic development, which was implicitly associated with the economic policies of former 
colonialist states. The problem was that this approach to developmentalism also entailed 
subordinating community and individual interests to the state and greatly strengthening the 
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power of postcolonial elites, who would for the most part be in charge of managing and 
reaping the rewards from development.160 
The 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development was the first major human rights 
document to advance developmentalism. This wasn’t a continuation of the NIEO, but rather 
an attempt to use international human rights law to create a right to development that was 
interdependent – a right needed to facilitate the delivery of other rights – and that would 
have equal priority with other rights. Commenting on the Declaration, Philip Kooijmans 
noted that the right to development was defined as “an inalienable right” that was necessary 
to realise all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 161  Crucially, the Declaration 
emphasised the importance of individual rights, referring to the ICCPR and the ICESCR and 
emphasised that the “enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot 
justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms.”162 Its passage was near 
unanimous in the General Assembly, although the US voted against it, which delayed the 
process of implementation for several years.163 
Substantively, however, the right to development was prone to internal incoherence, as it 
failed to identify either the content of the right or the duty holder.164 In practice, as Phillip 
Alston noted, governments often used the right to development “as an arena of last refuge 
in which to relocate many of [their] old ideological and political struggles.”165 The association 
between developmentalism and authoritarian governments did not help the promotion of 
the right to development, which in turn meant that support for it within key international 
institutions – such as the World Bank – was not forthcoming.166 Cases such as Indonesia 
under Suharto, where rights violations were carried out in pursuit of economic development, 
were closer to the developmentalism pursued at the Tehran conference in 1968, which was a 
form of authoritarian apologism, rather than the interdependent right contained in the 1986 
Declaration; although crude associations between developmentalism and authoritarianism 
often had a trace of residual imperialism in them. Even after 1986, the idea of a right to 
development remained ideologically unpopular with key stakeholders in international 
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economic institutions, many of whom were formerly colonialist states. The problem was that 
the Declaration did nothing to resolve what David Kinley termed the responsibility dilemma 
between states, as framing development as a right was not going to resolve the basic tension 
between Western states who claimed that the development was a political instrument used 
by Third World governments, and postcolonial states who argued development was a 
right.167 As a consequence, Yash Ghai noted, a wider perception was created among Third 
World states that “developed countries were united in their opposition” to the Declaration, 
which, in the eyes of some states, appeared to be a case of Western double standards.168 A 
renewed interest in the right to development emerged in the early 2000s; in 2004, the UN 
set up a High Level Task Force on the Right to Development, which from 2009 began 
investigating how the Declaration could be used to achieve the aims of Millennium 
Development Goal 8 – the creation of a global partnership for development. 
The right to development could have been a remedy to the residual imperialism of 
international law; however, the Third World bloc often used developmentalism to attack 
human rights more generally, and shield themselves from the scrutiny of international 
human rights organisations. To an extent, this attitude changed with the 1986 Declaration, 
which could have been a significant example of the reprioritisation of international human 
rights law on anti-imperialist lines. Instead, a combination residual imperialism and 
ideological opposition from the US helped derail this process, resulting developmentalism 
remaining synonymous with authoritarianism. 
(iii) Defensive Relativism : The ‘Asian Values’ debate and the ASEAN human rights 
commission 
Defensive relativism is the practical application of cultural relativism to oppose the 
functioning of human rights organisations. International human rights law does not, in the 
majority of cases, doubt the plurality of culture, but attempts to set universal minimum 
standards that allow a significant degree of subsequent diversity.169 It is possible to be 
sceptical of universal claims, as Bonny Ibhawoh is, and argue that there are important 
traditions of cultural dignity within African societies that can also protect rights.170 Cultural 
relativism is not a doctrine of morality – it is metaethical explaining of how moral decisions 
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are to be made, not what those decisions are – thus, in the case of cultural relativism, as 
Stephen Lukes notes, “the authority of moral norms is relative to time and place.”171 
Defensive relativism describes an argument advanced by a state party justifying non-
compliance with a human rights organisation on the basis that the rights that it protects are 
incommensurable with the culture in their jurisdiction. The Declaration and Programme of 
Action from the 1993 Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, contained a 
passage that appear to legitimise defensive relativism. In Article 5 it stated that the 
“significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind” in the application of international human 
rights law.172 Although its meaning was fiercely debated afterwards, the presence of this 
provision was in part an acknowledgement of the growing importance of cultural relativism 
as a state practice among states in the Third World bloc.173 
Defensive relativism is based on cultural absolutism, which is an extreme variety of moral 
relativism, rather than a distinct epistemic claim. 174  Rhonda Howard defines cultural 
absolutism as a philosophical position that declares a society’s culture to be of “supreme 
ethical value” and advocates “ethnocentric adherence to one's own cultural norms as an 
ethically correct attitude for everyone except loosely-defined ‘Westerners’”.175 This makes it 
possible, Howard argues, for forms of cultural absolutism to arise in Western democracies, 
noting that in debates about multi-racialism in Canada, the defence of cultural values was 
used to justify positions such as “immigration must be carefully controlled” and “[no one] 
would want to live in the same community as blacks.”176 Absolutist-relativism, Amanda Pollis 
cautions, can lead to claims of cultural distinctiveness from governments that are in fact a 
“wanton exercise of power by the elites” using ‘culture’ as a justification for wider human 
rights abuses.177 Jack Donnelly notes that absolutist arguments were used in the 1970s by 
“vicious dictators” who “regularly appealed to culture to justify their depredations.”178 Whilst 
built on absolutism defensive relativism when used as a form of anti-imperialist ideological 
opposition often used the language of limitations of existing human rights or the need for 
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human rights to be reprioritised. One political factor driving defensive relativism in 
international organisations was the growth of religious and cultural politics in some Third 
World bloc states, following the 1979 Iranian revolution. By the late 1980s, what Prashad 
termed a “cruel, cultural nationalism” had replaced the trademark secular anticolonial 
nationalism of the Third World bloc; in practical terms, this meant that in international 
organisations the Third World bloc states advanced defensive relativist arguments, even if 
they did not subscribe to a particular religion or cultural tradition.179 As Anthony Appiah 
notes, there is a danger for postcolonial literature to idealise or venerate the pre-colonial 
and construct an idealised past as a methodological foil to the supposed modernity of 
colonialism.180 The political expropriation of tradition was in part a mechanism for states to 
oppose the universal rights protected by an international human rights organisation. 
The Asian values debate, which began at the 1993 Bangkok conference – a regional meeting 
held prior to the 1993 Vienna Conference – was a major example of defensive relativism; 
although it should be noted that rather than being a response to a specific human rights 
instrument, it was a reaction against human rights more generally. The declaration from the 
Bangkok conference recognised the importance of human rights, but argued that “the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds” should be taken into account when applying human rights 
standards.181 This statement was highly ambiguous, as seemed to both advocated human 
rights protection and their being superseded by cultural particularities.182 These general 
principles were accompanied by a wider questioning of the role of the individual within the 
legal system, and a general defence of absolutist rule justified by reference to ‘Asian culture’ 
or ‘Asian values’. Then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed argued that although 
democracy was useful, Asians “should respect authority because it guarantees stability” and 
that political processes, such as challenging political leaders, were ‘treachery’ according to 
Malay tradition.183 These arguments were echoed by the Singaporean senior minister, Lee 
Kuan Yew, who argued that Singaporean society valued “discipline more than democracy”, 
and that other Asian societies should follow its example.184 
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Asian values appeared to be promoting a form of “soft authoritarianism”, which ostensibly 
favoured the reprioritisation of rights rather than their elimination.185 For example, Mahathir 
also announced that he wanted a review of the UDHR in its entirety – because it had been 
developed by “superpowers” – and suggested that the imposition of extra-cultural human 
rights standards was a form of imperialist oppression.186 Whilst this argument could be read 
as a case for the reprioritisation of international human rights law, its effective conclusion 
was that human rights law outside the direct control of the government ought to be rejected. 
As Abdullahi An-Na’im argued, governments in South East Asia by their treatment of political 
dissent and their human rights abuses, undermined and repudiated “the same culture and 
community in whose name it claims to speak.”187 There was also a tendency to conflate 
culture and sovereignty. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in a statement to the UN 
General Assembly in 1993, argued that “human rights ...are unquestionably of universal 
validity”, but that complex cultural realities meant that implementation had to be assessed in 
the “national context.”188 This was not only a matter of competence and expertise, but was a 
“logical consequence of the inherent right of nations to [their] cultural identity.”189 This 
conflation allowed for the defence of sovereignty to be turned into a defence of culture – 
something Howard had explicitly cautioned against – as it allowed elite politicians to decide 
the terms of culture in a manner that aligned with their own interests.190 
Asian values as a form of pre-emptive ideological opposition were institutionalised in the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Rights Declaration. After the 1993 
Vienna Conference, an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting issued a resolution calling for the creation 
of a regional human rights organisation, which progressed slowly for much of the next 
decade. In 2007, a revised ASEAN Charter contained references to a human rights 
mechanism, but these were described as “threadbare” by one commentator, and, as the 
previous chapter noted, these provisions were framed in a way so as to eliminate any ipsetic 
potential.191 Significantly, Article 14 of the Charter stated that any such organisation would 
have to operate in “conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter”. This brought 
in Article 2 of the Charter, entitled “Principles”, which had three separate references to some 
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form of defensive relativism as it committed the organisation to respect the “national 
identity” of member states, recognised the right of member states to “lead its national 
existence” and required respect for the different “cultures” of member states.192 These terms 
were so opaque that they seemingly left unfettered room for a state to claim that the 
exercise of a protection mandate by any future human rights organisation was a violation of 
the principles of the Charter, as it disrespected their national culture and their right to 
national existence. This act of pre-emptive ideological opposition institutionalised defensive 
relativism and severely limited the development of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).  
 
The 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration stated that the “realisation of human rights must 
be considered in the regional and national context”, again providing another relatively open-
ended provision that would directly facilitate defensive relativism.193 As Nicholas Doyle notes, 
various provisions in Declaration seem to echo the disagreements among the drafters about 
what human rights are and what they should protect.194 Tan Hsien-Li argued that the creation 
of the AICHR represented a “softening” of ASEAN states towards human rights; however, the 
inclusion of language within its legal structure that virtually duplicated the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration suggests that an alternate explanation would be that ASEAN states got what they 
wanted from a human rights organisation without really changing their views.195 ASEAN 
states maintained that this broadly aligned with the idea of creating an organisation that 
followed the ‘ASEAN way’ of building consensus and respect, and the Indonesian delegate to 
the panel that drafted the AICHR’s terms of reference argued that dialog could over time 
provide remedies to individuals that had suffered human rights violations.196 This claim, 
however, needs to be seen in the context of the Asian values debate more broadly, where 
claims of culture more generally were used to ideologically oppose the operation of 
international human rights organisations. Whilst it is possible that the ASEAN human rights 
commission may evolve and utilise a dialogic and non-confrontational approach to protect 
human rights, the inclusion of such open-ended provisions directly facilitates the capacity of 
                                                          
192 Art .2 ASEAN Charter <http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf> accessed 12 May 
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states to push back against any such evolution of its protection mandate. 
 
Conclusion  
If as An-Na’im writes, human rights “are supposed to be the rights of every human being”, 
they implicitly transcend states jurisdictions and presuppose a common agreement about 
the content of rights.197 As illustrated in the first section of this chapter, international human 
rights law was not a reflection of a consensus about what all states would deem as rights 
worth protecting. It was instead a reflection of a particular set of practices designed to 
protect human interests and capabilities, which a set of countries agreed to place into 
instruments imposing legal obligations. As such, international human rights law reflected a 
set of ideological preferences and could be used to advance a particular ideological cause. 
Whilst these two propositions are ultimately interrelated, due to the residual imperialism of 
international law, it is necessary to treat them as distinct in order to understand the different 
forms of Third World bloc anti-imperialism. The protection of human rights has also been 
used to justify neo-imperialist practices, such as humanitarian intervention, which inspired 
anti-imperialist opposition of the sort described in the third section of this chapter. This form 
of anti-hegemonic ideological opposition directly challenges the use of human rights as a 
justification for acts of neo-imperialism, but simultaneously also protects leaders of 
government within Third World states that commit human rights abuses. 
The second section of this chapter demonstrated how international human rights law’s 
content reflected a particular conception of human rights, which left it open to the criticism 
that it was imperialist. As RP Anand argued, with reference to international law in general, it 
had been created for Western nations “with a common cultural background and strong 
liberal individualistic features” and was unsuitable for a “heterogeneous world society”.198 
International human rights law, in its early stages, was no exception to this general trend; 
although it ought to be emphasised that as postcolonial states gained independence and 
entered into international organisations, their capacity to alter the substance of international 
law grew, as the case study of the right to development in the third section of this chapter 
illustrated. However, as even Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars 
acknowledge, ideological opposition from the Third World bloc did not produce a coherent 
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programme for reforming the substance of international human rights law.199 Instead, much 
as was the case with institutional opposition outlined in the previous chapter, anti-
imperialist ideological opposition often simply attacked international law as being a Western 
ideology. This was what lay behind defensive relativism, where international law’s claim to 
universalism was attacked as being a reflection of assumptions about Western supremacy. 
As the final case study in section three demonstrates, anti-imperialist opposition persisted 
within regional organisations; the AIHRC was designed to institutionalise defensive 
relativism, making the entire structure of the organisation a form of pre-emptive anti-
imperialist ideological opposition. The AIHRC is an interesting example of what this overall 
study seeks to analyse; it was created outside of the imperialist context of international law, 
reflecting the collective values of states in the region, and yet was subject to anti-imperialist 
opposition. This sort of pre-emptive opposition can be read, as the previous chapter argued 
as a form of rational design; states deliberately developed the organisation to reflect their 
interests, in this case these interests were rooted in a form of cultural absolutism that 
institutionalised defensive relativism.  
Anti-imperialist ideological opposition was caught by the lack of either an ideological 
alternative to international human rights law, or a distinct political programme for its reform.  
The numerous academic projects on the reform of international law, such as the TWAIL 
movement, should be distinguished from the behaviour of the Third World bloc (and latterly 
the Afro-Asian caucus) in international organisations.200 Even then, TWAIL is explicitly and 
implicitly criticised in a number of sources for being a diagnostic and analytical tool, rather 
than advancing a distinct programme for ideological reform. 201  Within international 
organisations, states engaging in ideological anti-imperialism were correct in their diagnosis 
of the problem of international human rights law’s origins and application, but often, 
ideological opposition resulted in a crude defence of the governments of postcolonial states. 
This is further illustrated in the next chapter, which analyses the UN Human Rights 
Commission and Council, where both institutional and ideological opposition quite often was 
a method for defending states from the Third World bloc that were committing human rights 
abuses.  
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What chapter four illustrates, with an analysis of the African Charter, is that many of the 
concerns about the ideological reprioritisation of international human rights law could be 
addressed and developed into a genuinely decolonial human rights instrument. This fulfilled 
Mignolo’s definition of the decolonial, as it used “new epistemes or new paradigms” and was 
built upon a “common ground or vision of the future.”202 Crucially, the African Charter 
removed international human rights law from its imperialist context, and, notionally at least, 
rendered anti-imperialist ideological opposition largely irrelevant. It was a decolonised 
human rights instrument in the sense that it drew from distinctly postcolonial experiences to 
define the contents of human rights law. However, as the examination of the AIHRC over the 
last two chapters demonstrates, anti-imperialist opposition can be incorporated into the 
design of regional organisations in a form of pre-emptive opposition.  This is due in part to a 
conflation of sovereignty and culture, which can lead to the creation of institutions with 
deliberately weak protection mandates, which also occurs in the institutions designed to 
enforce the African Charter. 
Anti-imperialist ideological opposition of the anti-hegemonic and the cultural absolutist 
forms, could not be adequately addressed by the creation of decolonial human rights 
instruments, as they were largely proxies for the defence of sovereignty. As the next chapter 
illustrates, there was often some overlap between anti-imperialist institutional and 
ideological opposition within the UN Human Rights Council and Commission, which revolved 
around the protection of the postcolonial state, to both safeguard against its own 
weaknesses and protect against the presumed hegemony of international law. What these 
forms of anti-imperialist ideological opposition and the persistence of different forms of anti-
imperialist institutional opposition discussed in the previous chapter, point to is that the 
legal structure of human rights organisations may cause anti-imperialism. Chapter five will 
argue that organisational protection mandates are inherently imperialist, and that this 
explains the persistence of anti-imperialist institutional and ideological opposition. Despite 
attempts to decolonise or propose an agenda for the reform of international human rights 
law, the legal structure of human rights organisations remains inherently imperialist due the 
structure of organisational protection mandates. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Opposition at the UN Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights Council 
Introduction  
At the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference, which drafted the instruments founding the UN, 
references to human rights were included as something of an afterthought.1 Until the 
formalisation of the UN Commission on Human Rights’ (the Commission) protection mandate 
in 1970 the UN had no formal mechanism for protecting human rights within states. A 
protection mandate describes the legal powers that an organisation possesses to hear 
petitions from individuals in member states or to scrutinise a state’s legislation for compliance 
with international human rights law. This is sometimes referred to as the structure of an 
international organisation.2 The Commission originally had a purely promotional mandate and 
in its first decade it spent much of its time drafting the human rights covenants which were 
designed to turn the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into two international 
treaties; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It was the campaign against 
apartheid, which was driven by the Third World bloc and went across UN institutions, that led 
to the creation of the Commission‘s protection mandate.3  
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter seems to preclude the operation of a protection mandate as it 
prohibits the UN from intervening “in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”4  
Article 55 and 56 of the Charter requires states to respect human rights, but without any 
specific mechanism for their monitoring or enforcement. 5  Under Article 5 and 6 of the 
Charter a state can theoretically be removed from the UN for committing human rights 
violations in their own jurisdiction, but in practice this never happened. Apartheid South Africa 
was excluded from the General Assembly, but it was never expelled from the UN entirely.6 The 
Security Council has powers to authorise military intervention “to maintain or restore 
                                                          
1 Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice (Indiana 
University Press 2008) 112-6.  
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international peace and security”, which have been used to protect human rights.7  However, 
the Security Council can only act where human rights abuses within a state are at risk of 
creating a wider international security threat and as chapter two of this study outlined, due to 
neo-imperialist politics these powers are sporadically applied.  
This chapter shows how postcolonial states, through the Third World bloc in both the 
Commission and later the UN Human Rights Council (which replaced the Commission in 2006) 
engaged in anti-imperialist opposition and the driving factor for this was the application of 
these organisations’ protection mandates. Institutional opposition, as chapter one argued, is a 
reaction to an organisation’s protection mandate and takes the form of a reassertion of state 
sovereignty. Protection mandates give the organisation what chapter one described as an 
ipsetic potential – the capacity to make an authoritative claim as to what a state’s law ought to 
be, giving the organisation an authoritative and rival claim to the state as a law maker. This 
varies in intensity depending on the nature of an organisation’s protection mandate. The 
Council and Commission are what Lawrence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter term political 
organisations in that they are comprised of delegates from member states and are dependent 
on political processes and political pressure rather than international legal obligations, to 
enforce their decisions.8 Anti-imperialist institutional opposition was predicated on the notion 
that postcolonial states’ sovereignty was relatively unequal to other states, in particular 
formerly colonialist states. Because of this international law became an instrument for 
perpetuating inequalities on postcolonial states or weakening their sovereignty and 
international organisations were a means of continuing these inequalities. The UN and other 
international organisations were residually imperialist as their legal structure preserved the 
power and privileged position of formerly colonialist states which, as chapter one argues, led 
to a sense amongst states in the Third World bloc that their membership of international 
organisations perpetuated imperialist dominance. This chapter shows how this persisted even 
after the demise of the Third World bloc in the early 1990s.9 Postcolonial states in the African 
and the Asian regional blocs often worked together in the Commission and the Council (the 
Afro-Asian bloc) to collectively engage in anti-imperialist opposition.  
Ideological opposition, as chapter two detailed, was where states opposed human rights 
organisations because of a philosophical objection to the content and nature of the 
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international human rights law the organisation was tasked with protecting. Anti-imperialist 
ideological opposition came in two forms; anti-hegemonic ideological opposition was 
predicated on the notion that international human rights law was a neo-colonialist tool used 
by former colonialist states to justify the oppression of postcolonial states which meant that 
the institutions set up to enforce it needed to be opposed. There were also arguments that 
international human rights law needed to be decolonised by reprioritising it’s substance to 
accommodate the needs of postcolonial states, such as allowing different cultural values to be 
recognised (defensive relativism) or to recognise the material needs of states 
(developmentalism). As the previous chapter argued the decolonisation of international 
human rights law would remove it from the imperialist context of its origins and expand the 
type of interests protected. Anti-imperialist ideological opposition at both the Council and 
Commission was however relatively unconcerned with decolonising international human 
rights law and more focused upon anti-hegemonic opposition. It is the application of 
protection mandates at UN institutions, this chapter argues, which tends to generate anti-
imperialist forms of opposition. This chapter examines this general trend by looking at the 
formation and decline of the Commission’s protection mandate, and the role anti-imperialism 
played in the process before examining how anti-imperialist opposition was still present at the 
Council. This will be illustrated further in the next chapter with an analysis of anti-imperialist 
opposition towards regional organisations before in the final chapter assessing the features of 
protection mandates that are inherently imperialist meaning that they will trigger anti-
imperialist opposition regardless of the rights that an organisation is tasked with enforcing.  
The first section of this chapter looks at the origins of the Commission’s protection mandate in 
the context of the wider campaign by the Third World bloc against apartheid at the UN. Whilst 
this made the Commission more powerful the Third World bloc resisted the Commission 
investigating situations outside of apartheid and actively defended a form of double standards 
whereby states from the Third World bloc were not considered by the Commission, even 
though there were extensive complaints of human rights violations within some states. This 
was a form of anti-imperialist opposition and eventually led to the Commissions replacement 
with the Council which was meant to be less overtly politicised.  However, the Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) process and other parts of the Council’s work were also subject to 
forms of anti-imperialist opposition from the Afro-Asian bloc. In a sense anti-imperialist 
opposition was readily explicable given the residually imperialist nature of the UN and the 
highly politicised nature of human rights in political bodies. Yet what is significant is the 
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correlation between anti-imperialism from the Third World bloc and the operation of 
protection mandates.  
(1) Anti-imperialist opposition to the UN Commission on Human Rights: 1967-
2006 
Under Article 62 of the UN Charter the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is authorised to 
make “recommendations for the purposes of promoting … human rights”. The Commission 
was a sub-body of ECOSOC created in 1946 which did not have the power to hear individual 
petitions and confined itself to promotional work.10 This was done largely at the instigation of 
Western powers, particularly the British and Australians, who successfully blocked proposals 
from the Philippines and Chile to create an independent organisation with its own bill of 
rights.11 The Commission did receive complaints from individuals but they had to be received 
in complete confidence – information about the complaints received between 1951 and 1952 
showed that the majority were concerned with religious liberties or political freedom – but 
there was no mechanism for considering the complaints and holding states to account.12 In a 
1951 Article Edgar Turlington, an American academic, described the Commission’s functions in 
terms of advancing the values contained in the UDHR by “teaching and education and by 
progressive measures”.13 The Commission’s membership was decided by ‘slate vote’ of 
ECOSOC members which meant that a list of countries seeking membership from each of the 
UN’s regional groupings was simply provided and approved by ECOSOC. The Commission met 
annually for a single period of six weeks in Geneva where it deliberated resolutions and 
organised other activities.  
The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the 
Sub-Commission) was set up in 1947 to conduct studies and make recommendations to the 
Commission on the prevention of discrimination. It consisted of 12 independent experts, 
elected by the Commission and acting in their individual capacities - by virtue of being an 
expert body it had a significant ipsetic potential.14 It did not initially have a specific mandate to 
hear individual cases of discrimination. Both ECOSOC Resolution 75 in 1947 and resolution 728 
in 1959 on individual communications affirmed the “no power to take action” doctrine leaving 
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the Sub-Commission without a protection mandate.15 The creation of bodies with the right to 
petition under Optional Protocol 1 of the ICCPR and the Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) in the 1960s provided a template for a protection mandate.  As 
part one of this section demonstrates, the campaign against apartheid provided the impetus 
for the creation of a protection mandate at the Sub-Commission. The individual complaints 
procedure, known as the 1503 procedure after the resolution that created it, allowed 
individuals to send in petitions detailing human rights abuses, which were then heard in 
confidence at the Sub-Commission’s annual sessions in Geneva.16 Overall the power of its 
protection mandate was essentially exhortatory but in that respect, it had some considerable 
influence especially in respect of Chile and other South American states which experienced 
military dictatorships.   
In 1967 the Third World bloc was able to collectively command just under half the votes at the 
Commission and from this point apartheid and the struggle against colonial and minority rule 
dominated the Third World bloc’s engagement with the Commission. As the second part of 
this section argues, this led to the shaping of double standards on human rights in Commission 
where the Third World bloc sought to target human rights abuses, committed by formerly 
colonialist states, and prevent the Commission from taking any action on human rights abuses 
in postcolonial states. Further expansion of the Commission in 1992 enhanced the strength of 
the Third World bloc. The end of apartheid in South Africa and the Cold War meant that the 
political dynamics, described in chapter one, which had created the conditions for the Third 
World bloc’s inter-group cohesion diminished. This did not mark a shift in the Commission’s 
political dynamics, instead Third World double standards morphed into a form of anti-
hegemonic ideological opposition. Whilst this may be a basis for criticising acts of imperialism, 
as a form of opposition in international human rights organisations it proved an incredibly 
nihilistic doctrine that, as the final part of this section argues, resulted in the breakdown of 
Commission’s protection mandate.  
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(i) The Third World bloc, anti-apartheid and the creation of a protection 
mandate for the Commission: The background to anti-imperialist opposition  
 
In the mid-1950s a variety of proposals to expand the UN’s power to enforce human right 
standards were mooted including proposals from Sri Lanka to create an international criminal 
court and Uruguay to create a UN Attorney-General.17 The US proposed some reforms to the 
Commission but these were dismissed by contemporary commentators as “a euphemism for 
inaction” and driven by short-term political motivations.18  The prevailing sentiment in 
ECOSOC had been that giving the Commission or the Sub-Commission investigative powers 
would threaten state sovereignty, but as the Security Council after the 1960 Sharpeville 
massacre began to issue stronger anti-apartheid resolutions there was a shift in UN bodies 
towards a more activist anti-apartheid policy. Some authors argue that General Assembly 
Resolution 2144 in 1966 was a turning point as it urged ECSOC and the Commission to improve 
the UN’s capacity to stop human rights violations.19 However, Resolution 2144 was specifically 
framed in terms of the UN’s “interest in combating polices of apartheid” and the preamble 
extensively referred to apartheid, minority rule and Portuguese colonialism.20 Out of the 
resolutions 14 substantive points, nine of them referenced the apartheid and anti-colonialism 
and only three of them referred, directly or indirectly, to the protection human rights. The 
procedure under resolution 1235 in 1967 authorised the Commission to receive information 
about human rights abuses and engage in a “thorough study of situations which reveal a 
consistent pattern of violations of human rights.”21 
Under the final version of resolution 1235 the Commission and the Sub-Commission gained 
the power to consider “violations of human rights … including polices of racial discrimination 
and segregation and of apartheid” and powers to investigate and study specific “human rights 
abuses”.22 It was debatable whether this meant that the procedure was limited to human 
rights abuses in southern Africa or whether this was merely an illustration of the situations in 
which the Commission should act.23 Article 3 of resolution 1235 stated that the Commission’s 
investigatory powers were confined to cases such as those “exemplified by the policy of 
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apartheid as practised in the Republic of South Africa.” 24  During the drafting process 
Cameroon and Algeria had sided with the USSR and argued that resolution should be limited 
to situations of colonial rule but the final wording seemed to use apartheid as an example, not 
as an exclusionary term. But the phrasing of the provision – in particular the specificity of the 
location the abuses - “the Republic of South Africa and in the Territory of South West Africa”  - 
meant that Third World states could argue that investigations should not occur outside of this 
context. In the early 1970s some African states argued that the Sub-Commission should not 
investigate matters outside southern Africa, even though significant racial discrimination 
persisted in many African states.25 The 1235 procedure was bound to attract a degree of 
institutional opposition and as Boyle observes states from the Third World bloc, even though 
they had instigated its creation proved as “reluctant as other states” to the prospect of it being 
used in their jurisdiction.26  Yet as Boyle goes on to note, there was a particular hostility to the 
mechanisms “engineered [to tackle] apartheid, colonialism and Israel” being used in Third 
World states.  
The case for the Commission being able to receive individual petitions had been made for 
many years, but ECOSOC had resisted granting it this kind of power.27 In July 1959 an ECOSOC 
Resolution rejected individual petition proposals, which were described by one contemporary 
source “the most elaborate wastepaper basket ever designed.”28  Support for individual 
petition as Burke notes changed after 1960 when more African and Asian states joined the 
General Assembly and sought election to the Commission however, support for individual 
petition was limited to their “two main preoccupations ….apartheid and colonialism.”29 There 
was considerable support from the Third World bloc both for the Committee on 
Decolonisation (the Committee of Twenty-Four) and for a committee to hear petitions under 
the CERD. It was campaigning by the Committee of Twenty-Four on the issue of apartheid and 
decolonisation that led ECOSOC to reconsider individual petition. During the drafting process 
Tanzania tried unsuccessfully to introduce proposals that would require the Sub-Commission 
to focus exclusively on colonial situations and apartheid.30 Other states from the Third World 
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bloc along with Eastern European states also severely criticised the application of the process 
outside of southern Africa.31    
The 1503 procedure Patrick Flood argues was “designed to provide a way for the Commission 
to evaluate situations amounting to consistent patterns of gross violations” of human rights 
and its procedure involved considering communications in private before activating wider 
political action from the Commission.32  European human rights activists initially praised the 
1503 procedure for providing a forum for individuals to petition governments about their 
human rights abuses. Yet, the procedure, whilst providing an extensive mechanism for the 
processing of individual complaints, did not make communications public until the end of its 
own internal review process, when recommendations were transmitted to ECOSOC. Nor did it 
actually make the individual victim a party to the proceedings; as Tardu notes under the 1503 
procedure the individual “plaintiff is an information transmitter” and there was no entitlement 
to have “his communication considered.”33 The communications were processed by an expert 
working group and then referred to the Sub-Commission for consideration - around six to 
eight communications out of the hundreds received each year were processed during each 
Commission session.  There was no mechanism for processing urgent communications 
received outside of the Sub-Commission’s annual meetings which as Tolley notes contributed 
to its failure to process complaints received about the Greek military junta in 1974.34 The 
secrecy provisions had been strongly supported by the Third World bloc and the Soviet Union 
during the resolution’s drafting process. It was only in the final stage of the communication, 
after an interstate dialogue had failed to yield results, that the substance of the 
communication could be made public, as a means of ‘shaming’ the state in question about its 
human rights violations.35  In 1978 the Sub- Commission went public with some of the 
complaints that it had received which included complainants from states in the Third World 
bloc such as Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malawi and Equatorial Guinea.  
In a wider perspective the 1235 and the 1503 procedures were part of a wider campaign led 
by the Third World bloc to shift the Commission’s focus towards fighting apartheid because as 
Vincent noted it was seen by the Third World bloc as a continuation of the anti-colonial 
struggle.36 During the early 1970s the Commission began issuing targeted resolutions against 
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minority ruled states. The focus on apartheid should be seen both in terms of the number of 
Commission resolutions passed and the amount of time spent on the issue. From 1970-80 
around 8% of all Commission meetings focused on South Africa specifically but when 
considering meetings on the issues of racism and self-determination – which were either 
proxies for attacking minority rule or apartheid – the Commission cumulatively spent around a 
quarter of its time on apartheid .37 In the early 1980s resolutions on self-determination formed 
the highest proportions of targeted resolutions issued by the Commission, the majority aimed 
at South Africa.38 The way apartheid dominated the Commission’s agenda was arguably 
illustrative of the power of the Third World bloc; between 1967 and 1974 only South Africa 
and Israel were the subject of direct action under resolution 1235.39  In the UN’s wider work 
the Third World bloc were also successful at making apartheid a priority so much so that by 
1995, half a century after the UN’s founding, one fifth of all General Assembly resolutions 
passed had concerned apartheid.40 
The progressive advancement of Third World priorities led to claims from formerly colonialist 
powers during the 1970s (from the US in particular) that the Commission was becoming 
‘politicized’. 41  Arguments about politicization ultimately favoured a narrow American 
“functionalist” view of international organisations which held that organisations should be 
confined to the powers granted to them by the states that originally created the 
organisation.42 During the Reagan administration criticism that the Commission was “anti-
Western” grew with many critics citing as proof the growing power of the Third World bloc.43 
As the Commission had been originally created as a political and not a legal body, it was 
unsurprising that states would seek to pursue political strategies but the assumption was that 
this agenda would broadly be in a Western mould.44 As Lyons et al. note the Commission was a 
major forum for the Third World bloc to “mobiliz[e] their combined force to argue for systemic 
changes”.45 It is important to note that US criticism of the Commission, of the sort outlined 
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above, was more focused on their perceived loss of influence then it was on highlighting Third 
World double standards. 
The Third World bloc were in a much stronger position in the Commission than they were in 
other UN bodies and were able to overcome some of the structural weaknesses outlined in 
chapter one. This was principally because they were able to mobilise bloc votes to advance 
their own agenda.  After the expansion of the Commission in the late 1960s Boyle noted that 
bloc voting and the “solidarity” of “regional and political groupings” was determining its 
agenda.46 Given the relative power that the Third World bloc began to acquire it is somewhat 
paradoxical that anti-imperialism was such a factor. Part of this can be explained by the 
context of the UN – it was and remains an organisation constructed in a residually imperialist 
legal framework as discussed in chapter two. Therefore even if control could be established 
over a particular UN body the overall framework of the organisation still favoured the interests 
of formerly colonialist states.  
     (ii)  Double Standards and anti-imperialist opposition from the Third World bloc 
1965 -1981 
“In definitional terms” Laurie Wiseberg argues “a double standard means applying different 
criteria to situations which are so similar that they merit equal treatment.”47 Whilst this may 
seem truistic, double standards can be a difficult concept to grasp. International human rights 
law was, as David Forsythe notes, predominantly shaped in a liberal Western mould.48 
Therefore many instances of double standards can be read as manifestations of different or 
divergent human rights standards. Double standards were where human rights abuses were 
criticised by states in the Third World bloc when practiced by formerly colonialist states, but 
explicitly or implicitly defended when analogous or identical practices occurred in the Third 
World. For example Wiseberg notes that during the 1960s “no parallel was drawn between 
the exploitation of the Ethiopian peasant and the exploitation of the South Africa squatter” 
even though both were exploited by their governments and denied political rights.49 Double 
standards should not be confused with a rejection of the concept of human rights; those 
practicing double standards often accepted the idea of a system of international human rights 
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law - they disagreed about whom it ought  apply to, arguing that human rights scrutiny should 
not be applied to states within the Third World bloc.  
Double standards were not confined to states in the Third World; in the 1980s the US openly 
supported authoritarian anti-communist regimes in Latin America whilst claiming to support 
human rights. Jeane Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN during the Reagan administration 
argued that there was a distinction between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘totalitarian’ regimes.  US 
support for authoritarian regimes could coexist with their commitment to promote human 
rights because they were “less repressive” than totalitarian regimes as they left “in place 
exiting allocations of wealth, power [and] status”.50 Kirkpatrick was relatively clear that the 
reason for favouring authoritarian regimes, and ignoring their human rights abuses, was that 
they were “more compatible with US interests”. 51  Double standards on human rights 
protection in international organisations were often manifestations of intra-bloc ideological 
preferences and resulted in some states or some issues never being considered because they 
were protected by bloc votes at the Commission that delayed or hampered consideration of 
human rights abuses in their jurisdiction. This evidently infuriated some UN officials and in a 
1982 address to the 38th session of the Commission, the Director of the UN Human Rights 
Division, Theo van Boven said that he found it “unacceptable...[that] gross violation of human 
rights in any country should not be discussed ... simply because other situations have not been 
taken up as well.”52 
Double standards should not just be seen in terms of states pursuing their own self-interests, 
as states in the Third World bloc often cited two specific objections to international human 
rights law to justify their double standards. Firstly it was often argued, as Third World 
delegates did at the First World Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968, that the 
UDHR did not meet the material needs of Third World.53 This was a definite case of anti-
imperialist ideological opposition as the inadequacy of the UDHR in terms of advancing 
development was a major part of the Third World bloc’s criticism of international human 
rights law. There was however little explicit linkage drawn between ideological opposition and 
the practice of double standards. Secondly, it was implicitly and sometimes explicitly, argued 
that non-apartheid related human rights abuses were of a lesser priority than those 
committed under apartheid. This argument was rooted in the Third World bloc’s collective 
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identity as the remaining minority rule/colonial regimes in Africa posed an existential threat to 
their sovereignty as they represented the continuation of colonialism in defiance of 
international law. Given the relative fragility of many Africa states sovereignty the presence of 
an imperialist redoubt in Southern Africa, which in the 1960s looked set to continue in spite of 
international action, posed an existential threat to postcolonial sovereignty in Africa.54  
When the existence of apartheid was used to inhibit the consideration of the human rights 
records of states in the Third World bloc but encourage the consideration of other states this 
was an act of anti-imperialist institutional opposition. The double standards from the Third 
World bloc were based on the notion that postcolonial sovereignty was unequal and under 
threat from international law which justified collective anti-imperialist institutional opposition 
towards the application of international human rights law by international organisations in 
postcolonial states. As the Commission was a political organisation, its protection mandate 
depended upon a process of politically shaming a state in order to trigger a process of law 
reform. The obstruction of what Conall Mallory termed the “name and blame” process of 
identifying a state as a human rights violator was a way of protecting the domestic-legal 
sovereignty of a state by preventing it from being subject to a process whereby it was under 
pressure to change its laws.55 Double standards in this regard were also a form of extreme 
anti-hegemonic ideological opposition, as they were predicated on the implicit belief that all 
human rights abuses were colonialist in origin. 
It is important to note that there was a marked shift from implicit double standards to explicit 
double standards as the number of Commission members from the Third World bloc increased 
in 1967. The increase in membership led to there being 14 members from the African and 
Asian geographic blocs. With the added support of the 12 Latin American and Eastern 
European bloc this meant that the Third World bloc could count on between 45-75% of the 
voting power in the Commission. Although this was subject to alliances on specific issues it 
allowed the Third World bloc to effectively shape different aspects of the Commission’s work. 
It also allowed them to reinforce their basic position on the application of human rights law. In 
1968 in a Commission sponsored debate on polices in the occupied Palestinian territories, the 
delegate from Iraq was challenged about the executions of prisoners in Iraq. The Iraqi delegate 
responded that these were wholly domestic matters and other delegates on the Commission 
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supported this position. From the late 1960s onwards Boyle described bloc voting at the 
Commission as “restricting and frustrating its work”.56  
Rupert Emerson writing in 1975 observed that systematic human rights abuses, such as 
massacres in Rwanda in 1965 and forced deportations in Ghana, were being overlooked, 
ignored or in some cases even defended by the Third World bloc at the Commission.57  
Delegates from the Third World bloc blocked discussion of discriminatory practices in Ghana 
and Tanzania by the Sub-Commission.58 This did not necessarily mean that the states in the 
Third World bloc were always successful in blocking the consideration of communications from 
Third World states. In 1977 the Sub-Commission considered a communication from Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Malawi alleging that the government was attempting to ban them from practicing 
their religion. One possible reason that this communication might not have been subject to the 
same level of opposition was, as the Commission acknowledged in their report to ECOSOC in 
1980, that the abuses complained of had ceased in 1975. Given this the Commission 
recommended only that ECOSOC call for damages for “those who may have suffered 
injustices”.59 Yet, at the same time the Commission noted the “failure of the Government of 
Malawi” to co-operate or respond to the communication over a three year period, indicating 
that standard patterns of institutional opposition were still a feature of Third World bloc states 
interaction with the Commission.  
 
When Uganda’s forced expulsion of the Asian community came before the Sub-Commission in 
1972 consideration of the case the Nigerian delegate to the Commission attempted to bloc it 
arguing that the situation “was not a human rights abuse”.60 A number of Commission 
delegates argued that they should not concern themselves with matters outside Southern 
Africa, even though what was going on in Uganda was systemic racial discrimination of the 
sort that the Sub-Commission had a direct mandate to investigate.61 In March 1977 the Sub-
Commission was forced into abandoning an investigation into systematic human rights abuses, 
including the operation of government sponsored death squads in Uganda, after political 
resistance from African members on the Commission.62 After a group of Nordic countries in 
1978 proposed a General Assembly resolution condemning Uganda, African states from the 
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Third World bloc negotiated a compromise where the resolution would not be debated or put 
to a vote and the situation referred back to the Commission for investigation.63    
The Commission first received communications alleging serious human rights abuses in 
Equatorial Guinea in 1974 and considered the communications in confidence in 1975. Since 
independence the government of Macías Nguema had engaged in systematic internal 
repression which included public summary executions and by the mid-1970s Nguema had 
murdered, for real or imaginary crimes, over two thirds of all of the members of parliament 
elected in 1968.64  The police and the army had beaten to death numerous public officials and 
notoriously Nguema personally oversaw the decapitation of his finance minister. When the 
Commission tried to open up a dialogue with Equatorial Guinea this was initially rejected by 
the Nguema government, who criticised the UN using standard anti-imperialist language, and 
other members of the Commission initially supported this position. It was not until 1977 when 
regional bodies joined the condemnation of Equatorial Guinea that the Commission was able 
to adopt a confidential resolution and in 1978 they were able to launch an investigation under 
Resolution 1503.65  The Nigerian government were particularly keen to take action as many 
Nigerian guest workers in Equatorial Guinea had been killed in state run executions. When 
Nguema was overthrown in a coup in 1979, the new government began to co-operate with the 
Commission, allowing the visit of a Special Rapporteur, although this appears to have been a 
largely tactical move as the new government obstructed the Special Rapporteur’s work at 
several stages. What is significant about Equatorial Guinea was that it began as a case of 
double standards but when the scale of the government’s human rights abuses threatened the 
security of neighbouring states, Third World states supported the Commission’s actions.66  
Importantly the Equatorial Guinea case did not create any wider precedent for action from the 
Commission.  
The claim of imperial or colonial bias weakened slightly in the early 1980s and when the Sub- 
Commission considered a report on slavery in Ethiopia and Mauritania from a group of NGOs, 
anti-imperialist complaints about the report were simply rejected.67  It is noteworthy that one 
of the reasons for the Commission’s relative success in its actions against Chile was due to its 
government losing its key geopolitical ally when the US under the Carter administration 
adopted a pro-human rights foreign policy. This led to it falling outside the major power blocs 
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and becoming politically isolated at the UN. The Third World bloc had little sympathy with the 
Pinochet regime and it was alienated from many other pro-Third World regimes in the Latin 
American region. Van Boven noted that “Chile like situations” in other parts of Latin America 
never came before the Commission and the repeated presence of South Africa on the 
Commission’s agenda meant that by the end of the 1970s “reproaches of selectivity, double 
standard, conspiracy of silence...” were constantly “in the air” at the Commission’s meeting.68 
During this period South Africa, Rhodesia, and the remaining Portuguese colonies were 
perpetrating significant and systemic human rights abuses. However, as Wiseberg notes, this 
argument cannot logically excuse or explain the Third World bloc’s insistence that apartheid 
should be the sole concern of international human rights organisations to the active exclusion 
of other situations.69 Double standards may have actually retarded the construction of an anti-
apartheid consensus in international organisations as some Western states reacted with 
hostility to what they saw as an attempt to weaken human rights by some members of the 
Third World bloc, and this contributed to the relative lack of agreement at the First World 
Conference on Racism in 1978. Double standards also allowed Western leaders who were 
wary of any direct legal action against apartheid for domestic political reasons, such as 
President Ronald Regan and British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher, to justify their inaction, 
as they claimed that Third World human rights abuses needed to be tackled first because they 
were not being addressed. This was highly cynical politics but illustrated how double standards 
among one group of states created an incentive for double standards that cut could across all 
international organisations. Double standards became more complex in the mid-1980s and as 
the second section of this chapter outlines, also continued at the Human Rights Council.  
(iii) Anti-imperialist opposition and the collapse of the Commission’s 
protection mandate: 1982 -2005 
The appointment of Thematic Special Rapporteurs, beginning in 1982 with the appointment of 
Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Detentions, allowed for the investigation of specific issues 
outside of thematic or specific resolutions at the Commission. The independence of Special 
Rapporteurs, who had roving briefs that continued outside of the Commissions’ sittings, 
circumnavigated the power of voting blocs at the Commission.70 This was complimented by 
the work of specialist working groups, in particular the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances which had broad ranging remits and powers which included the 
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ability to mount country visits. The Third World bloc were initially supportive of the Working 
Group on Enforced Disappearances in 1981, as it was created in response to the on-going 
human rights abuses committed by the military regime in Argentina. This support was in part 
contingent; Argentina was a right-wing authoritarian regime, with pro-US leanings, isolated 
from pro-Third World Latin American states. When the Commission’s final report included 
references to Ethiopia and other countries this was heavily opposed by some states in the 
Third World bloc. Opposition took the form of collective non-cooperation with both Special 
Rapporteurs and Working Groups. In 1989 the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances reported that seven states, including Angola and Guinea, had not 
substantively replied to numerous allegations of human rights violations in their countries.71  
Susan Koshy argues that during the 1980s bloc based resistance began to soften as changes to 
the membership of the Commission led to the inclusion of more Western states that formed 
“issue based coalitions” with members of the Third World bloc on a variety of different 
matters.72  There is some basis to believe Koshy’s basic contention on this point as during the 
1980s a number of different special rapporteurs and working groups began to be appointed, 
dealing with torture, arbitrary detention and freedom of religion.73 From 1981 to 1985 the 
Commission issued a series of resolutions singling out Iran and Kampchuca (Cambodia), two 
states that had previously been defended by the Third World bloc, for engaging in systemic 
human rights abuses. Yet the cause of this was not necessarily a change in the Third World 
bloc’s attitude to the Commission’s protection mandate but rather a change in the domestic 
political structures of the states concerned. The Iranian revolution and their war with Iraq had 
broken down the standard pattern of intra-bloc solidarity. Writing about voting patterns in the 
General Assembly in the 1980s Tomas Frank observed that the Third World bloc by and large 
voted in favour of resolutions condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Kampchuca, because 
this was a reflection of their common consensus on the issue of non-interference in sovereign 
affairs.74 
By the end of the 1980s the complaints system, under resolution 1503, had run into problems. 
The Commission’s role as a political gatekeeper to the Sub-Commission meant that the Third 
World bloc were able to maintain patterns of collective anti-imperialist opposition. The only 
way to consider some cases, such as the systemic human rights abuses under the Mobutu 
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regime in Zaire, was in confidence under the 1503 procedure and many of these cases were 
never made public.75  This weakened the Commission’s protection mandate which was 
contingent upon identifying a state as a human rights violator.76  Some states were able to 
escape consideration in confidential sessions all together; from 1984 onwards Pakistan was 
highlighted as cause for concern at Commission meetings but managed to escape referral to 
the Sub-Commission for action for years. In a particularly grisly coincidence in 1988 the 
Commission removed Iraq from the investigation procedures under Resolution 1503, just four 
days before Saddam Hussein’s government launched a nerve gas attack on the Kurdish 
minority in Iraq.77 By the beginning of the 1990s however, the relative decline of the voting 
power of the Third World bloc and a greater promotional interest in human rights among 
African governments meant that the number of country specific cases considered by the 
Commission trebled.78  
 
It was the further expansion of the Commission in 1992 which contributed to a return of bloc 
voting. This was accompanied by a renewed sense of solidarity among the Third World bloc 
against the US, because of their long running campaign at the Commission against Cuba and 
their foreign policy, which increasingly used humanitarian justifications for what appeared to 
be neo-imperialist actions.79 Cuba was able to rally the Afro-Asian bloc in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s to openly challenge resolutions on civil and political rights. A similar issue arose 
with China who after 1992 managed to escape criticism or investigation of its own human 
rights abuses until the Commission’s demise in 2006. It did this by constructing a coalition of 
states from the Afro-Asian bloc which supported a policy of no further action when the US 
tabled resolutions criticising China’s suppression of political dissent and religious freedom.  By 
2001 China had escaped censure nine times meaning that the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre was never considered by the Commission.80 When the US was voted off the 
Commission in 2001 this was seen as a direct attack on their imperialist policies and increasing 
tendency towards unilateral interpretations of international law.81 Yet China never received 
anything like the same treatment even though by the 1990s it was engaging imperialist 
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practices such as using economic leverage on states to encourage them to abstain from critical 
votes in international organisations. The ideological rationale behind the Afro-Asian bloc in the 
Commission appeared to be entirely anti-hegemonic rather than anti-colonial – it was focused 
on attacking states in the Western and Other Regional Group at the UN rather than attacking 
colonialism as a practice. Afro-Asian bloc states sided with Russia when resolutions on the 
situation in Chechnya came before the Commission, even though the victims in this case were 
a Muslim minority living under what was arguably a form of colonial rule. However, Russian 
support for non-intervention policies in international organisations was invaluable to the anti-
imperialist institutional opposition of the Afro-Asian bloc. 
  
There were signs that direct anti-imperialist opposition was in the mid-1990s losing some of its 
potency; when Sudan attacked the Commission as imperialist and racist for criticising the 
discriminatory nature of the Sharia laws imposed by the military led government, they did not 
receive any support from other states and a Commission resolution condemning Sudan was 
adopted by a wide margin.82  However Sudan was still voted onto the Commission by the 
Africa bloc and when the US lost its seat in 2001, it was noted by some observers that it was 
extremely ironic that Sudan was able to keep its seat even though it was engaging in slavery 
and racial and religious oppression.83  Afro-Asian bloc states also continually supported 
resolutions against Israel, which by the late 1990s had become increasingly open ended. Many 
of them focused on attacking Israel politically rather than on specific abuses experienced by 
Palestinian civilians. The reason for these shifting alliances was due both to the nature of 
individual governments and the increasing ideological fragmentation of bloc voting.  
 
A subtler form anti-imperialist institutional opposition occurred through attempts to engineer 
double standards within the Commission’s legal powers. In 1993 states from the Western and 
Other bloc were able to successfully resist a proposal by the Third World bloc to limit the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance to only examining cases in Europe and North America.84 
In 2001 the Asian bloc opposed the work of a Commission subgroup examining a declaration 
of indigenous rights, arguing that it should not include indigenous communities living in their 
states. They argued that the concept of indigenous people only concerned the “situation of 
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the original inhabitants ... disposed and marginalised by settlers from overseas [that] still 
remain under domination”.85 This would have confined indigenous rights to the Americas and 
Oceania (the Australian Pacific region) and the reference to domination was a way of inferring 
colonial-imperialism.  
 
The major focus of ideological opposition from Afro-Asian bloc states in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, was the promotion of democracy as a human right and an integral component to 
the rule of law. In 2001 several states from the Afro-Asian bloc, including the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Libya, Swaziland, Syria, and Vietnam abstained on a motion about 
importance of free and fair elections but supported a motion, sponsored by Cuba, emphasising 
the need to tackle socio-economic inequality as part of democratic governance. As the Indian 
delegate noted the Cuban resolution highlighted “the fact that poverty inhibits the full and 
effective enjoyment of human rights” and this appeared to be a continuation of the Third 
World bloc’s attempts to reprioritise human rights.86 However, when competing resolutions 
on democracy were again tabled in 2002 Michael Dennis noted that some states in the Afro-
Asian bloc were supporting competing resolutions “with the intention of subverting efforts to 
promote and define democracy, and not with the intention of promoting economic, social, and 
cultural rights… within their own countries”.87  At the 60th Session of the Commission in 2004 
there were a large number of resolutions on the promotion of economic social and cultural 
rights but as Nazila Ghanea and Ladan Rahmani noted there was little progress on the issue of 
creating an enforcement mechanism for these rights.88  This anti-hegemonic ideological 
opposition from the Afro-Asian bloc was illustrative of a general antipathy towards the 
protection of human rights with resolutions on economic and social rights being used to 
subvert the development of supranational rights protection more generally rather than 
strengthen the protection of economic and social rights. As the previous chapter detailed this 
had been a feature of anti-imperialist ideological opposition from the Third World bloc since 
the First World Conference on Human Rights in 1968.  
 
Double standards, both Third World double standards and other political double standards, 
had by the early 2000s become increasingly problematic and were undermining the efficacy of 
the Commission.  Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner, in a 2005 speech described it as 
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“wrong and obscure” that states were able to view blocking moves as “a political triumph”.89 
She went onto say that “violation[s] of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of 
the world” were being answered with reference to resolutions only targeted against four 
states.90  An empirical analysis of Commission membership in 2008 by Martin Edwards et al., 
revealed that states with comparatively worse human rights records were more likely to be 
elected to the Commission.91  The data presented analysed a country’s comparative score on 
an index of physical integrity violations that measured incidents of unlawful killings, political 
arrests and other human rights violations and showed a correlation between the propensity of 
a state to commit human rights abuses and their seeking Commission membership. This 
became particularly apparent after 2000 and coincided with an acceleration of double 
standards in terms of votes and decisions about investigations of human rights abuses.92  In 
2003 when Libya was appointed as chair of the Commission, whilst maintaining a network of 
torture facilities for opponents of its government, it provoked a significant international 
backlash.93 In July that year the incoming High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira 
de Mello warned that the Commission’s “use for political ends” was giving rise to a “very 
serious credibility problem.”94 
(iv) Interpreting anti-imperialist opposition at the Commission  
“Imagine a jury that includes murderers and rapists” Brad Roth the Executive Director of 
Human Rights Watch wrote in a New York Times opinion piece, noting that such “spectacles 
are not far from reality at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights”.95 These very 
public sentiments illustrated just how far the credibility of the Commission had been eroded 
by the escalation of doubles standards in the 1990s. A report from the UN Secretary General’s 
office in 2005 noted that as some states used membership of the Commission to attack other 
states, the Commission had developed a “credibility deficit”.96 Ideological and institutional 
anti-imperialist opposition was heavily responsible for generating this credibility deficit. It is 
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important in any historical assessment of the Commission to stress that the Third World bloc 
were not wholly responsible for the Commission’s collapse and long term hostility from the US 
also played a role in the decline of its credibility. 
As noted above the double standards of the Third World bloc were a mixture of anti-
imperialist institutional opposition and anti-hegemonic opposition. A partial defence of double 
standards could be mounted by looking at the fallacies of the universal human rights project. 
Universality is contingent upon the idea that a depoliticised interpretation of rights exists that 
applies to every person equally. As argued in the previous chapter this is ahistorical and 
ignores the socially contingent nature of many rights, which often places a large premium 
upon rights, such as civil rights against the state, that are highly Western centric in both their 
origin and importance. This argument explains why different conceptions of human rights exist 
and why states adopt a relativistic position. There is however, little evidence that relativism, of 
the sort outlined in the previous chapter, was a factor in anti-imperialist opposition at the 
Commission. Additionally the practice of double standards involves accepting the principle of 
universal rights, whilst in practice cherry picking the incidents that could be considered human 
rights abuses by a human rights organisation. Protecting some states over others undermined 
the Commission’s protection mandate which was entirely dependent upon what Ramcharan 
described as the bringing of the “international presence to bear upon a situation”.97  Political 
shaming, as the final chapter makes clear, was the principal way for protection mandates to 
encourage compliance, with international human rights law.  
  
One of the closest attempts at an ideological justification for Third World double standards 
was made by Ali Mazuri who argued that African nationalism aimed to seek “pigmentational 
self-determination” to rectify the core problem with colonialism which was domination by 
other races.98 Although Mazuri’s argument was focused on self-determination, the basic 
principle was that human rights and self-determination were remedial anti-colonial concepts, 
which did not apply to postcolonial states. This, as Onyeonoro Kamanu notes, implicitly 
defended intra-racial domination and was essentially the position which the Third World bloc 
often by default endorsed when arguing that human rights standards should not apply to 
postcolonial states.99 At its best this was a case for alternate forms of imperial domination 
and, at its worse, can be read as an argument that denies the citizens of postcolonial states 
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agency as their oppression and genuine campaigns against their governments could be 
ignored because of the racial identity of those committing the human rights violations. 
Frequently the implied and expressed justification used for applying double standards was the 
historical fact of colonialism and that it was therefore more important to address was the 
manifest injustices in the system of colonial rule. Yet that was not what anti-imperialist 
opposition at the Commission, was doing. The practice of double standards shielded the 
governments of postcolonial states who were engaged in repressive actions against their 
citizens.  Again it is important to stress that the Third World bloc were not alone in double 
standards. After the Helsinki Accords of 1977, which made the language of human rights part 
of the ideological battleground of the Cold War, both the US and the USSR engaged in 
repeated double standards on Human Rights issues, which contributed to the erosion of the 
Commission.100 These states were neo-imperial superpowers that used the human rights 
situation in weaker states as pawns in an ideological rivalry, whereas Third World states were 
often some of the weakest states in the UN. Nevertheless the direction of anti-imperialist 
opposition within the Commission seemed more preoccupied with attempting to shield states 
in the Third World bloc from the exercise of its protection mandate  
 
 What is remarkable is that the activities of the Third World bloc at the Commission focused 
relatively little on attempts to reprioritise the content of international human rights law. The 
campaign to launch a New International Economic Order, which was at its zenith in the 
General Assembly in the mid-1970s received little attention in the Commission. Prior to the 
drafting of the declaration of the Right to Development at the Commission, economic and 
social rights took around 5% or less of the Commissions time. It was only after 1980 that 
economic and social rights began to take over 10% of the Commissions time.101 This could 
reflect Brownlie’s general statement, outlined in the last Chapter, that it was only in the 1980s 
that the language of rights became dominant in campaigns for distributive justice.102 However, 
since the First World Conference on Human Rights, the Third World bloc had consistently 
identified the material inadequacy of human rights as the key problem with human rights law. 
In the 1990s economic and social rights were still the focus of only around 10% of the 
Commission’s time. When considering this, alongside the role that relativism played in anti-
imperialist opposition at the Commission, it is reasonable to conclude that anti-imperialist 
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ideological opposition was not focused on reforming the imperialist context of existing 
international human rights law.  
 
Significantly the thread that connected these incidents of anti-imperialist opposition together, 
particularly those detailed in the third part of this section, was the protection of postcolonial 
states sovereignty from international organisations. Many of the incidents of anti-imperialist 
institutional opposition, such as the blocking of states being scrutinised by the Sub-
Commission, and the fight over the concept of democracy, were aimed at reducing the 
capacity of the Commission to exercise its protection mandate over postcolonial states. As 
demonstrated in the next section anti-imperialist opposition at the Council, which replaced 
the Commission in 2006, was also concerned with protecting states from the exercise of the 
organisation’s protection mandate.  
(2) Anti-imperialist opposition at the UN Human Rights Council: 2006 onwards  
In 2006 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan warned that the Commission had “a credibility 
deficit” which “casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations [human rights] system 
as a whole.”103  In December 2004 the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
which was empowered to evaluate existing UN institutions and their capacity to provide 
security in the Twenty First Century published their findings.104 Their report criticised the 
Commission’s “double standards” and noted its diminishing credibility.105  They concluded that 
too many states were seeking membership of the Commission “not to strengthen human 
rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others.”106 In 2005 Annan’s 
office published a report entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’ on UN reform which noted that the 
Commission’s double standards had cast “a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations 
system as a whole” and recommended the creation of a new Human Rights Council.107  By 
2006 there was an emerging consensus at the UN that the Commission was not fit for purpose 
when it came to protecting human rights. One clear theme emerging from both reports was 
that the new body should have some form of membership criteria to prevent states that 
routinely abused human rights from using their membership of the Commission to give their 
actions greater legitimacy. Annan was clear that he wanted “those elected to the Council …to 
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abide by the highest human rights standards" to eliminate the practice of human rights 
abusing states protecting and defending one another from scrutiny.108  
 
Around this time there were a variety of proposals for institutional reform in circulation. After 
a series of highly critical reports on UN Treaty Bodies by Phillip Alston, a school of thought 
emerged that a single unified treaty body was the way to rectify institutional weaknesses and 
at conferences in Lichtenstein in 2003 and Nottingham in 2006 various proposals for a unified 
treaty body and harmonised reporting process were considered by groups of experts.109 In a 
2006 concept paper Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, argued that 
a unified standing treaty body would create an authoritative and visible system for protecting 
human rights.110 Manfred Nowak took these arguments still further arguing for the creation of 
a world human rights court modelled on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which 
would act as a tribunal of last resort for human rights complaints against states.111 Nowak 
argued that this new court would not require a new treaty but states could indicate the 
existing treaties which “the Court may apply in cases brought against them” and the court 
could then offer reparations to the victims of human rights abuses.112 In a 2011 article, after 
the Council had commenced its operations, Nowak argued that a world court human rights 
court would face less opposition than the Council.113 Nowak offered little conclusive analysis 
to indicate why this would be possible, let alone probable and much of his argument appears 
to focus on a scaling up of the ECHR on a transnational scale.  
 
Alston noted that whilst there was some disagreement between the different views about the 
powers of the new Council and what functions it should perform the general consensus was 
that a new body should be representative but not adopt the partisan approach to human 
rights protection that had been prevalent in the Commission.114  However, as Alston noted, 
there was a general failure of agreement about what had gone wrong with the Commission. 
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For example Ghanea notes that the 2005 report from the Secretary General’s office left a 
series of unanswered questions about the problems affecting the Commission. Ghanea also 
argued that the politicisation of Commission as well as making it a liability also made it an 
asset, as it was reactive to its member states.115 Others however disagreed with this 
assessment and Tomas Wiess was highly critical of what he saw as “state sovereignty and 
cultural solidarity” routinely trumping efforts to protect rights.116 Whilst both Wiess and 
Ghanea agreed that politicisation was the problem, they were not in agreement about the 
solution or source of politicisation. This is illustrative of some of the disagreements over the 
causes of the Commission’s decline and the absence of a series of even notionally agreed 
explanations of its failure meant that the process of shaping the Council took place in a 
vacuum. One area where this was the case were the proposals for Council membership 
criteria. As Walter Kälin and Cecilia Jimenez recommended in relation to reform of the 
Commission’s membership, the criteria for membership should be “positively” shaped to 
encourage membership from states who were complying with reporting requirements in 
treaty bodies and who complied with other UN bodies.117  This was a shrewd recommendation 
as rather than set up membership requirements based on the content of a state’s domestic 
laws, which would inevitably aggravate anti-imperialist ideological opposition, these criteria 
tracked general organisational compliance. However when the High Level Panel on reform – a 
group of experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General – considered the issue they rejected 
the idea of a restrictive membership criteria. Their report only noted in general terms that 
membership criteria could “risk further politicizing” the Council and recommended universal 
membership without any further consideration of the matter.118   
In its first resolution the Council created new mechanisms to enable human rights protection. 
The Advisory Committee of the Council was a body of 18 experts serving in their personal 
capacity which was intended to function as the Council’s think-tank and provide research on 
implementation issues relating to the Council’s mandate. The Council’s  individual complaints 
mechanism was based on the Commission’s 1503 procedure and working groups were also set 
up to investigate thematic human rights issues.  Some of the literature on the Council focuses 
on the UPR to the exclusion of other aspects of the Council – Elvira Redondo described the 
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UPR as the “only substantial change introduced” by the Council.119 This is unfair as there were 
numerous reforms that were highly significant and in many ways it is a different entity to the 
Commission. The first part of this section examines how institutional opposition emerged in 
the UPR process and the second part of this section examines anti-imperialist opposition more 
generally in the Council, specifically referring to some of the changes between the Commission 
and the Council. 
(i) The Universal Periodic Review (UPR)  process  
The UPR process was envisaged in General Assembly Resolution 60/251 which called for a 
process of human rights review “‘based on objective and reliable information” where 
“universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States” would be ensured.120 
The appeal of the UPR process was that it would not directly target states nor would it be 
open to control by dominant states – each state would have its turn to attack other states and 
promote their values and would also have their turn to have their human rights records 
scrutinised. The process required all UN members to appear every four years before their 
fellow states at the Council’s headquarters in Geneva. Around 16 countries are reviewed in 
each UPR session and 48 countries a year go through the review process. Three states are 
selected at random to comprise a troika which reviews information from the state under 
review pertaining to their protection of human rights. This includes a country report from the 
state party, documents from other international human rights organisations (such as treaty 
review bodies) and reports from civil society organisations and Non- Governmental 
Organisations about the human rights situation in the country under review.  
The centre piece of the process is the dialogic component of the review where the state under 
review is questioned for up to three and a half hours by the UPR working group which consists 
of Council members and is chaired by the President of the Council. This takes the process of 
interactive questioning between the state under review and the rest of the working group, as 
well as other UN member states, and is part of the UPR’s dialogic approach which attempts to 
achieve compliance with human rights law through a targeted dialogue with the state under 
review.121 After this recommendations are issued from the panel to the state party about 
changes that have to be made to their laws, domestic policies or state practices. There are five 
categories of urgency surrounding recommendations and states can reject or accept the 
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recommendations, made and their responses to recommendations are noted. There is a 
further option to give a general or a specific response to the recommendations and an option 
to give a general response about how the state views the subject matter of the 
recommendation being made to it. Recommendations give the UPR process a protection 
mandate, as statements are issued about what the laws of a state ought to be, although the 
process as a whole is not judicial in the sense that the UPR is not a tribunal and there is no 
forum for individual petition.  Its protection mandate is principally political in that it aims to 
use the dialogic process to encourage compliance with international human rights law.  
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said that peer review would send a “clear message that all 
countries would have their human rights record and performance examined.”122 The equality 
of arms between states was constructed in juridical terms by the rules governing the conduct 
of UPR proceedings. It allows states to essentially drive proceedings and dictate what priorities 
they perceive as important by asking questions to the state under review. States under review 
can also advance their own human rights priorities, which would on the face of it address 
some of the concerns inherent within anti-imperialist ideological opposition outlined in the 
previous chapter. For example Malaysia was able to emphasise at length the importance of 
economic and social rights when it was under review.123 At the opening of the 26th session of 
the Council the delegate from Cuba praised the UPR process for creating real “equality 
between states” which, given Cuba’s opposition to the Commission detailed above, indicated 
that on this measure the UPR had been notionally successful in addressing a specific grievance 
from the Third World bloc.124 Equality between states however, requires that some obvious 
double standards from certain states are ignored. There was a public outcry when in the spring 
of 2014 the Saudi Arabian delegate criticised Norway, the state under review at the time, for 
its allegedly poor record of protecting women’s rights.125 In the name of equality it was also 
necessary for the UPR process to abandon any criteria for participation based on a state’s 
human rights of record to maintain the appearance of parity between states.   
The UPR, whilst dependent on a juridical fiction of equality, was able to bypass much of the 
residual imperialism in conventional international legal structures by levelling down the 
                                                          
122 Emphasis mine - Address to the seventh ordinary session of the Human Rights Council, 3 March 2008 available 
at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID¼196 accessed 9 July 2015.  
123 Ying Hooi Khoo ‘Malaysia’s Human Rights Performance:  Assessment of its First Session of Universal Periodic 
Review in the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2014) 6 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal 19. 
124 26th Regular Session of the Human Rights Council (10 - 27 June 2014). 
125 Felicity Morse ‘Saudi Arabia criticises Norway over human rights record’ The Independent 29 April 2014 available 
at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/saudi-arabia-criticises-norway-over-human-rights-record-9301796.html> 
accessed 9 July 2015.  
137 | P a g e  
 
capacity of Western states to avoid scrutiny of their own human rights records. When the US 
was under review in November 2010, Ghana, along with several other states, recommended 
that the US become signatories to the ICESCR, something that as the previous chapter detailed 
had been the subject of fierce ideological opposition from the US. The US rejected these 
recommendations along with other more politicised recommendations from Iran, to “refrain 
from the application of unilateral measures against other countries”.126 The US had made an 
equally politically charged recommendation to Iran when it was under review in February 2010 
when it recommended that Iran “discontinue ...show trials”.127 This had little to do with the 
technical implementation of international human rights law, as both states framed their 
recommendations in politically incendiary language. This was not an indication of the failure of 
the UPR process but rather a reflection of it at work as it was designed to operate as a forum 
that could simultaneously ensure scrutiny of the standards set out in international human 
rights law whilst acknowledging vast ideological disagreements between states on the 
substance of human rights.  
By October 2011, all 193 member states in the UN had been through the UPR process. Navi 
Pillay, the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said in a press release that the UPR 
had proved to be a “innovative, transparent, collaborative …catalyst for change” but cautioned 
that the process of issuing recommendations needed to become precise and states needed to 
work with the Council in implementing the accepted recommendations.128 In 2011, the Council 
adopted decisions on the implementation of recommendations requiring the UPR process 
during the second cycle of country reviews to focus on ensuring that recommendations made 
during the first cycle of reviews had been implemented, by asking the state under review 
about domestic law reforms and accession to international treaties.129 This strengthened the 
UPR’s protection mandate as by questioning a state about previous recommendations that 
had been made to them the UPR process was in effect holding a state to account over its 
human rights commitments.  
Significantly states from the former Third World bloc were still engaged in patterns of 
opposition, in spite of the notional equality of arms between states in the UPR process. An 
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analysis of the first cycle of reviews, beginning in 2008, showed several examples of anti-
imperialist opposition. Jarvis Matiya observed that states tended to use official or unofficial 
groupings to act as a bloc to influence agendas, delegates speaking orders and other 
procedural matters to protect themselves from scrutiny.130  Other studies of the UPR noted 
that states from the African and Asian bloc would frequently defend other states from their 
region or would attempt to use their status as developing countries to deflect scrutiny from 
Western delegates.131 Tunisia and Bahrain for example were able to mount, what Gareth 
Sweeny described as, “an exercise in filibustering” by only receiving questions praising their 
human rights records, when both countries were engaged in violent repression of their 
domestic political opponents.132 In 2011 Pillay warned states not to engage in “manipulative 
tactics” during the review process and warned that some states “aimed” to turn it “into a 
meaningless procedural exercise”.133 
Recommendations have often not been offered by states in the Afro-Asian bloc to fellow 
states from the grouping. Where recommendations have been offered they have often been in 
the form of “friendly recommendations” that have called for technical assistance or capacity 
building and not directly addressed legislative or administrative barriers to the 
implementation of human rights.134 At Pakistan’s review in 2012 many states from the Afro-
Asian bloc framed their statements and recommendations in a manner which reflected 
previous patterns of anti-imperialist opposition - praising Pakistan’s commitments to socio-
economic rights but ignoring numerous failures of the rule of law in the country.135 At both 
Indonesia’s first and second review it received what one account described as numerous 
“loaded questions from its friends” and many of the recommendations made to the state by 
the Asian bloc were congratulatory rather than relating to specific reforms.136 Whilst activity of 
this sort may seem fairly inconsequential, in the context of the limited time of the UPR 
                                                          
130 Jarvis Matiya ‘Repositioning the international human rights protection system: the UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2010) 36 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 313.   
131 Gareth Sweeny and Yuri Saito ‘An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2009) 9 HRLR 203.  
132 Ibid 210.  
133 Office of the High Commissioner (n 125). 
134 Allehone Abebe ‘Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council’ (2009) 9 HRLR 1, 18. 
135  UN Watch ‘U.N. Review Praises Pakistan’s Rights Record’ 2 Nov 2012 
<http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/11/02/pakistan-receives-criticism-and-praise-at-the-un-this-week/> 
accessed 10 June 2015. 
136 Yuyun Wahyuningrum ‘Indonesia and the Universal Periodic Review: Negotiating Rights’ from Hillary 
Charlesworth and Emma Larking Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP 2014).  
139 | P a g e  
 
sessions, a concerted exercise to swamp the dialogic process with platitudes has the effect of 
impeding states from other blocs from asking questions.137   
As Roger Blackburn noted in a 2011 study, many states from the Asian bloc, which had been 
behind the 1993 Bangkok Declaration used the language contained in it to justify human rights 
violating practices in their own domestic political systems.138  Article 5 of the Declaration 
stated that human rights needed to be applied with “respect for national sovereignty” and 
governed by the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs” of states.139 As argued in 
the previous chapter this effectively neutered supranational human rights scrutiny and 
protection by providing an unlimited scope for domestic restrictions of human rights law and 
when the Declaration was raised during the UPR process it was used to resist 
recommendations for reform before they had even been made. The format of the Peer Review 
also facilitated relativistic opposition to issues relating to the protection of Lesbian, Gay and 
Transsexual Rights (LGBT) rights within international human rights treaties. For example in 
2009 the Nigerian delegate stated that no homosexuals were visible in Nigeria and used this as 
a justification for not fulfilling their obligations under the ICCPR to decriminalise laws 
criminalising sexual orientation.140  The Gambia resisted recommendations from the UN 
Human Rights Council to embark on a process of decriminalisation, claiming that Gambian 
culture would not “allow homosexuality.”141 Some states, such as Malaysia, when under 
review accepted the majority of recommendations made to it on a subject such as women’s 
rights, but many of these were framed in open ended terms or, as was the case with China’s 
recommendation to Malaysia included the language of the Bangkok Declaration saying that 
such rights should be recognised in “accordance with national circumstances”. 142 
Recommendations from Canada and Norway that reservations to the Convention on the 
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Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) should be removed were simply 
noted. This is significant as the presence of wide ranging reservations has long inhibited the 
operation of the CEDAW Committee.143 What unified all of these incidents of defensive 
relativism was that they were aimed at preventing further scrutiny of the state’s human rights 
record through the UPR process, not at reprioritising the content of international human rights 
law.  
As Elvira Redondo argues, criticism that the UPR process is weak the point because the 
purpose of the process is to provide a mechanism that is non-confrontational with a more 
cooperative framework, essentially maintaining that the diluted protection mandate serves an 
overall normative purpose.144  As Kälin notes the UPR process is a form of secularised ritual 
that is dependent upon bringing peer pressure upon states to change their practices and 
laws.145 Therefore attempts to inhibit the ritualised nature of the UPR’s dialogic process are an 
act of institutional opposition as it undermines the UPR’s protection mandate. The anti-
colonial dynamics described earlier in this chapter persisted in different forms in the 
opposition of postcolonial states to the UPR’s protection mandate.  
(ii) Blocs and anti-imperialist opposition at  the Council 
The Council consists of 47 member states elected from the UN General Assembly from each of 
the core regional groupings, in a secret ballot, for a term of three years and states can only 
serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. The protection mandate of the Council allows it 
to issue recommendations, which can be used to both highlight human rights violations and 
encourage positive practices within states.146 Although states applying for Council membership 
are notionally under an obligation to "uphold the highest standards” of human rights 
protection and cooperate with the Council in enforcing these obligations, Yvonne Terlingen 
argues, that this requirement has not taken seriously by some of its members.147 In practice 
membership of the organisation has become something that states are entitled to seek as a 
matter of status, regardless of their record promoting human rights.  The African and Asian 
blocs in the UN have between them 26 Council seats whereas the Western European and 
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Other Group and the Eastern European Group have 13 seats. The voting power in the Council, 
much like the Commission, lies predominantly with postcolonial states. Yet the perpetuation 
of anti-imperialist of institutional opposition in the Council can be seen as evidence that the 
driving features of anti-imperialist opposition to human rights organisations more generally lie 
beyond the asymmetrical sovereignty of postcolonial and formerly colonialist states and the 
general imperialist context of international law.  
As Nowak noted in a study of the first five years of the Council’s operation, Algeria and Egypt 
had emerged as highly dominant players, despite their poor domestic human rights records, 
and had used their position as states that straddled the Africa bloc and the Organisation of the 
Islamic Council (OIC) bloc to “pursue their own political interests.”148 Half of all resolutions 
were focused on Israel and the Occupied Territories which led to other human rights crises 
being under considered by the Council or ignored all together.149 A statistical analysis of voting 
patterns in the first four years of the Council’s operation revealed that the majority of 
resolutions passed without any opposition, although 71 resolutions could be identified as 
facing significant opposition.150 Within this selection of resolutions, in particular the ones 
initiated by Pakistan and Egypt, there tended to be a counter-reaction from European Union 
states.151  The resolutions that drew the most hostility were resolutions that were in essence 
country specific, either targeting Israel or a member of the Afro-Asian bloc. However, as 
Mallory notes, there were a number of states from the Afro-Asian bloc in the Council that 
were willing to break with the consensus and vote in favour of resolutions directed at other 
states from that grouping - far more so than in the Commission.152   
The Council has held far more special sessions to address individual country situations than 
the Commission and in its relatively short life span has already hosted four times the number 
of sessions. Israel has been the focus of 30% of all special sessions held to date, and the 
situations in Darfur, the Democratic republic of Congo and Libya have been the focus of 
around 12% of all sessions held.153 Again the question is one of focus; Israel’s human rights 
abuses require investigation but the level of resources and time given to them, in comparison 
to the human rights abuses taking place in Sudan, is indicative of anti-imperialist opposition in 
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either an extreme form of institutional opposition or anti-hegemonic opposition. Resolutions 
from the 2009 special session on Sri Lanka did not condemn the actions of the army, when it 
was widely documented that it was engaged in crimes against humanity, or call for the 
creation of an international mechanism to investigate human rights violations. This was 
because the Afro-Asian bloc voted to end discussion before the German delegate’s proposals, 
which strongly condemned Sri Lanka for using arguments about state sovereignty to deflect 
calls for an international investigation into crimes against humanity, could be considered by 
the Council.154  
The most significant example of collective regional action as a form of anti-imperialist 
opposition came with the consideration of Sudan by the Council. Sudan, as detailed above, 
had been considered under the 1503 procedure at the Commission and in 2005, in one of its 
last acts, the Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur for Sudan.155  The conflict in the 
Darfur region of Western Sudan had started in 2003 and even though a peace agreement was 
negotiated in 2006 hostilities continued and there was some considerable evidence that the 
Sudanese government was continuing to use proxy fighters, in the form of the Janjaweed 
militia, to continue to commit systemic human rights abuses. During discussions and debates 
on action against Sudan the Africa group continued to protect Sudan, either repeating 
statements frequently so as to unbalance the nature of the debate at the Council, or by 
insisting on speaking on behalf of Sudan as the Tunisian delegate did in 2007 when he claimed 
that Sudan was cooperating with the Council when in fact it was blocking access to the 
country. 156   Sudan used the language of anti-imperialist institutional opposition when 
exercising its right to reply at the Council; at the Third Session of the Council in 2006 the 
Sudanese delegate claimed that Sudan was the victim of an “international campaign to offer 
false information” and at the Fourth Special Session of the Council in 2006 claimed that this 
was another attempt by the West to undermine “the dignity and sovereignty of weak 
states.”157  At the Fourth Session the Algerian delegate delivered a statement on behalf of the 
African bloc arguing that the Council must not adopt a “heavy-handed response aimed at 
naming and shaming an African government.”158 Both the OIC and the African blocs also 
argued, using a strand of anti-imperialist ideological opposition, that in order to address the 
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ongoing crisis in Darfur more aid and financial assistance should be given by Western states to 
Sudan, implicitly raising the notion of sovereign inequalities being the cause of human rights 
violations.159 
The Council’s consideration of LGBT Rights, led to outright displays of anti-imperialist 
opposition - principally ideological opposition that appeared relativistic but was in fact anti-
hegemonic. When in 2011 the Council passed a Resolution on human rights, sexual orientation 
and gender identity, the 19 votes in opposition came from the Afro-Asian bloc and South 
Africa, the one African nation that voted in favour of the Resolution, was accused of 
“Westernising” human rights.160 In 2012, in response to a proposed panel discussion on LGBT 
rights the Pakistani delegate argued that as the  Vienna Declaration, from the Second World 
Human Rights Conference in 1993, had acknowledged the importance of “regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” the OIC group were 
entitled to oppose the consideration of a report on LGBT Rights at the Council.161 In 2014 the 
Council passed a second resolution on LGBT Rights but Egypt and other African states 
attempted to insert a series of amendments removing all reference sexual orientation.162 One 
observer from the International Service for Human Rights noted that the issue had cemented a 
“hard line” bloc of objectors that were willing to use procedural mechanisms to ideologically 
oppose any reform in this area.163  
Conclusion  
The Commission was originally intended to be a body for promoting human rights in a 
Western model and its early activities, which mostly involved supervising the drafting of the 
human rights covenants and running promotional events, reflected the priorities of both 
Western and Soviet powers. The West wanted to promote human rights for ideological 
reasons and the Soviets were broadly willing to acquiesce in the creation of a UN human rights 
body provided its ipsetic potential was severely limited. The large expansion of the UN in the 
1960s and the Third World bloc’s growth in the General Assembly allowed it to take greater 
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control of the Commission’s agenda. The focus on apartheid was not without cause – it was a 
significant human rights crisis and many of the formerly colonialist states, either out of self-
interest or latent neo-imperialism, were reluctant to take action. Significantly apartheid 
became the chief justification for double standards which was the vehicle for anti-imperialist 
institutional and ideological opposition at the Commission. Anti-imperialist opposition 
occurred in spite of the relative dominance of the Third World bloc over the Commission and 
was eventually a significant contributory factor to its eventual demise and despite substantial 
institutional reforms anti- imperialist opposition continued at the Council.  
Double standards undermined the capacity for the Commission and the Council to engage in 
the shaming of states as human rights violators. As these were both political bodies they 
depended upon political mechanisms as the basis of their protection mandate and double 
standards from the Third World bloc resulted in these mechanisms only working in a limited 
range of cases (i.e. South Africa, Israel) and not in other cases. The protection of some states 
within the Third World bloc states from political condemnation as a human rights violating 
state undermined the protection mandate of both organisations. But it was the presence of 
the protection mandate in the first place, or in the case of the Commission attempts to apply 
its protection mandate outside of the circumstances in which it was intended to operate that 
specifically led to anti-imperialist opposition. Anti-imperialist ideological opposition aimed at 
decolonising international human rights law by recognising cultural differences in human 
rights or protecting previously marginalised sets of rights was relatively rare in both the 
Council and the Commission. Many of the instances where decolonial anti-imperialist 
ideological opposition appeared to take place, such as the defensive relativism towards LGBT 
rights in the Council, were in fact anti-hegemonic opposition to the very idea of human rights.  
The UN , as noted at the beginning of the this chapter, was an organisation constructed to 
preserve the residual imperialism of formerly colonialist states and the fact that there was a 
strong backlash to attempts to tackle apartheid from these states was evidence of the 
continued problem of residual imperialism. However anti-imperialism is not just a result of the 
residual imperialism of international organisations or the neo-imperialism of international 
human rights law’s content. The next chapter analyses the creation of the African Charter and 
the types of opposition to the African Commission and Court of Human Rights. The African 
Charter successfully reprioritised the content of international human rights law in a genuinely 
decolonial manner, as it envisaged a distinctly new form of human rights that recognised the 
material needs of postcolonial states. Yet forms of anti-imperialist opposition persisted against 
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the regional organisations created to enforce the charter indicating that the causes of 
opposition go beyond objections to the origins of international law. It also persisted in spite of 
these regional organisations being created outside the residually imperialist framework of 
international law. Rather as this chapter has indicated as organisations acquire a protection 
mandate its ipsetic potential poses a threat to states, even if, as was the case with the 
mechanisms to deal with the human rights abuses emerging from apartheid, state parties 
agree with the adoption of a protection mandate.  
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     CHAPTER FOUR  
    Opposition within the African Human Rights system 
Introduction  
In December 1979 an expert group met in Dakar to start preparations on a draft African 
human rights charter. The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the Charter) was 
opened for signatories in 1981 and came into force in 1986. The African Commission of Human 
and Peoples Rights (‘the Commission’), which had been mooted since 1969, became 
operational in 1987. This Chapter examines opposition to the Commission and other 
supranational bodies enforcing the Charter looking at how forms of anti-imperialist opposition 
persisted in regional organisations. Institutional opposition, as chapter one detailed, is a 
reaction to an organisation’s protection mandate – the legal powers of an organisation to 
protect rights in sovereign states – and takes the form of a reassertion of state sovereignty. 
Anti-imperialist institutional opposition was predicated on the notion that the sovereignty of 
postcolonial states was relatively unequal to other states and international law was an 
instrument for perpetuating sovereign inequalities. Ideological opposition, as chapter two 
detailed, was where states opposed human rights organisations because of philosophical 
objections to the content and nature of the law the organisation was tasked with protecting. 
Anti-imperialist ideological opposition was predicated on the notion that international human 
rights law was neo-colonialist and needed to be reprioritised to reflect the needs of 
postcolonial states. Regional human rights systems in postcolonial states were discussed in 
chapters one and two. What distinguishes the African Commission, from organisations such as 
the ASEAN Human Rights Commission, is that like the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights it has functioning judicial organs and an extensive 
caselaw. This makes it an appropriate case study to examine how anti-imperialist opposition 
can continue within regional organisations. This is particularly important as the African Charter 
addressed many of the underlying concerns that anti-imperialist ideological opposition had 
with the substance of international human rights law. The persistence of forms of anti-
imperialist opposition, even where the substance of human rights law had been reprioritised 
and the organisation for their enforcement existed outside the imperialist context of 
international law, indicates that the supranational protection of human rights has an element 
of inherent imperialism to it that cannot be removed by decolonising human rights law or 
regionalising its protection.  
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The creation of the Commission represented an impressive rate of progress given that a 
decade earlier the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) seemed to be institutionally averse to 
any mechanism to protect human rights.1 Some writers, such as George Mugwanya and 
Vincent Nmehielle, have attempted to trace a history of human rights within the OAU, citing 
the numerous organisational commitments to anti-apartheid; however this interpretation 
needs to be treated with caution. 2  At OAU summits the OAU secretariat advocated 
decolonisation and supported anti-apartheid measures but this was part of an anti-colonial 
agenda. As noted in chapters one and three there was no direct correlation between anti-
apartheid and the acceptance of human rights or organisational protection mandates. The 
rhetoric of human rights in the anti-apartheid campaign did not extend to the systemic human 
rights abuses of postcolonial states, as the case of the Ugandan and Kenyan Asians detailed in 
the previous chapter illustrated. Additionally the OAU’s rigid adherence to the doctrine of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member states hindered attempts to protect human 
rights within member states. 
Kofi Kufuor argues that some of the standard explanations about the causes of the Charter’s 
formation – such as the growing importance of human rights in US foreign policy under 
President Carter, the widespread condemnation of the dictatorships in Uganda and Equatorial 
Guinea in the late 1970s and the growing institutional faith in the OAU - are inaccurate as 
neither of these factors were particularly decisive in the Charter’s formation.3 At the African 
Conference of the Rule of Law, held in Lagos in 1961, proposals were advanced for an African 
Convention on Human Rights with a court to protect human rights, but these proposals were 
shelved and whilst discussed at the summit conference of the OAU in 1963 no conclusion was 
reached.4 In 1967 a conference of jurists from Francophone states made a similar proposal 
which was not discussed by the OAU but a year later at the First World International Human 
Rights Conference the Nigerian delegate campaigned for the establishment of regional 
commissions, although this did not feature in the conference communiqué. A 1969 UN 
regional seminar in Cairo, attended by representatives from nineteen African states, 
concluded that a regional human rights commission should be created but little happened.5 
During the 1970s the OAU faced a dilemma about how to respond to personalist dictatorships 
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- the common term for the regimes of Idi Amin (Uganda) Jean-Bédel Bokassa (Central African 
Republic) and Marcias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea) – whilst safeguarding the organisational 
principle of non-interference.6 In 1975 the Government of Tanzania criticised the appointment 
of Idi Amin as Chair of the OAU, noting that the organisation was acting like a “trade union” for 
governments.7 The Tanzanian statement noted the shear hypocrisy of calling “for the isolation 
of South Africa because of its oppression” whilst at the same time continuing cooperation with 
Uganda where “the Government survives because of the ruthlessness with which it kills 
suspected critics”.8 
Whilst Kufuor is probably, correct about there being no definitive cause for the creation of the 
Charter the experience of personalist regimes in the late 1970s certainly made the OAU 
collectively more open to the idea that the human rights abuses within individual members 
states were a matter of organisational concern. In 1979 the OAU Assembly of Heads of States 
and Government passed a resolution calling for a conference to draft an “African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights” which would also provide for “the establishment of bodies to 
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights.”9 This marked the start of the creation of the 
African Human Rights system – which collectively comprises of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights. During the 
2000s this was complimented by the creation sub-regional courts with a human rights 
jurisdiction, such as the Court of Justice of the Economic Court of West African states, the East 
African Court and the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community which have 
emerged through the process of economic integration between states in their respective sub-
regions.  
The African Charter represents the most concerted and comprehensive attempt by 
postcolonial states to create a human rights instrument that diverged from the imperialist 
paradigms of international human rights law described in chapter two. Bina Okere argues that 
the Charter attempted to create a concept of human rights that rejected the politics of human 
rights coming from both the east and west, allowing a genuinely new conception of human 
rights to emerge.10 The Charter was a genuinely decolonial instrument in that it attempted to 
diverge from the existing epistemic constraints of international human rights law and envisage 
a genuinely new paradigm of human rights that departed from existing paradigms of human 
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rights. The decolonial project Walter Mignolo argued attempted to empower “racialized 
subjects” helping them “to regain the human dignity that ... [the] imperial project...took away 
from them.”11  Decolonialism provides a methodology for removing human rights from its 
Eurocentric foundations and hence the imperial context of international human rights law’s 
formation.12 Therefore if the concerns behind ideological anti-imperialism are ever to be 
addressed it is important to understand how a decolonial human rights instrument could be 
created. From the work of decolonial theorists it is possible to discern three specific 
components of a decolonial human rights instrument.  
Firstly there would need to be a distinct sense of ownership of these rights and their content, 
shape and realisation as Mignolo notes elsewhere “who speaks for the human” is the most 
important question in human rights. 13  This means that institutions need to be “de-
westernised” which Mignolo in his engagement with the works of Kishore Mahbubani, 
describes as meaning “that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by 
Western players and institutions.”14 Secondly the epistemological framework from which 
rights were derived would need to be distinct. Both Bonaventura De Sousa Santos and Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres have argued that there needs to be a decolonial epistemological turn that 
would dismantle “relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the 
reproduction of ....geo-political hierarchies.”15 From an African perspective Sabelo Ndlovu-
Gatsheni argues that this involves expereinces“ from the vantage point of those epistemic 
sites that received the ‘darker side’ of modernity” which involved engaging with 
“appropriations, epistemicides, and denials of humanity” caused by the colonial project in 
Africa.16 As detailed in chapter two international human rights law used an epistemic paradigm 
that was distinctly western and contingent upon a western conception of the individual. 
Thirdly the content of human rights would need to be, as Macarena Gómez-Barris argues, “re-
purposed” to genuinely account for the needs and struggles of the marginalised and 
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oppressed.17 As detailed in chapter two the ideological reprioritisation of human rights was a 
significant element of anti-imperialist ideological opposition. However, as chapter three notes, 
the ideological reprioritisation of human rights was a marginal aspect of opposition from the 
Third World bloc at the UN Commission on Human Rights and UN Human Rights Council.  
This chapter argues that the African Charter, under the criteria set out above, was a genuinely 
decolonial human rights instrument. This is set out in the first section below but as the second 
section outlines, the Commission, the principle mechanism for protecting the rights contained 
in the Charter was subject to both institutional and ideological pre-emptive opposition that 
created an organisation with a weak protection mandate. This opposition was distinctly anti-
imperialist in nature and as the third and fourth sections of this chapter demonstrate, this 
continued in a pre-emptive form towards the African Court of Human Rights and in a direct 
form towards the tribunals of Regional Economic Communities who also enforced the Charter. 
As outlined in the conclusion of the previous chapter the persistence of anti-imperialist forms 
of opposition in UN human rights bodies, even after the Third World bloc had gained a degree 
of control over them, could be explained by the fact that the UN itself was an institution 
constructed within the colonial-imperial template of international law and preserved the 
power of the formerly colonialist states. However, none of the same arguments applied to the 
regional institutions described in this chapter. These were organisations created outside of the 
colonial-imperialist structures of international law and applied a genuinely decolonial set of 
human rights.  
Whilst anti-imperialist opposition at the regional level is less intense and direct than at the 
international level, the persistence of forms of anti-imperialist opposition raises broader issues 
about the nature of human rights enforcement. What appears to be a unifying theme behind 
the anti-imperialist opposition detailed in this chapter, as it was in the previous chapter, is that 
anti-imperialist arguments emerge in response to an organisation’s protection mandate. A 
protection mandate, as chapter one outlined, gives an organisation an ipsetic potential – the 
capacity to give itself increasing competencies to declare what the law should be and can 
result in the organisation claiming sovereign-like authority.18  States sought to curb or 
eliminate this when constructing regional mechanisms, using anti-imperialist justifications for 
their pre-emptive opposition. The next chapter will go onto address, how this highlights that 
whilst international human rights law can be decolonised removing, it from its imperial 
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context thus eliminating the rationale for anti-imperialist ideological opposition, the 
protection of human rights at the supranational level is inherently imperialist.  
(1) The African Charter of Human Rights and the decolonisation of human rights 
law 
In 1979 Leopold Senghor, the then President of Senegal, stated that the Charter needed to 
“keep constantly in mind our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa.”19 The UN 
organised a conference in Monrovia in September 1979 with experts from across Africa, which 
issued a proposal on the creation of an African commission of human rights. Two months later, 
under the terms of reference set by the OAU, a group of experts held a conference in Dakar 
which used a research paper prepared by Keba M’Baye the then President of the International 
Court of Justice, as the basis for deliberation. They eventually produced a set of proposals for a 
wide ranging charter on human rights but with only vague references to a commission or 
enforcement mechanism. After some delays, the Dakar draft eventually formed the basis of 
the final text of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which was signed at Banjul 
in January 1981. It contained both Third Worldist sentiments on the importance of collective 
economic rights, and a series of notionally cultural framings of rights, designed to give a 
regional sense of ownership to human rights law.20  
The Charter gives economic, social and cultural rights the same status as civil and political 
rights: Article 15-17 protects the right to work, health and education. It also tackles the 
inherent western individualism of human rights in Articles 19–24 by protecting a series of 
peoples, or group rights designed to protect communities rather than individuals. Many of the 
deficiencies of international law and international human rights law that had been raised by 
the Third World bloc in the 1970s during the campaign for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) were directly addressed in the Charter. Its preamble specifically reaffirms states 
adherence to the “principles of human and peoples’ rights and freedoms” contained in the 
instruments of “the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations.”21 By giving 
equal importance to existing international human rights law and the Third World bloc’s 
campaigns for economic justice, the Charter can be read as a realisation of campaign for the 
reprioritisation of human rights law to reflect the concerns of postcolonial states. One of the 
problems with analysing the origins of the Charter is that no record of its Travaux 
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Préparatoires exists, so it is difficult to assess the forces behind its formation.22 An analysis of 
the literature on the Charter and the Commission’s decisions, gives some indication as to 
purpose and intention of its framers.  
Although the right to Work, Health and Education are protected in the International Covenant 
of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) there are two crucial differences between it 
and the Charter. Firstly, by being given equivalence with civil and political rights, the division 
between rights protecting material conditions and rights protecting liberties - a division largely 
engineered by the US during the drafting process of the human rights covenants at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in the 1950s – was extinguished by the Charter which reaffirms 
the interdependence of different rights.23  The Charter’s preamble states that the two sets of 
rights “cannot be dissociated” from one another and that the “satisfaction of economic, social 
and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.”24 Secondly the 
Charter does not contain the language of progressive implementation, as the ICESCR does, 
placing a much stronger obligation on states to implement and protect economic and social 
rights. As Chidi Odinkalu argues this broke “down the dichotomies and artificial barriers 
imposed on the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.”25 Decisions and 
reports from the Commission affirmed this view; in 1992 the Commission found that states 
were required to include these rights in their national constitutions and practically realise 
rights, such as the right to work, by incorporating positive legal protections, such as laws 
protecting trade unions, into national law.26 Whilst the provisions on economic social and 
cultural rights were extensive they were criticised by some writers who argued that they were 
of a limited nature and didn’t include guarantees of the right to housing, food or an adequate 
standard of living.27 
The Charter absorbed some of the NIEO’s principles goals directly reflecting elements of the 
two General Assembly Resolutions containing the core NIEO instruments that were outlined in 
chapter two. Article 21 of the Charter guarantees the right of “peoples” to “freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources” echoing the UN General Assembly Declaration on 
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Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources which stated that control of “natural wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the interest of ...the well-being of the people of the State 
concerned.”28 Article 22 of the Charter sets out similar guarantees to Article 7 of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. Both protect the “the economic, social and cultural 
development” of a state’s people and enshrine of the right of states to choose the system by 
which such development is delivered.29 In this sense Upendra Baxi’s praise that the inclusion 
of the right to development in the Charter represented “the development of the right to 
development” is deserved as the Charter placed specific features of the NIEO’s economic 
justice agenda into a rights orientated framework.30 JB Ojwang argued that the promotion of 
the right to development as a core right was interdependent with other more traditional civil 
and political rights and had a distinctly African basis to it as it was “guided by the outstanding 
concerns and realities of society.”31 Unlike the western conception of rights, Ojwang argued, 
an African conception of rights did not insist on preserving unequal material conditions. 
Ojwang was not arguing for a radical political programme of property appropriation but rather 
was making a broader observation about the assumptions behind the formation of the 
Charter. Other writers in the 1980s also argued that in order to have relevance to African 
societies, human rights needed not just to safeguard abstract legal relationships but also 
provide material security.32 The Charter, by protecting both the right to development and 
private property against unlawful appropriation, attempts to provide a framework of rights to 
provide a holistic guarantee of material security. In this sense the Charter contained a 
genuinely decolonial framework of human rights in that it did not preserve existing colonial-
era hierarchies of rights and adapted human rights to the context of African states. This met 
both the second and third criteria for a decolonial human rights instrument outlined in the 
introduction.   
One significant feature of the Commission’s jurisprudence in this area was that it took a 
holistic approach to development in tandem with other rights. In the Endorois case, which 
involved a petition from the Endorois people who were evicted from ancestral land at Lake 
Bogoria in central Kenya, the Commission emphasised the role of consultation with groups as 
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being an important part of the right to development.33  This placed civil and political rights 
within the exercise of the right to development and as Serges Kamga, notes in his commentary 
on the case; the protection of the right to development was linked to the wider protection of 
freedoms, making it an interdependent human right.34 This marked a progression away from 
the politics that had surrounded the initial promotion of the redistributive development which 
as Alston argues had often been used for point scoring by the Eastern bloc or for the “Third 
World [bloc] to ‘distort’ the issues of human rights.” 35   The Charter placed the right to 
development within a wider context of political development and the protection of rights, 
which significantly diminished the capacity of political leaders to use the promotion of 
developmentalism as a filibuster technique to derail the protection of human rights more 
generally, as was the case at the First World Conference on Human Rights in 1968.36 
The wording of the right to development and anti-discrimination provisions in the Charter also 
intertwined economic empowerment with anti-colonialism. These two themes were seen in 
the Commission’s decisions on their interpretation. In SEAC v Nigeria, a case concerning the 
Ogoni People’s right to a clean environment, the Commission acknowledged the importance of 
the right to a clean environment, urging the Nigerian government to “restore cooperative 
economic development to its traditional role in African society” and acknowledge the “painful 
legacy of colonialism.”37 Article 20 was explicit in its anti-colonialist stance stating that 
“colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of 
domination.”38 The wording of Article 19, specifically prohibits “the domination of a people by 
another” reflecting a distinctly anti-colonial perspective to equality.39 As Richard Kiwanuka 
notes in an analysis of Article 19 and 20, these provisions were intended to serve as collective 
rights for peoples to use against situations of colonial domination, such as was the case in 
apartheid South African and occupied Namibia.40 Although Article 19 provided a specific 
schema of protection for minority rights within postcolonial states, Kiwanuka notes that 
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because of the way these rights are framed there is a danger that the concept of peoples could 
“turn out to be counter- productive” as state parties could easily claim people’s rights were in 
fact state rights.41 Kiwanuka observed the government of Zaire often claimed they were acting 
in the interests of ‘the people’ when they were committing human rights abuses but in 
common with other early commentators on Charter, he had faith that provided “the 
Commission is allowed to function effectively” it could mitigate state parties attempts to 
exploit rights as a justification for their own actions.42 Although the anti-colonial references in 
group rights were designed to foster a sense of postcolonial justice, as the next chapter 
argues, they contributed to the assumption that human rights abuses were predominantly the 
responsibility of formerly colonialist states.  
The Charter’s core achievement was a construction of universality that was distinct from 
existing conceptions of universality in international human rights law. The conceptual 
foundation for the universal application of human rights under the Charter is the protection of 
the “legitimate aspirations of the African peoples”.43 However, the Charter’s preamble does 
not construct any new framework of legal principles for its implementation and enforcement 
and the obligation on signatories rests on the existing framework of treaty interpretation in 
international law. The substantive provisions of the Charter relating to duties and communal 
rights are often cited as evidence of this new universalism. Bonny Ibhawoh argues that the 
UDHR’s universalism, which is rooted in the citizen state distinction, is alien to traditional 
forms of rights in African societies and that the imposition of a strictly individualistic form of 
rights is paternalistic.44 Ibhawoh’s argument alludes to the need for some form communal 
rights to be recognised in tandem with individual rights a theme developed by El-Obaid and 
Appiagyei-Atua who argue that in traditional African societies “an organic connection” exists 
between communal and individual rights.45 Overall the entire framework of collective and 
individual economic rights meant that there was a genuine sense of African ownership over 
the rights in the Charter – meeting both the first and the third criteria for a decolonial human 
rights instrument outlined in the introduction of this chapter.   
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The section on collective rights, contained in Articles 19-24 of the Charter, and the section on 
duties, contained in Articles 27-29, offers an alternate conception for the epistemic basis of 
rights and rights holders. Collectively these provisions go some way to addressing what 
Mignolo describes as the “imperial presuppositions” that underpinned the existing 
epistemology of human rights which were rooted in western individualism.46  It was, Ebow 
Bondzie-Simpson argues, not clear whether the group rights articulated in the Charter were 
intended to be legally binding or whether they were simply "aspirational and exhortatory" 
declarations to state parties.47 Murray and Steven Wheatley note that the Commission has 
allowed petitions from individuals claiming violations of these rights, especially the provisions 
on self-determination and minority rights.48 One case involving Article 19 rights held that the 
discriminatory treatment of black Mauritanians was both a violation of their right to equal 
treatment under the Charter and “domination of one section of the population by another” 
effectively combining individual civil rights and collective group rights.49  In their exhaustive 
summary of the Commission’s jurisprudence on Articles 19-24, Clive Baldwin and Cynthia 
Morel complimented the Commission for its “broad and flexible” understanding of peoples’ 
rights, which allowed indigenous communities and minorities to make rights claims. 50 
However, they go onto sound a cautionary note in their conclusion, observing that many of 
the Commission’s judgements on these rights had been ignored and that “pressure” needed to 
be put on states to “comply with the commitments they have made.”51 These provisions were 
decolonial as they recognised rights that had ontological foundations outside of liberal 
individualism which was associated with a distinctly western conception of rights. It is 
however, important to note that the degree to which these decolonial rights could be 
recognised and become a reality for the citizens of African states depended on the efficacy of 
the Commission as an enforcement mechanism.  
Whilst group rights had a long history in international law and the Third World bloc had been 
promoting them for years, the sections on duties contained in the Charter were unique. Article 
27 states that individuals have a duty to “family and society” and Article 28 requires 
individuals to “respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination.”52 Seemingly, 
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this simply adds a correlative duty to the protection of individual rights but their precise role is 
very unclear. The nature of duties under the Charter was discussed in some depth by Mutua 
who concluded that rights were situated within conceptions of justice that were specific to a 
given society and in pre-colonial African societies the receipt of dignity, as the basis of rights, 
was contingent upon the performance of duties.53 Some early writers on the Charter were 
concerned that state parties would use the presence of duty clauses to justify far reaching 
restrictions on rights.54 Some writers, such as Gino Naldi, noted that whilst it was possible to 
read group rights as evidence of the 'statist' nature of the Charter, they were in fact 
demonstration of notionally African traditions, without much legal substance.55 The duty 
provisions of the Charter remain relatively underused and many of the fears about their abuse 
never materialised. The provisions on collective rights and duties represent an attempt to 
provide a new epistemic foundation for human rights based on collective rather than 
individual relationships to society. This is genuinely decolonial as it envisaged a formulation of 
rights not caught within the colonial-era paradigm of international human rights law. 
However, their realisation and protection, was contingent upon a functioning human rights 
organisation as was their ability to remain genuinely decolonial, and not be hijacked by the 
leaders of postcolonial state.  
(2) Opposition to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights is not mentioned once in the Chrater’s 
preamble, which stresses the importance of the “duty to promote and protect human rights” 
without any reference to enforcement.56 The Charter’s provisions on the Commissions legal 
powers are opaque. Under Article 30 the Commission is empowered in very general terms to 
“promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa” but subsequent 
provisions give little indication as to how exactly this was to happen. The Charter‘s procedures 
to ensure the Commission’s independence are detailed extensively as are the content of 
complaints that it could be consider. The Commission consists of eleven members, serving in a 
personal capacity, who meet in biannual sessions to monitor compliance with the Charter. Its 
work consists of examining state reports on legislation, reviewing reports of special 
rapporteurs assigned to investigate thematic human rights issues such as the protection of 
human rights defenders or the prevention of torture, and hearing petitions from individuals 
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alleging human rights abuses from member states. The Charter is however silent about the 
Commission’s capacity to enforce compliance from member states, vague about its 
jurisdictional competences and silent about the remedies it could offer to victims.57  
The Commission is often discussed in terms of its weakness and it appears to have three 
specific forms of weakness although most commentators are not particularly explicit about 
which form of weakness they are discussing. The most obvious is the comparative or relative 
weakness of the Commission. For many years it was the weakest regional human rights body 
and its protection mandate was much more limited in scope than the European Court of 
Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. As Okere notes the Commission 
had a much weaker enforcement mechanism than the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and as illustrated below, the majority of the 
literature on the structure on the Commission acknowledges its relative weakness.58 The 
Commission also has administrative weaknesses; for many years it operated on relatively 
limited resources and its sessions had to be held in different locations. As Frans Viljoen notes 
the Commission became increasingly dependent on European and Canadian donor funding 
exposing it to the general criticism that it was part of a western attempt to spread human 
rights.59 Finally the Commission can be considered weak because it lacks autonomy from the 
OAU and its member states. Even after significant developments in the Commission and at the 
AU in the early 2000s, the Commission is still not fully autonomous from the AU. This makes it 
prone to institutional capture by the AU or ‘state capture’ by becoming a vehicle for states 
parties to project their own interests under the guise of a human rights organisation. As 
Vincent Nmehielle notes whilst state capture of the Commission was often speculated about, 
there was no evidence that Commission had actually been subject to institutional capture or 
had issued decisions, which were subject to procedural biases.60 Yet the fact that the 
appointment of the Commissioners remained in the hands of state parties and  they sought to 
influence the process of their appointment contributed to the sense that the Commission was 
not truly independent. Infamously Moleleki D. Mokama of Botswana served as the Attorney-
General of Botswana whilst at the same time serving on the Commission.61 
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The weakness of the Commission stems from its evolution which can be read as a form of pre-
emptive institutional opposition. As shown in the first part of this section during in the process 
of the Charter’s formation states intentionally gave the Commission a weak protection 
mandate that would limit its future ipsetic potential. This directly led to the problems of 
enforcing the Commission’s decisions discussed in the second part of this section.  The final 
part of this section argues that the Commissions weaknesses and institutional opposition it 
faced are explicable as acts of pre-emptive anti-imperialist opposition.   
(i) Pre-emptive institutional opposition in the Commission’s formation 
There were two key aspects of pre-emptive opposition in the Commission’s formation. Firstly, 
clawback clauses in the Charter limited the operation of any enforcement mechanism by 
truncating the scope of states obligations in a way that would limit any supranational 
organisation’s capacity to enforce rights. Clawback clauses are different from other equivalent 
provisions in international human rights law, such as derogation clauses, as they are 
mechanisms that allow the unlimited restriction of rights in national law and do not contain 
proportionality tests. A comparison between Article 11 of the African Charter and Article 11 of 
the ECHR - both of which protect the right to freedom of association - illustrates the 
difference. The Charter states that the exercise of freedom of association “shall be subject 
only to necessary restrictions provided for by law” and goes onto give a series of indicative 
examples of where freedom of association may be limited.62 The ECHR states that “no 
restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society” and then goes onto give a closed list set of 
circumstances in which laws may be passed limiting the right to freedom of association.63  
On the face it the distinction is not vast but the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” 
gives a standard by which a state’s claim of necessity in restricting rights can be assessed by a 
human rights organisation. Absent such a standard a state is free to argue necessity from a 
subjective perspective to suit their interests. This has the effect of limiting the scope and 
capacity of a human rights organisation as it deprives them of an objective standard of rights 
limitations which they can use to scrutinise a state’s human rights record and afford 
individuals within the state human rights protection. Equally the circumstances under which 
the right to freedom association may be limited in the ECHR are far more tightly defined than 
in the Charter meaning that it is comparatively harder for a state party to argue under the 
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ECHR that the restriction of the right is legitimate. So to directly compare the two instruments 
from the perspective of protecting human rights; the right to freedom of association under the 
African Charter can be subject to a wide variety of restrictions in individual states and under its 
formulation in the Charter there is only a limited scope for a supranational organisation to 
review these limitations. Under the ECHR states can still impose far reaching restrictions on 
the freedom of association but the framing of the right gives a supranational organisation 
greater room to review such restrictions and an objective standard by which to assess them. 
There are similar formulations in other parts of the Charter; Article 6 protects the Right to 
Liberty and Security of the Person but states that “no one may be deprived of his freedom 
except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law.”64 
The textual provisions of the Charter seem to indicate that clawback clauses were intended to 
favour a state party’s interpretation of legislation restricting human rights. Richard Gittleman 
links clawback clauses to the functioning of the Commission arguing that effect of clawback 
clauses was to ensure that the Commission provided not a “scintilla of external restraint upon 
a government's power to create laws contrary to the spirit of the rights granted” under the 
Charter.65 Early commentary on the Charter identified clawback clauses as a significant 
problem for the protection of rights by the Commission. Writing in 1985 D’Sa argued clawback 
causes permitted the suspension of rights “in a wide range” of “undefined” circumstances.66 
Mathews went further arguing in 1987 that clawback clauses restricted rights  “in such a 
manner as to make them somewhat difficult to be enjoyed” and concluded that they indicated 
that states did not intend to actually be bound by the civil and political rights provisions of the 
Charter.67 Clawback clauses originated at the Dakar conference on the African Charter where 
state delegates sought to balance the competing concerns of state sovereignty and the 
creation of a regime for protecting human rights. As argued below the delegates at the Dakar 
conference was more concerned with creating an instrument that states would sign up to, 
rather than creating an instrument that could ensure the long term protection of human 
rights.  
 The Commission has resisted the notion that clawback clauses should be used by states to 
arbitrarily limit rights or resist the operation of the Commission’s protection mandate. In Legal 
                                                          
64 ACHPR Art 6 (n. 21). 
65 Gittleman ‘The Banjul charter’ from Claude Welch, Jr. & Ronald Meltzer, eds., Human Rights and Development in 
Africa (State University of New York Press, 1984) 
66 R D’Sa ‘Human and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter’ (1985) 29 Journal of African Law 
72, 76. 
67 Mathews ‘The OAU and Political Economy of Human Rights in Africa: An Analysis of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights, 1981’(1987) 34  Africa Today 85, 92.  
161 | P a g e  
 
Resources Foundation v Zambia it held that “no state party to the Charter should avoid its 
responsibilities by recourse to the limitations and claw-back clauses.”68  The Commission has 
also criticised the use of clawback clauses to suspend rights in times of emergency holding that 
“limitations on the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by 
emergencies.”69 Clawback clauses, the Commission noted, have been used to give “credence 
to violations which by implication Viljoen argues means that states should not use clawback 
clauses to  deny access to the Commission.70 However Laurent Sermet, writing in 2007 argues 
that despite the Commission’s efforts clawback clauses allow rights to be “defined, 
implemented and applied in a manner that may deprive [them] of any real substance.”71 In 
this context clawback clauses are a form of pre-emptive institutional opposition as they 
guarantee that the enforcement of the rights in the Charter will be limited as clawback clauses 
mean that there is in effect a presumption in favour of a state’s limitations on rights. 
Therefore any supranational organisation with a protection mandate would as a result of 
clawback clauses have its ipsetic potential limited by clawback clauses. 
Secondly the legal structure of the Commission had a deliberately weak protection mandate 
that was designed to limit its ipsetic potential. As stated earlier no definitive record of Travaux 
Préparatoires of the Charter exist but Bertrand Ramcharan has managed to publish several 
documents from the UN sponsored Monrovia Conference in July 1979. Ramcharan’s article 
describes how the original proposals from Ghanaian jurists at the Monrovia conference 
envisaged an activist Commission with a broad mandate but these proposals were 
considerably watered down at a subsequent conference of experts in Dakar in 1979.72 The 
final draft of the Charter reflects the Dakar draft. For example the Monrovia draft contains 
references to powers of the Commission to provide good offices to member states where 
violations were occurring which was omitted in the final draft.  The Monrovia draft also states 
that the Commission should be empowered to “[study] situations of alleged violations, their 
causes and manifestations” which again was omitted in the final draft of the Charter.73  
Significantly as Viljoen notes earlier drafts of the Charter contained provisions for a 
Commission which would have the “power of initiative to take action in response” to human 
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rights violations.74 The final draft of the Charter contains no equivalent provision and whilst 
the Commission is mandated to ensure the protection of human rights its powers are limited 
to “conditions laid down by the present Charter” which is a deliberately vague position as the 
Charter contains few reference to the actual legal powers of the Commission.75 Both Viljoen 
and Ramcharan indicate that during the latter stages of the drafting process, states opposed a 
Commission with an expansive protection mandate preferring instead to create an 
organisation that was more directly under the control of the state parties. Viljoen noted that 
during the Monrovia discussions there was a considerable disagreement among the delegates 
over the promotional and protective functions of the Commission.76 
The provisions on individual petitions in the Charter are similarly vague. Article 55 of the 
Charter states that the Commission should “make a list of the Communications other than 
those of State Parties” and this list would then be given to all of the members of the 
Commission for them to consider which ones were admissible.  This placed considerable 
limitations on the Commission’s capacity to protect individual rights and as Rachel Murray 
notes the only action that the Charter proposed the Commission take in these cases was to 
refer them to the OAU.77  This would seemingly put state governments in control of the 
Commissions’ capacity to enforce cases involving violations of an individual’s human rights. 
The Commission has been able to circumnavigate these uncertainties by adopting rules of 
procedure at its Third Session that clarified the process for individual applications. This was an 
early example of the Commission’s ipsetic potential and the OAU resisted pressuring the 
Commission to adopt a strict approach on the confidentiality requirements under Article 59 of 
the Charter.78 As Claude Welch noted, by 1990 nearly 105 petitions had been filed with the 
Commission but all of them remained confidential and the Commission had yet to take any 
steps on any of them.79 
At an international conference on regional human rights mechanisms in 1993 delegates noted 
that Commission had yet to complete the consideration of a single individual application. As 
Murray notes the Commission’s relative inaction in its first decade needs to be seen in the 
context of its severe underfunding and the limited resources provided by the OAU to assist its 
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operation.80 The OAU appears to have wanted to shape an organisation that was largely 
promotional and complimentary to its own efforts to protect human rights. However, given 
the high premium the OAU placed on non-interference in the affairs of member states it was 
not clear how the Commission could function within the OAU’s broader legal and policy 
framework. Under the Charter’s framework the Commission is in a partially subservient role to 
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government and required its authority to publicise 
its decisions. 81  These provisions Rowland Cole argued had the effect of putting the 
Commission under the political control of the OAU.82  The Commission’s promotional role was 
heavily emphasised in the final draft of the Charter – Article 45 makes only one reference to 
protecting rights but has three different references to the promotion of human rights. This 
seems intended to downplay the Commission’s protective functions. This can all be read as a 
form of pre-emptive institutional opposition as when drafting the Charter states sought to 
constrict the mandate of any new human rights institution. Nevertheless the Commission was 
able to develop its own protection mandate over the course of the 1990s which was to have 
some successes. This however was an example of the Commission’s ipsetic potential which 
was to lay the basis for future anti-imperialist opposition.  
(ii) Direct institutional opposition to the Commission’s operation  
In a similar fashion to the Third World bloc at the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR, there 
was reluctance towards engaging with the Commission’s state reporting procedures. Under the 
Charter all state parties are obliged to submit a “report on the legislative measures taken” by 
them to implement the Charter’s rights.83 Beyond a requirement to report every two years the 
Charter is vague about the content of state reports, which as Christoph Heyns argues was part 
of an overall pattern of evasiveness on the key details of state obligations in the Charter’s text 
to encourage states to ratify the Charter quickly.84 There is limited evidence on this direct point 
but it squares with the overall account outlined above about pre-emptive institutional 
opposition in the Charter’s formation. State reports are a component of a state party’s overall 
duty to promote and protect human rights and as Evans and Murray note the process is 
intended to be collaborative not confrontational, reflecting the overall desire of the Charter to 
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promote African values.85 However, in practice state parties have often resisted sending in 
reports or submitted inadequate reports making the reporting process similar to treaty body 
processes in terms of delay and obstructions. The first state to report was Libya in 1988 and 
that year the Commission adopted Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, which emphasised 
the importance of reporting on both legislative measures taken to protect civil and political 
rights and measures that state parties were taking towards enabling economic development 
and the protection of natural resources.86   
In 1997, after a decade of the Commission’s operation, 33 state parties had yet to submit a 
report. When factoring in the dates that states had ratified the Charter and submitted reports 
in line with its provisions, this meant that in the Commission’s first decade around 15% of all 
state parties could be said to have been complying with the reporting obligations. A snapshot 
of reporting nearly a decade later reveals a slight improvement but many of the same patterns; 
at the Commission’s 40th session, eleven states had submitted all of their reports, eight states 
still owed a report, fourteen states had submitted an initial report but none since and fifteen 
states had never reported.87 This amounted to a compliance rate of around 20% ; a limited 
improvement among state parties since 1997. By this point states had arguably strengthened 
their commitment to the protection of human rights with the adoption of the 2000 AU 
Constitutive Act which placed a strong emphasis on the protection of human rights. At the 53rd 
session in 2013 eight states were counted as being up to date with all reporting processes 
whilst eleven states had yet to submit any report. The behaviour of some countries in this 
process is revealing; Zaire, which was heavily criticised for its refusal to comply with the Human 
Rights Committee, also refused to submit reports to the Commission.88 However after the fall 
of the Mobutu regime and the transformation of the state into the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), its compliance with reporting procedures improved so that by the 53rd session 
the DRC was a fully up to date with all reporting procedures.89 By contrast Zimbabwe, which in 
1997 was fully compliant with the reporting procedures, was by 2013 highly non-compliant 
with three reports overdue. This pattern of behaviour correlates with the priority both states 
gave to human rights and the external perception of their human rights records. This suggests 
                                                          
85 Evans and Murray ‘The state reporting mechanism of the African Charter’ in Evans and Murray (n. 50) 50-1. 
86 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, Second Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights 1988-1989 ACHPR /RPT 2nd Annex XII available at 
http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme02/african_commission_resolution_13.pdf.  
87 Evans and Murray (n 84) p.54 – they note that the situation is in fact slightly more complex than these figures 
show with some states reports still pending and other states whose single submission counted as multiple reports.  
88 See Chapter One. 
89 34th Activity Report of the African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights, p.3 available at 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/34/achpr53eos13_actrep34_2013_eng.pdf> 20 July 2015.  
165 | P a g e  
 
that compliance with the Commission is linked to the way that a state wishes to project their 
own political interests in connection to human rights and responses to other human rights 
organisations. This is fairly standard institutional opposition, as was outlined in chapter one, 
but the initial scale of non-compliance can be read as symptomatic of a deeper institutional 
weakness of the Commission and of potential anti-imperialist opposition.   
Another useful metric to assess institutional opposition is the relative compliance of state 
parties with Commission’s contentious decisions. As Viljoen and Louw note the Commissions 
decisions are not technically binding on state parties, as it issues "recommendations" to state 
parties, rather than "orders” which are legally binding.90 Nevertheless the Commission has 
been clear that its decisions should be read in line with the general commitments that state 
have to protect and promote human rights and it is now a widely accepted legal principle that 
in order to properly fulfil these requirements states should follow the decisions of the 
Commission.91 Murray and Long note that the concept of compliance is somewhat difficult to 
define with respect to the Commission and that sometimes decisions can be complied with 
over long periods of time.92 It should be noted that in the vast majority of decisions made on 
the merits of an individual petition– decisions made where the Commission has looked at the 
substance of the case and not ruled on a procedural or technical rule – the decision has gone 
against the state party.93 Out of these cases there is a compliance rate of around 46% - 
compliance being defined as where a state complies in full or in part with a decision against 
them but even then as Viljoen and Louw note these figures are uncertain and the only thing 
that can be definitively established is that there is a general trend to non-compliance with the 
Commission’s decisions.94 Compliance in relation to interim remedies is also relatively weak 
and notoriously Nigeria ignored an interim order to postpone the execution of the activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa.95  Whilst there were other factors surrounding the case, as Nigeria was under 
military rule at the time, it nevertheless is cited as illustrative of the Commissions relative 
powerlessness.96 There are also, as Wachira details, many cases of states simply ignoring 
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judgments and some states such as Eritrea have had multiple decisions against them without 
even communicating a reply.97 
 Significantly there appears to have been little change with the transformation of the OAU into 
the AU. The AU’s 2000 Constitutive Act prioritises the protection of human rights but does not 
mention the Commission which has led some authors to conclude that this was an attempt to 
side-line the organisation.98 Whilst it is technically possible for the Pan-African Parliament to 
order compliance with the Commission in order to resolve contentious cases this power has 
never been utilised.99 Some of the Commission’s decisions have influenced domestic legal 
processes but where this has happened this is much more a reflection of the internal legal 
systems and local activist forces than it is of the Commission’s institutional success.100 In 2008 
the Commission received a significant increase in AU funding which did go some way to 
rectifying some of the logistical problems it faced in making individuals aware of their rights, 
monitoring state compliance and administering the various aspects of its work.101  
(iii) Interpreting the Commission’s “weakness”; Anti-imperialism within pre-emptive 
and direct opposition to the African Commission  
As outlined in chapter one anti-imperialist institutional opposition was characterised by two 
related assumptions; firstly the sovereignty of postcolonial states was juridically unequal to 
that of other states and secondly, in part as a consequence of the first assumption, 
international human rights law posed a distinct threat to the sovereignty of postcolonial 
states. These assumptions can be seen behind the justifications and explanations of the 
Commission’s weakness even though the Charter was a decolonised human rights instrument. 
Ideological anti-imperialist opposition, which was outlined in chapter two, contended that the 
content of international human rights law represented colonial-imperial interests or was a tool 
for neo-imperialism. As argued in section one of this chapter many of the concerns behind 
anti-imperialist ideological opposition were addressed by the African Charter’s reprioritisation 
of human rights. However, elements of anti-imperialist ideological opposition persisted in 
relation to the Commission’s capacity to enforce rights. The Commission’s weak structures 
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described in part one of this section can be read as an act of pre-emptive anti-imperialist 
opposition and the subsequently high levels of institutional opposition was in part an act of 
direct anti-imperialist institutional opposition.  
 There has been some attempt to explain the Commission’s comparative weaknesses to other 
organisations as a virtue, or a reflection of African values which is similar to the arguments of 
anti-imperialist ideological opposition identified in chapter two. As Amoah noted in his study 
of the Charter’s origins, one of the reasons the drafters of the Charter cited for rejecting the 
creation of a court was that Africans preferred to settle disputes through negotiation and 
conciliation rather than through adversarial litigation.102 A number of other writers noted that 
at the time of the Commission’s formation there was an assumption that a non-adversarial 
body was in keeping with African values.103 There are few concrete details as to who originally 
advanced this view and its context, yet this view appears to be a defensive-relativist 
justification for not including a court of human rights into the final Charter. In common with 
many the relativist arguments in the Asian values debate, detailed in chapter two, this 
argument appears to be an example of states utilising loosely defined cultural values to justify 
the existence of an organisation with a weak or non-existent protection mandate. Significantly 
when at its 22nd Ordinary session the Commission considered legal approaches to the issue of 
non-compliance with the Commission’s decisions the importance of “dialogue” with the 
recalcitrant state party, rather than legal obligation, was stressed seemingly giving weight to 
the claim that the Charter had constructed the Commission to have a non-legal approach to 
enforcement that seemed to follow defensive–relativist assumptions. 104  However the 
Commission that was eventually created by the Charter was a quasi-judicial body, which 
specifically envisaged litigation.  
An additional dimension to this argument was that some of the rights contained within the 
Charter, in particular the Right to Development and the Right to a Satisfactory Environment, 
were arguably rights that did not need a framework for litigation and enforcement.  Solidarity 
rights, such as the Right to Peace and the Right to Development, are founded on what Karl 
Vasek termed the ‘fraternity’ of humanity and their realisation often requires collective action 
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from a variety of actors working together in a common cause.105 These rights require political 
solidarity between states for their delivery and the rights holder is the community at large, 
rather than an individual.106 At a 1986 conference on the promotion of human rights in Africa, 
legal experts argued that “the primary impetus” for the promotion of human rights “will have 
to come from Africans themselves” and they concluded that the creation of networks of 
solidarity was important to form the basis of “collective self-reliant development.”107 This 
misses the point; given that the state controls or has the capacity to control natural resources 
and the means of production, which underpin these rights, the ability to take action against 
the state is vital to ensure the realisation and protection of such rights. The first Chairman of 
the Commission took this view concluding that the Charter had reprioritised the substance of 
international human rights law to reflect the “struggle for African people” but the Commission 
was in danger of become a “paper tiger”  which weakened the rights contained in the 
Charter.108  
In terms of institutional opposition, from its inception commentators on the Charter had 
noted a highly a defensive approach to state sovereignty and that the Commission had limited 
powers to protect human rights within signatory states. Umozurike writing in 1988 
acknowledged the deficiencies of the commission but was optimistic that it could develop a 
system for adequately protecting human rights.109 Dlamini argued that the Charter showed 
that African states are “not unconcerned about the violation of human rights”, but at the same 
time acknowledged that the uncertainty surrounding the Commissions’ mandate makes “the 
charter largely ineffective.”110 Other early commentators were less optimistic.  At a 1986 
symposium entitled "Human Rights in the African Context” held in Port Harcourt Mathews 
warned that the Commission’s relatively weak powers of scrutiny and enforcement would 
“allow despotic regimes to continue on their paths of abuse.”111 Writing elsewhere in 
Mathews described the Commission as “disappointing” and noted that there was a danger 
that the Commissions weaknesses may make signing up to the Charter an “empty gesture.”112 
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The relatively weak protection mandate of the Commission can be read as an act of pre-
emptive anti-imperialist opposition in the following ways.  
Firstly there were those who argued that the charters weaknesses reflected actual weaknesses 
within the sovereignty of African states, mirroring the arguments about the sovereign 
inequality of postcolonial states outlined in chapter one. Bina Okere makes this point in her 
early comparative study between the Charter and the ECHR and the Inter American Human 
Rights Commission, noting that  
 “African States, still jealous of their newly acquired national sovereignty, have 
not  yet come round to conceding to an international judicial organ [for] the 
arbitration of human rights questions.”113 
Evelyn Ankumah writing in 1996 makes a similar point although from a slightly different 
perspective noting that “having fought had to acquire their independence from colonial 
powers, African States were preoccupied with maintaining their sovereignty.”114 Ankumah 
argues that this explains the difficulties behind “the promotion and protection of human 
rights” in the OAU and explains the overall hostility to supranational human rights scrutiny.115  
Odinkalu writing in 2003 makes a similar point arguing that it was “early insecurities about the 
precariousness of their newly won independence” that led African states to an “extreme 
assertion of sovereignty” which marginalised human rights in inter-state activities until the 
end of the twentieth century.116 This framed the Commission’s weakness as a direct result of 
decolonisation and the construction of the postcolonial state. This is an inversion of the anti-
imperialist argument outlined in chapter one; in the same way that states opposed 
international organisations because of their sovereign inequalities stemming from 
decolonisation, states now constructed an organisation to reflect their sovereign inequalities.  
Abdullahi An-Na'im takes this argument further reasoning that it “is unrealistic to expect the 
postcolonial African State to effectively protect human rights” because the postcolonial state 
in Africa had been created by colonial rule and therefore was “incapable of creating and 
sustaining the institutions and processes necessary to protect rights.”117 The logical conclusion 
of this argument is that any supranational institution created by postcolonial states was likely 
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to fail because it would rely on the institutions of the postcolonial nation state to implement 
its decisions. As Odinkalu observed in a similar vein that “ineffectual national foundations 
cannot support effective regional supervision.”118 Emmanuel Bello writing at the time of 
Charter’s drafting argued the Commission was “illusory and unworkable” because it attempted 
to accommodate all African states and it was better instead, he argued, to attempt to form an 
organisation between like-minded states, such as those with a common law tradition.119 These 
explanations are explicit in drawing a link between the weakness of the colonial state and 
international organisations and in doing so rely on a notion of statehood and juridical 
sovereignty, central to anti-imperialist thinking.  
The second major argument was that states had intentionally created a weak protection 
regime as means of balancing their hostility to international legal mechanisms with their 
desire to appear human rights compliant.  M’Baye’s thesis is that the Commissions’ 
weaknesses originated in the Charter because it was "what the African States were able to 
accept in 1981”.120 Viljoen also makes this point noting that the Commission had “clearly been 
designed to accomplish very little”.121 He goes on to note that the OAU/AU’s approach to the 
Commission was “schizophrenic” as they simultaneously praised it for its accomplishments 
and starved it of resources.122 Sindjoun situates this argument in a broader context and 
concludes that the Commission was effectively mere “window dressing” in order accede to the 
demands of the international community.123 States have certainly implicitly relied on this 
interpretation when engaging in acts of institutional opposition; when the Commission found 
that far reaching executive decrees passed by the military regime in Nigeria constituted a 
violation of the right to fair trial Nigeria argued that the decision infringed their sovereignty.124  
The Gambia argued when the Commission ruled on the undemocratic transfer of power and 
violations of free after a coup in 1995, that the Commission should only concern itself with 
serious violations of human rights. 125 Botswana when ordered to pay compensation to an 
individual who had been wrongly deported the Foreign Affairs Minister, Phandu Skelemani, 
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reject the Commission’s  decision saying “it does not give orders ....we are not going to listen 
to them.”126 
These examples pointed to the weakness of the Commissions protection mandate being a 
result of the organisation’s rational design. Significantly Botswana was at the time was a 
democracy with independent courts, unlike the other two examples, meaning that opposition 
was related to the organisation and not just a reflection of that particular state’s attitude to 
the rule of law. There has also been relatively low rate of compliance when the Commission 
has issued remedies on the basis of expansively interpreting its powers under the charter to 
allow it to issue orders relating to compensation or specific far reaching law reform.127  Again 
the compliance in these cases was true of states which were democratic with strong judicial 
institutions and non-democratic states with weak institutions. When reading this pattern of 
behaviour in line with the account of the Commission’s formation, set out in part one, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Commission’s protection mandate was intentionally 
constructed in an anti-imperialist mould – it was designed to protect postcolonial states from 
the potential effects of a human rights organisation. This original act of pre-emptive 
institutional opposition explained the acts of direct in institutional opposition detailed above. 
What marked these acts of institutional opposition out as anti-imperialist is that they were 
based on the assumption that the Commission had been created not to exercise a protection 
mandate over the postcolonial state. When the Commission exercised its protection mandate 
it exacerbated sovereign vulnerabilities at the heart of anti-imperialism. For the most part 
institutional opposition, as Udombana argued, was characterised by “a spirit of furious 
indifference” from Africa leaders towards the Commission and there are some clear examples 
of institutional opposition which were non anti-imperialist such as the procedures on annual 
reporting.128 Yet where purposive arguments about the Commission have been made by states 
they have served to highlight the Commission’s pre-emptive anti-imperialist foundations.  
(3) Pre-emptive anti-imperialist institutional opposition to The African Court of 
Human and Peoples Rights  
In 1998 the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted an additional 
Protocol to the Charter establishing an African Court of Human and Peoples Rights. Whilst the 
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original draft of the Charter contained no provision for a Court the possibility was open for a 
Protocol to the Charter on a Court to be adopted and implemented. Even after the passage of 
the 1998 Protocol it took until 2004 to get the necessary number of state-party signatures for 
its ratification. It was intended to eventually replace the Commission and it was scheduled to 
take over the premises of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha once the 
Tribunal’s workload wound down, although in its final form the Court was put in a 
complimentary relationship with the Commission. 129  In 2009 the Court issued its first 
judgement dismissing a case for lack of standing against the government of Senegal.130 Whilst 
the judgement was a hearing on matters standing before the court as Charles Jalloh argued, it 
represented a significant advancement that an independent African court was able to operate 
and issue judgements on human rights matters.131 
The creation of the Court saw a recurrence of the pre-emptive institutional opposition that 
was present at the Commission’s creation, as states in the OAU moved from initially opposing 
the idea of a human rights court towards supporting a court with limited rights of standing. 
Rebecca Wright in her analysis of the Court’s formation concludes that this was a form 
“rational design” as the Court was designed to reflect, and not challenge, state supremacy and 
state interests.132 Rational design theorists were discussed in the introduction and first 
chapter; they presume that states shape organisations both to reflect shared interests and in 
anticipation of their future powers and potential.133 Wright’s analysis, whilst emphasising the 
importance of postcolonial sovereignty in relation to the Court’s foundation, by virtue of being 
written in 2006 does not analyse how these concerns affect its operation. Subsequent disputes 
about the Court’s capacity to hear international criminal cases reveal ongoing concerns about 
its ability to threaten state sovereignty suggesting that states defensive attitude to the Court 
was a response to its perceived potential rather than its actual,powers.  
In the early 1990s a series of high level meetings culminated in a draft proposal for an African 
Court of Human Rights being drawn up in 1994 by a committee of experts convened by the 
International Commission of Jurists. In 1995 these proposals were the basis of an OAU expert 
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meeting convened in Cape Town to discuss the formation of an African Court of Human 
Rights.134 This was a significant step by the OAU as they seemed to be actively contemplating 
the creation of an institution that had a much stronger protection mandate than the 
Commission which could litigate against states in order to enforce human rights. Gina Bekker 
argues that these developments need to be seen in the context of the previous year’s 
Rwandan genocide as “African states wanted to be seen to be doing something tangible” in 
response.135 This is not entirely dissimilar to histories of the European Court of Human Rights 
that focus on the memory of the holocaust as a spur to its development and the original drafts 
of a Protocol on the Court used the Inter-American and European human rights systems as a 
template.136 Significantly these early drafts contained a provision which allowed individuals to 
directly access the Court after their state had ratified the Protocol, in a similar fashion to 
Protocol 11 of the ECHR which made jurisdiction of Court compulsory after a state joined the 
Council of Europe.  
 Bekker and Wright both note when state parties to the Commission were invited to file 
comments on the proposed Protocol many of them attacked this particular clause. The 
Gambia worried that individual petitions would encourage “vexatious and embarrassing 
actions” and the Mauritanian delegate worried that allowing NGOs to use the individual 
standing provisions would allow them to attack state parties.137  Julia Harrington argues that 
Nigeria’s influence on drafting process - which was at the time under the rule of General 
Abache and had publically ignored the Commission by executing Ken Saro-Wiwa in defiance of 
an interim order - may have been decisive in persuading some state parties to reject the 
individual petition provisions.138 There is no direct evidence in support of this hypothesis but 
the attitude of many of those commenting was quite hostile even though there were some 
state parties, such as Tanzania, that were strongly in favour of individual petition. At a second 
OAU meeting of government experts in Nouakchott in 1997 the individual provision was 
amended to make individual standing optional. 
The final text of the Protocol requires states to issue a declaration “accepting the competence 
of the Court to receive cases” from individuals and NGOs and requires the Court not to receive 
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such cases where a declaration has not been filed.139 This allows two options for individuals 
and NGOs to access the Court; either the Commission refers their case to the Court – 
potentially taking a long time - or an individual state enters a declaration allowing individuals 
access. As of the spring of 2016 seven out of the 24 parties to the Protocol had made such a 
declaration.140 This severely limits the Court’s capacity to protect human rights as the case of 
Timan v Sudan illustrates. The applicant was a Sudanese refugee from Darfur living in the DRC 
and had been expelled from Sudan after being declared an enemy of the Sudanese 
government. The application was dismissed because the government of Sudan had not filed a 
declaration allowing individual petitions to the Court.141 As the Sudanese government has 
remained uncooperative with the Commission and was at the forefront of the AU campaign 
against the ICC the prospect of it submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the Court was highly 
unlikely. The rule under Article 34(6) of the Protocol has been used to declare 55% of all of all 
cases brought by individuals against states inadmissible.142 In 2013 the Court held that there 
was no violation of a right to a fair trial when a state chose not enter an Article 34(6) 
declaration and that there was no obligation on state parties to make such a declaration.143 In 
March 2016 Rwanda, who had been one of the first states to file an Article 34(6) declaration, 
withdrew their declaration shortly before a court was due to hear an application from a 
leading political dissident.144 Admissibility decisions in relation to declarations under Article 
34(6) are a symptom of pre-emptive institutional opposition as the rule was specifically 
designed by states to limit the Court’s capacity to protect human rights and stifle its ipsetic 
potential.   
The decision by the AU to merge the Court and the African Court of Justice, an AU institution 
created by the 2000 AU Constitutive Act, can be read as a form of pre-emptive opposition. 
Whilst the Charter of the new African Court of Justice and Human Rights resolves some of 
issues of standing in the Protocol, it also represents an attempt by the AU to create a new 
court which it has greater control over.  A merger between the two bodies was first proposed 
by President Obasanjo of Nigeria in 2004 who thought that the Court of Justice could have a 
human rights division with competence to hear human rights matters and the AU assembly 
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adopted a formal decision on the merger.145 Kane and Motala were critical of this decision 
because it represented an attempt by the assembly override treaty obligations under the 
Charter and had “serious consequences for the rule of law in Africa.”146 Although they 
concluded that were the merger to happen it could potentially strengthen the power of the 
Court. During the drafting of the Court’s proposed charter in 2006 a general reservation clause 
was inserted that would allow states to declare that they did not consider themselves bound 
by aspects of the Court protocol. 
The merger proposals were related to proposals to give the Court jurisdiction to try 
international crimes. The fact that these proposals originated as a response to opposition from 
AU states towards the ICC and condemnation of what the AU termed the abuse of universal 
jurisdiction, meant that it was unlikely that these proposals were going to enhance the Court’s 
protection mandate.147  The 2010 Assembly of the AU in Kampala adopted a resolution to 
“empower” the Court “to try international crimes” but at the same session resolutions were 
also passed urging African states not to cooperate with the ICC and condemning the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction. 148  Although the AU Constitutive Act committed it to the 
“condemnation and rejection of impunity” this provision was extremely unclear as it did not 
clearly state who this applied to and appeared alongside provisions safeguarding “sovereign 
equality” and prohibiting member states from interference “in the internal affairs” of 
others.149 This allowed the AU Assembly in 2011 to pass a resolution that simultaneously 
reiterated the commitment of the AU to ending impunity but also called for states to respect 
“the immunity of state officials”.150 The AU Assembly also issued a series of resolutions urging 
for deferrals of the ICC’s prosecutions in Kenya and Sudan, opposing the involvement of the 
ICC in Libya and supporting states ignoring the ICC arrest warrants and allowing indicted 
individuals to visit their state.151  
This pattern of events can be understood as anti-imperialist ideological opposition to the ICC 
and to European states attempting to assert universal jurisdiction over African leaders. The AU 
weren’t necessarily averse to international prosecution in theory and in 2010 supported the 
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prosecution of Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad, for Crimes Against Humanity.152 
However at the 2014 AU Summit states voted to prevent the Court from issuing proceedings 
for international crimes “against any serving African Union Head of State or Government”.153 
This would only apply after the merger of the two courts and the granting of the jurisdiction to 
the court to try international crimes. By the beginning of 2015 the direction of travel of the AU 
was towards the establishment of a tribunal with no protection mandate which would 
effectively preserve the impunity of heads of government in relation to international criminal 
charges. This represented the regionalisation of anti-imperialist opposition. Even though the 
Court had been created outside the imperialist context of international law, the anti-
imperialist arguments of weak sovereignty and overly powerful international organisations 
affected its design. This was accompanied by outright anti-imperialist opposition to human 
rights organisations exercising their protection mandates against the leaders of postcolonial 
states.  
(4) Direct anti-imperialist institutional opposition: Regional Economic 
Community Court’s and the protection of human rights  
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter the three major Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) in Africa the Economic Court of West African States (ECOWAS), the East Africa 
Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) all have tribunals 
with a human rights jurisdiction. In all three REC’s the original purpose of the organisation was 
economic integration and the purpose of the tribunals was to adjudicate on the interpretation 
of the organisations constituent treaty. Their tribunal’s acquired a human rights jurisdiction by 
judicial interpretation of their constitutive acts or had the power directly granted to them by 
an organisational decision. The REC’s courts and tribunals have all faced varying degrees of 
institutional opposition when trying to protect human rights within states although the level of 
anti-imperialist institutional opposition has been comparatively less than the anti-imperialist 
opposition to the Commission and Court.  
Between 2007 and 2013 the EAC Court of Justice (EACJ) was able to rule on eight separate 
human rights matters but has faced some considerable institutional opposition from 
member’s states who have opposed its ipestic potential.  The EACJ had no explicit human 
rights mandate but has interpreted its powers under Article 27 of the EAC Treaty, which gives 
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them jurisdiction to interpret community values, as giving them the capacity to interpret 
human rights matters.154 This was a somewhat wide interpretation of what appeared to be 
narrowly constructed provisions and the Court’s insistence that their role was interpretive did 
not constrain them from essentially developing a protection mandate. This noted James 
Gathii, was the judges attempt to escape the EACJ’s  “initial obscurity” within the EAC and 
“overcome its severe institutional weaknesses.”155  Whilst this form of judicial activism, Gathi 
argues, was welcomed by civil society activists it resulted in some hostility from EAC executive 
and he notes that the EACJ’s “expansive jurisprudence has been … resisted by member 
states.”156 After a ruling against Kenya a series of amendments to the EAC Treaty were passed 
by a special summit in 2007 attempting to place severe procedural limitations on the Court.157 
However these were later ruled to be incompatible with the procedures set out in the EAC 
Treaty and so the reforms were quashed and the EACJ was able to carry hearing human rights 
cases.158 Given in 2014 the Court heard a case from Uganda challenging the legality of its anti-
homosexuality law and in 2015 heard a case from Burundi challenging far reaching press 
censorship laws it is remarkable that direct institutional opposition to EACJ has been relatively 
limited.159 There is however a low level of compliance with the Court and although judgements 
can technically be enforced within national legal systems there is little evidence of this had any 
definitive results.  
The dissolution of the SADC Tribunal’s human rights jurisdiction was perhaps the most 
forthright case of anti-imperialist institutional opposition towards the RECs.  Article 4 of the 
2001 revised SADC Treaty commits member states to a general set of organisational principles 
which include ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ and Article 15 of the 2000 SADC 
Protocol on the operation of the Tribunal allows an applicant to bring an action against a 
member state if they have “exhausted all available remedies” or are “unable to proceed under 
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their domestic jurisdiction.”160 These two provisions were read in tandem as giving the 
Tribunal the power to hear cases from individuals in member states. Yet regardless of the legal 
merits of this position, the fact that the creation of a SADC human rights court had been 
explicitly rejected when drafting the 2000 Tribunal Protocol meant that its human rights 
jurisdiction was built on weak foundations.161 When Zimbabwean farmers who were victims of 
Robert Mugabe’s land redistribution programme found avenues of redress effectively blocked 
in their own jurisdiction (the Zimbabwean government went so far as to actually change the 
Constitution to restrict their rights of appeal) they took their case to the SADC Tribunal. In 
Mike Campbell v Zimbabwe the Tribunal held that the restriction of the claimant’s right to 
challenge the appropriation of their land constituted an ouster clause and consequently there 
had been a violation their rights under the African Charter and a breach of the SADC Treaty.162 
The Zimbabwean high court refused to enforce the judgement and when claimants returned 
to the Tribunal to get a declaration against the government, the Zimbabwean justice minister 
attempted to claim that they were not bound by the Tribunal’s decision.163  The Zimbabwean 
government the conducted an extensive lobbying exercise to persuade other SADC member 
states to suspend the Tribunal. At the 2010 SADC heads of government summit, the Tribunal 
was suspended pending a review of its functions. In 2012 a meeting of law ministers from 
SADC countries devised an alternate set of proposals for the SADC Tribunal which did not 
include a human right jurisdiction and these were quickly adopted at the SADC heads of 
government summit later in the year, effectively terminating the Tribunal’s human rights 
jurisdiction.  
SADC had previously been heavily critical of Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe and in 2009 
approved a wide-ranging set of administrative measures against Zimbabwe in response to 
post-election violence and human rights abuses in the country. Fear of the Tribunal’s ipsetic 
potential was evident in discussions of the Tribunal’s power at SADC’s 2010 summit - 
Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete exclaimed ‘we have created a monster’.164 Justifying the 
2012 decision to terminate the Tribunal’s human rights jurisdiction Namibia's Minister of 
Justice Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana, argued that Member States were entitled to “fine-tune 
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regional bodies” where states thought it fit and that the Tribunal existed to “serve us [the 
governments of SADC].”165 This was an extreme example of institutional opposition as it 
envisaged eliminating the organisational protection mandate because of its failure to comply 
with state wishes. This had a distinct anti-imperialist dimension to it as Zimbabwe sought to 
build solidarity against the Tribunal by using anti-imperialist rhetoric about the dangers of 
human rights to build up inter-state solidarity against the Tribunal’s human rights jurisdiction. 
By contrast the ECOWAS Court of Justice has faced a relatively low level of institutional 
opposition and no anti-imperialist opposition. The 1975 ECOWAS treaty made no reference to 
human rights but the revised 1993 treaty recognised the promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights as one of the organisation’s core principles. Ebobrah in a detailed analysis 
of the ECOWAS’ human rights commitments casts some doubt as to whether this constitutes a 
human rights regime.166 The significant difference between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and 
the SADC Tribunal is that a 2005 Protocol issued by a summit of ECOWAS Heads of State 
specifically gave the Court “jurisdiction to determine case of violation of human rights that 
occur in any Member State”.167 In 2008 the Court issued its first ruling against a member state 
when it held that Niger was obliged to take positive legislative measures to prevent its citizens 
from customary forms of slavery.168 The Court has subsequently issued a series of judgements, 
interpreting the African Charter and other international instruments, including a landmark 
judgement against Nigeria concerning the right to a sustainable environment, demonstrating 
the Court’s capacity to implement the Charter’s decolonial conception of human rights.169 
However the Gambia, which has had three Court rulings made against it in relation to the 
imprisonment, torture and murder of anti-government journalists, has refused to implement 
its rulings.170 The Gambia’s current government has a long history institutional opposition 
towards international human rights organisations but their opposition towards the Court is 
distinct from the anti-imperialist institutional opposition that affected the SADC Tribunal as it 
does not use arguments based upon sovereign inequality or collective solidarity. It is 
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noteworthy that whilst the Court has condemned Gambia for failing to implement these 
judgements there are few direct enforcement measures that ECOWAS has taken against it.171  
The overall assessment of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice by Karen Alter et al. is 
broadly positive and they note that states have been willing to tolerate the Court exercising a 
far wider human rights jurisdiction than the African Court.172 In part they note this is due to 
the a series of reforms that allowed civil society groups and other supranational actors to 
lobby in favour of human rights reforms to be included within the Court’s jurisdictional 
competence rather than, as was the case with the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal, judges 
interpreting organisational decisions to give the Court a protection mandate. Another reason 
for the Court’s relative success Kufuor argues is its institutional economic framework which 
prioritises the doctrine of institutionalised ordoliberalism – the idea that the economic 
institutions should be organised to ensure that the free market and economic integration 
produces results.173 This encouraged states to view the protection of human rights in the 
context of ensuring greater economic integration, something that was supported by other 
transnational actors. Both explanations have some merit to them and although initially dogged 
by a rather low rate of compliance, Alter et al note that there is evidence that the Court is able 
to shape remedies in a manner that has progressively encouraged greater compliance.174 One 
potential factor in ensuring a relatively low level of opposition to REC’s appears to be that 
their tribunals often hear a wide range of other commercial and constitutional matters and 
therefore are not seen solely as a human rights organisation. However, this may not be subject 
to limitations as Gathii notes in relation to the EAC, whilst the organisations member states 
were committed to economic integration these commitments were seldom framed in legal 
terms or in terms of protecting human rights.175  
Conclusion  
The African Charter, as the first section of this chapter demonstrated, was a genuinely 
decolonial human rights instrument as it radically broke with existing conceptions of human 
rights by using a different epistemic framework and by giving equal status to all forms of 
rights. However the evolution and practice of the Commission and Court showed that OAU/AU 
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and states within those organisations, engaged in pre-emptive institutional opposition on a 
vast scale to inhibit the creation of organisations with an effective protection mandate. This 
opposition was often anti-imperialist as it drew on the notion that postcolonial sovereignty 
was weak and under threat from international human rights law and occasionally used the 
anti-imperialist ideological argument that the enforcement of rights was incompatible with the 
culture of some societies.  
There is a line of argument that in general terms attempts to explain anti-imperialist 
opposition towards regional human rights organisations in terms of the radical 
incommensurability of human rights with postcolonial states. These explanations in a limited 
sense can explain why some organisations are likely to have weak protection mandates. As the 
second section noted there is nearly four decades of scholarship on the African Commission 
arguing that the postcolonial state was unable to support a supranational human rights 
regime. However, these explanations above do not give an indication of how over time the 
situations within states might change and it is noteworthy that democracies as well as non-
democracies have engaged in pre-emptive and direct anti-imperialist opposition. As some 
African scholars have noted democratic states with independent courts are often necessary 
for human rights enforcement which correlates with the experience of other regional 
systems.176 As the fourth section of this Chapter noted there is some evidence of a slightly 
different attitude towards the protection of human rights in relation to the REC’s. Apart from 
the SADC case, there are much more standard practices of institutional opposition towards 
these organisations.  
 Equally explaining human rights problems in terms of state weakness ignores the apparent 
shift in the politics of human rights as the OAU transitioned into the AU. As Wachira notes the 
AU had the capacity to impose sanctions and launch military operations to protect human 
rights, powers which required considerable interstate co-operation and envisaged violating a 
state’s sovereignty.177  Attitudes towards state sovereignty and the capacity of regional 
organisations to protect human rights did evolve – it was just that this evolution of attitudes 
did not necessarily involve the Commission or the Court. Additionally focusing on radical 
incommensurability and the inherent weakness of the postcolonial state inadvertently falls 
into the orientalist methodological trap of believing that there exists a class of ‘savages’ that 
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can never be human rights compliant.178 The defensive relativist argument, which maintains 
that adjudication violates collective values and therefore adversarial approaches at the 
supranational level should be rejected, has been heavily criticised. As Issa Shivji notes these 
interpretations of collective identity refer to a collective that is defined by the “oppressor 
state.”179 The African Charter recognised the rights of communities and groups to maintain 
their distinct collective existence - it was the postcolonial state that denied these groups their 
rights and resisted the creation of mechanisms to protect them. Also removing human rights 
from their imperial context does not necessarily involve eschewing any form of enforcement 
mechanism. As Jose Manuel-Barreto notes what is necessary for the decolonisation of human 
rights is “a dialogue with other visions of rights” and he is critical of attempts to completely 
reject the western tradition of rights.180 This would include the idea that there are obligations 
upon the state to protect human rights in line with a basic international legal framework.  
In short anti-imperialism as practiced towards regional human rights organisations was not 
necessarily a feature of the postcolonial state and the decolonisation of a human rights 
instrument did not involve abandoning human rights organisations with a protection mandate. 
Rather the common feature underpinning all of the different instances of anti-imperialist 
opposition in this chapter is hostility to the creation of a protection mandate. This can also be 
seen in chapter three as anti-imperialist opposition principally coincided with attempts by the 
UN Commission on Human Rights to develop a limited protection mandate and the 
reprioritisation of the substance of international human rights law played a relatively marginal 
role in the activities of the Third World bloc. Protection mandates, by giving the organisation 
an ipsetic potential, give the organisation an ongoing power to prescribe the content of a 
state’s laws which as the next chapter argues is inherently imperialist as it depends upon 
devaluing a state’s external sovereignty. This means that whilst it is possible to decolonise the 
substance of international human rights law, as this chapter demonstrated, its protection at 
the supranational level will inevitably have an imperialist dimension.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
        Inherent imperialism and the legal structure of human rights 
organisations  
 
Introduction  
In the introduction to this study a distinction was drawn between the imperialist context of 
international human rights law’s origins and inherent imperialism – the properties of a legal 
regime that envisage the political dominance of weaker state parties by stronger entities. The 
imperialist context of international human rights law’s origins were discussed in chapter two 
where it was shown how eighteenth century colonial-imperialism shaped international law’s 
formation and how in the twentieth century early instruments of international human rights 
law reflected a western European tradition of rights. As the last chapter showed it is possible 
to remove international human rights law from this imperialist context and the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples Rights is an example of a decolonial human rights instrument reflecting 
a distinct set of regional human rights priorities.1   
When postcolonial states grouped together in international organisations in the Third World 
bloc, anti-imperialism underpinned much of their collective institutional and ideological 
opposition. As chapter one outlined anti-imperialist institutional opposition was predicated on 
the notion that postcolonial states’ sovereignty was relatively unequal to other states and 
supranational human rights organisations helped perpetuate these sovereign inequalities.  All 
states engage in some form institutional opposition towards supranational human rights 
organisations as a means of reasserting their sovereignty against an organisation, but anti-
imperialist institutional opposition is a more extreme form of opposition predicated on 
sovereign weakness. Anti-imperialist ideological opposition, as chapter two outlined, was 
predicated on the notion that international human rights law was a neo-colonialist tool that 
needed to be reprioritised to accommodate the needs of postcolonial states. Chapter three 
examined how anti-imperialist opposition from the Third World bloc within the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and latterly the UN Human Rights Council was principally a 
response to both organisations’ protection mandates. A protection mandate, as chapter one 
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outlined, is the collection of legal powers that allow an organisation to protect human rights 
within a sovereign state and ensure compliance with human rights organisations. Even though 
the African Charter was a decolonised human rights instrument, forms of anti-imperialist 
opposition persisted against the institutions created to enforce the rights contained in the 
Charter. This would suggest, as the conclusion of chapter four argued, that anti-imperialist 
opposition was not just a response to the imperialist context of international human rights law 
but is a response to the exercise of an organisation’s protection mandate.   
This chapter examines the causes of anti-imperialist opposition from a different direction 
arguing that all protection mandates envisage a form of imperialist juridical dominance over a 
sovereign state. This means that regardless of the origins of the human rights law an 
organisation applies and regardless of the nature of the organisation (i.e. whether it is a 
regional or international organisation) organisations with a protection mandate will face anti-
imperialist opposition. Protection mandates, this chapter argues, are inherently imperialist 
and this is a feature of organisational design which triggers anti-imperialist opposition to 
supranational human rights organisations, regardless of their origins and the decolonised 
status of the human rights law that they apply.  
In the first and second section of this chapter it will be shown how protection mandates give 
an organisation the legal powers to designate states human rights violators. The notion of 
universality in international human rights law, section one argues, has historically been 
defined by a negative universal reference – the concept of universality is defined by defining 
the existence of an outsider or other. As section two shows the juridical framework of a 
protection mandate, allows organisations to construct political categories of human rights 
violating and human rights compliant states and then use these categories to pressure states 
to change their domestic laws and practices. Whilst this is not directly physically or materially 
coercive, if a state is identified as a human rights violator this can affect their external 
sovereign legitimacy. Almost every state in the world is party to at least one international 
human rights agreement and as chapter one argued compliance with human rights law is a 
way of demonstrating external sovereign legitimacy.2 A protection mandate has the potential 
to affect a state’s claim to what Stephen Krasner termed international legal sovereignty – the 
right to be recognised as legitimately sovereign by other state powers.3 The categorisation of a 
state as a human rights violator and the consequences this has for its external sovereignty 
implicitly justifies the ipsetic potential of an organisation. Ipseity according to Jacques Derrida 
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is a form of power that allows an individual to position themselves as having “the right and the 
strength to be recognised as sovereign.”4 As chapter one argued human rights organisations 
have an ipsetic potential and in some cases can challenge their member states domestic legal 
sovereignty – their capacity to make laws and take decisions on behalf of the population.  This 
is because organisation’s exercising their protection mandate are making an authoritative 
claim as to what the laws of a state ought to be which erodes the traditional sovereign 
prerogative of lawmaking. This chapter develops this by arguing that organisations justify their 
ipsetic potential because, when they are exercising their protection mandate, they are 
attempting to remove states from the category of human rights violating states and move 
them into the category of human rights compliant states.  
Regardless of whether this is successful the fact that a protection mandate attempts to do 
this, section three argues, is inherently imperialist. The circular nature of the process 
envisaged by protection mandates – the organisation creates the excluded state, defines 
universality with reference to the excluded and then attempts to save the excluded state – not 
only presumes a type of juridical domination over the process of law making in sovereign 
states, but also mimics the process of colonial-imperialism. Even regional organisations 
applying decolonized human rights law rely on protection mandates opening them to anti-
imperialist opposition. Anti-imperialist opposition persists because of protection mandates 
and absent a new legal framework for organisations to enforce human rights law the process 
of protecting human rights at the supranational level will remain inherently imperialist.  
As argued in chapter one, states do not join human rights organisations solely for self-
interested, or realist reasons but because of a more complex series of rational choices they are 
socialized into making.5 However this is contingent upon states viewing the expected loss of 
domestic legal sovereignty that is necessary to comply with an organisation’s interpretation of 
human rights law as fulfilling some broader aim. Where organisations with functioning 
protection mandates do not face anti-imperialist opposition, and only face institutional 
opposition of the sort described in chapter one, it is usually because that organisation has 
established a foundational political narrative that allows states to accept the inherent 
imperialism of its protection mandate. This allows states to view their potential classification 
as a human rights abusing state as legitimate and a necessary risk because there is a clear 
consensus about its necessity.  Section four analyses opposition to the European Court of 
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Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and compares this to the 
opposition described in the previous two chapters. Anti-colonialism did not establish a 
foundational political narrative that facilitated states accepting the legitimacy of a protection 
mandate as it situated formerly colonialist states as the originator of human rights abuses. 
This in part explains why anti-imperialist opposition is more prominent in some regional 
organisations than others.  
The crucial point that this chapter makes in concluding this entire study is that there are parts 
of the legal structure of supranational organisations that are responsible for triggering anti-
imperialist opposition. The parts of an international organisation that triggers anti-imperialist 
opposition is found in the organisation’s protection mandates. Therefore anti-imperialist 
opposition, of the sort described in the previous chapters is an inevitable feature of all 
supranational organisations operation, regardless of whether they are a regional or an 
international organisation, unless there is a political consensus around the operation of that 
organisation’s protection mandate.  
(1) The negative universal reference, international law’s universalism and colonial 
imperialism  
Behind the juridical universalism of a human rights instrument, Seyla Benhabib argues, there is 
a justificatory universalism which seeks to justify the juridical application of rights across all 
societies.6  To understand justificatory universalism it is necessary to distinguish the universal 
aspiration and the universal realization of human rights. Universal aspiration is the idea that 
rights ought or should be universal. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) contains a statement of universal aspiration where it states that human rights 
are a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations”.7  The justification for 
this kind of universalism Benhabib argues can be found through a “discourse-theoretic 
framework” that reasons that all humans ought to have rights because of a “moral 
universalism” based on “equal respect for the other [human] as a being capable of 
communicative freedom”. 8   This is a cosmopolitan form of reasoning that is broadly 
teleological in its declarative statements – it explains the basis for rights being universal 
without necessarily providing a rationalization or justification for how they can become 
universal.9 
                                                          
6 Seyla Benhabib Dignity in Adversity Human Rights in Troubled Times (Polity 2011) 11. 
7 Preamble A/Res 217A (III).  
8 Ibid Benhabib 64.  
9 See David Held Cosmopolitanism: Ideas and Realities (Polity 2010) 67-70.  
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Universal realization requires a justification as to why human rights should be enforced in all 
states. This is different from the fact of an international legal obligation - human rights treaties 
as a matter of international law bind signatory states. The existence of an obligation is 
different from the enforcement of an obligation by an external body over a state. Benhabib, 
whilst acknowledging that international human rights law purports to act as a form of global 
constitution, does not directly engage with how international law justifies the enforcement of 
rights in a sovereign state. As chapter one noted juridical instruments that aim to protect 
human rights by empowering organisations to act against states justify the universal 
realization of rights with reference to the protection of a victim or victims.  This can be seen in 
Optional Protocol One of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which 
refers to “victims” and “violations” of rights as the basis for the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) – the ICCPR’s treaty body - exercising its protection mandate over states.10 The 
justification for universal realization is constructed by identifying both the violator and victim 
and using this as a pretext to take action against the violator. Mukau Mutua noted that 
international human rights law requires the creation of categories of human rights violating 
“savages” whose “victims” would then be “saved” by the application of human rights law.11 
Mutua’s analysis captures how the justificatory universality of an instrument that seeks to 
realize human rights is to an extent dependent on defining categories of victim and violator. 
To understand how the justificatory universality of an instrument realising human rights law 
operates it is first necessary to examine how the justificatory universality of international law 
is constructed through a negative universal reference.   
The negative universal reference was developed by Foucault in his lectures at the Collége De 
France that form part of ‘Society must be Defended.  Foucault’s theorisation of sovereignty 
sought to demonstrate its construction in terms of the “techniques”, “subjugation effects” and 
“technologies of domination” that gave the sovereign its power.12 A new discourse appeared, 
Foucault argued, which constituted the state and the subject of the state into a collective “we” 
or “I” that spoke in the discourse of “right” and “demanded rights”.13 This led to the creation 
of a form of “state racism” in the eighteenth century as the sovereign defined itself with 
reference to its biopolitical control and constructed a principle of “national universality”. 14 
This universality gave both a structure to the state and constituted the subjects of the state 
                                                          
10 Preamble, OP 1 ICCPR 999 UNTS 1 1966. 
11 Makau Mutua ‘Savages, victims and saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’(2001) 42  Harvard Journal of 
International law 202 
12 Foucault “Society must be defended” (David Macey trans Penguin Books 2004) 46. 
13Ibid. 49, 52. 
14Ibid 239. 
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itself.  As Andrew Neal argues Foucault does not see the construction of the state in terms of 
“milestones on the road to Enlightenment” but rather as “sedimented outcomes of long 
forgotten and bloody conquest.”15 The universal power of the sovereign was defined both by 
the subjects that the sovereign could control and by the subjects that were outside the 
sovereign’s control. Although Foucault originally focused his analysis on the construction of 
state sovereignty the concept of a negative universal reference can be applied to the 
construction of the justificatory universality of juridical mechanisms more generally. During 
international law’s formative years in the era of colonial imperialism it was the colonial subject 
that provided the negative universal reference on which the justificatory universality of 
international law was built. Peter Fitzpatrick, in his analysis of the negative universal reference 
in Foucault’s work, argues that it is comprised of four fused stages.  
 The first stage of constructing a negative universal reference is to presuppose a “unity of 
species” which enables the comparison of the other outside this unified species.16  This is 
relatively similar to the construction of an alterity in postcolonial theory where the civilized 
virtues of colonialism were defined with reference to the colonized.17 In Orientalism Edward 
Said argued that the process of constructing the orient created a “political vision of reality 
whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West us etc.) and 
the strange (the Orient, the East “them”)”.18 The construction of the occident and imperial 
assumptions about universality were, as Emmanuelle Jouannet argues, intertwined with 
international law’s universalism.19 The identification of an oriental ‘other’ can be seen in early 
theories of international law. Writing in 1795 Robert Ward, argued that the Law of Nations 
only applied to “a particular class of nations.”20 In 1798 Sir James Mackingtosh, the Chief 
Justice of Bombay, argued that international law should only be modified by “the civilized 
nations of Christendom” and not the “voluptuous savages of Otaheite [or] the meek and 
servile natives of Hindostan.”21  
                                                          
15 Andrew Neal ‘Cutting Off the King's Head: Foucault's Society Must Be Defended and the Problem of Sovereignty’ 
(2004) 29 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 373, 382.  
16 Peter Fitzpatrick ‘Foucault’s Other Law’ in Ben Golder (ed.) Re- reading Foucault: Law Power, Rights (Routledge 
2013) 50.   
17 Lewis Gordon ' Problematic People and Epistemic Decolonization: Toward the Postcolonial in Africana Political 
Thought' from  Nalini Persram (eds) ' Postcolonailism and Political Theory' (Lanham MD 2007).  
18 Edward Said Orientalism (Penguin 1995) 43. 
19 Emmanuel Jouannet ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law?’ (2007) 18 EJIL 
379.  
20 David Armitage Foundations of Modern International Thought (CUP 2013) chp.2  
21 Ibid. 
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The notion of an outsider or ‘other’ to define universality can also be seen in Alain Badiou’s 
work on the common ethical grounds of human rights.22 Badiou conceives of ethics as being 
both “an a priori ability to discern evil” and as an adjudication principle to determine the 
“good” which will intervene against evil.23  Human rights, Badiou argues, is an “ethical 
ideology” which is concerned with the production of evil and good subjects, this is not a 
natural phenomenon as ethics appropriate a “simulacrum of truth” to transform “codes of 
communication”.24 The significant feature of Badiou’s thinking is that he identifies how a 
system of human rights law “strives ... to ward off evil.”25 Under Badiou’s framework a system 
of human rights, such as an international human rights organisation, only functions by 
reference to an external evil which, it identifies and creates. The significance of Badiou’s work 
is that it identifies how an outsider or evil is required to construct the justificatory universalism 
of an instrument that promotes the universal realisation of human rights.  
The second stage of the negative universal reference involves the creation of a system of 
universal knowledge. In Truth and Juridical Forms Foucault argues that knowledge of man 
“originated in social patterns of control” and goes onto link this to judicial practices and the 
“manner in which wrongs and responsibilities” are settled.26 The claim to universal knowledge 
further facilitates the generation of the outside or negative. As Anita Loomba noted 
colonialism reshaped the “boundaries of human knowledge” and the construction of 
knowledge of colonised territories “like the functioning of ideology” was able to produce 
representations and misrepresentations of “reality and its reordering.”27 Literary historians, 
such as Mary Louise Pratt, have noted that travel writings were means of producing “Europe’s 
differentiated conceptions of itself” and creating a “Eurocentered global.”28 Colonial era 
biology and anthropology was also used to enhance colonial power over territories under 
colonial rule constructing of a universal knowledge governed by colonial powers.29  
Marti Koskenniemi details how conferences on the nature of international law in Paris and 
Berlin in the mid-nineteenth century sought to unify different types of colonial knowledge 
production to enhance the control of western states over the rest of the earth.30  Writing in 
                                                          
22 Alain Badiou Ethics An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (Verso Books 1993) 2 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 80-83  
25 Ibid 91. 
26 Michel Foucault Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (James Faubian tran, Penguin, 1994) 2. 
27 Anita Loomba Colonialism/Postcolonailism: The New Critical Idiom (Routledge 1998) 57.  
28 Mary Louise Pratt Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (2nded Routledge2003) 5. 
29 Laurelyn Whitt Science, Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples: The Cultural Politics of Law and Knowledge (CUP 
2009) Chp.1.   
30 Martti Koskenniemi Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870 – 1960 (CUP 2004) 16-18  
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1880s, around the time of the creation of the Congo Free State Tarvers Twiss, an international 
legal theorist, constructed a framework of positivist international law for expanding 
sovereignty over territories that were otherwise lawless – or outside of European control.31 
Anthony Pagden traces the history of universal natural rights and notes that the idea of a law 
of nature was contingent on a form of universal knowledge that explained the seemingly 
backward state of human society in the Americas and Africa by constructing an “account of 
the origins of human society” which saw humanity embarking on a “historical process leading 
inexorably towards a higher good.”32 Even less teleological accounts of human society, such as 
the “state of nature narratives” of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Pagden argues, were 
contingent upon offering a “counterfactual” account of “human history” which situated the 
west as where a society advanced towards from its uncivilized condition.33  
The third stage of the negative universal reference is the obverse of the second, as the 
universal has to make a claim to include the excluded into the universal.34 In later writings 
Foucault identified this as a component of disciplinary regimes more generally which he 
argued identified a “culprit” which was both part of the “[disciplinary] code and at the same 
time outside the code” and eventually offered “the possible transformation of individuals.”35 
Postcolonial theorists have observed that the idea of including the other was essential to the 
civilising mission of colonial imperialism. Michael Adas notes that the civilizing mission of the 
European powers in the nineteenth century was a retrospective justification for imperial 
conquest aiming to “uplift” the “savage peoples” to the universal good of western societies.36 
French colonialism described this policy as mission civilisatrice, and it depended upon the 
“fundamental assumptions of the superiority of French culture.”37 In the late colonial era 
Michael Mann noted that colonial literature represented western civilization in the form of the 
“confident...Oriental, which has successfully adapted the moral and material values of the 
civilizing mission.”38  
                                                          
31 Travers Twiss ‘An International Protectorate in the Congo River’ (1883) 9 The Law Magazine and Review 1-20.  
32 Anthony Pagden ‘Human Rights, Natural Rights and Europe’s Imperial Legacy’ (2003) 31 Political Theory 171, 180.  
33 Ibid 181. 
34 Fitzpatrick (n. 16) 
35 Foucault Security Territory Population: Lectures at the College de France (Graham Burchill tr, Palgrave Macmillan 
2009) 5. 
36 Michael Adas ‘Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission’ in 
Christopher Lee (eds.) Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Ohio 
University Press 2010) 69. 
37 Michael Mann ‘Torchbearers Upon the Path of Progress’: Britian’s Ideology of a ‘Moral and Material Progress’ in 
India’ in Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michaela Mann (eds.) Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British 
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The concept of guiding the non-civilized other towards progress or reform can be seen in the 
structure of the League of Nations Covenant which states that “colonies and territories” were 
to be developed under “a sacred trust of civilisation.”39 In 1945 League of Nations mandate 
territories were transferred to the United Nations who continued to support the stated 
purpose of the mandate in ensuring the “well-being and development of peoples not yet able 
to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”40  Mutua argued that this 
attitude continued into international human rights law which remained premised “on the 
transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric prototype.”41  
Judith Grbich takes this further arguing that international law has a “messianic” complex which 
leads to “the sight of other peoples’ sufferings” confirming the “logic of the Western self as 
‘entitlement.”42 Human rights and the structure of international human rights law, Gribich 
argues operates to save individuals from their suffering. This stage of the negative universal 
reference helps explain one of the paradoxes of international law as it marginalises the 
colonised other whilst simultaneously promising their salvation. Sophie Bessis identifies this 
tension in the enlightenment values purportedly advanced in the colonial-imperial project, 
which promised a form of emancipation whilst practicing a form of enslavement.43  
This is also seen in the fourth stage of the negative universal reference which complements 
the third stage. Now with its ability to “enter the universal” the excluded or outsider in 
Fitzpatrick’s words now “resides permanently within the bearers of the universal.”44 The 
universal has to include the excluded and define the very nature of the excluded other.  What 
Carl Schmitt termed the nomos of colonialism originally undertook this project as it defined 
the territorial globe with reference to a form of universal order which categorised territories 
into nations and non-nations.45 By undertaking this territorial demarcation international law 
had become universalised as even the areas that it did not reach were now in effect classified 
by international law. Emmanuel Jouannet in his commentary on Emer de Vattel’s 1758 work 
the Law of Nations argues that international law originally had a “Welfarist purpose” which 
aimed to establish a “positive conception of the good and perfectible life for all peoples” and 
                                                          
39 Art.9 The Covenant of the League of Nations 1919 225 Parry 125. 
40 John Dugard The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy 
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43 Sophie Bessis Western Supremacy: The Triumph of an Idea (Zed Books, 2003) 22- 42. 
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justified intervention in states deemed less civilized by European nations.46 Attempts to codify 
international law in the 19th Century with the creation of the Institut de droit international in 
1873 were premised upon the construction of a system of civilized universalism which would 
in Koskenniemi’s words advocate for “European peace and progress” and enable the 
“transformation of "Oriental" nations in the image of European modernity.”47 This has its 
modern counterpart in the structure of good governance programmes in international 
organisations such as the World Bank which specifically set out to link economic aid to 
improvements in a country’s human rights policies.48 The World Bank’s Good Governance 
programme links development assistance to the promotion of the rule of law and human 
rights, and Stephen Humphreys work shows the connection between this and the process of 
colonisation.49 The idea of universality is completed by this fourth stage as it shows how the 
universal shapes both the subjects it includes and excludes. 
What the above shows is how the justificatory universalism of international law was originally 
created by using the colonised subject as a negative universal reference. The justificatory 
universalism of organizational protection mandates, the next section argues, is created by 
using the idea of a human rights violating state as a negative universal reference.   
 (2) The negative universal reference in the legal structure of human rights 
organisation’s protection mandates  
Most human rights organisations lack the power to directly apply coercive measures against 
states. Although protection mandates give organisations legal authority to scrutinise or even 
rule upon the status of domestic laws, these powers cannot compel a state to comply with the 
organisation. The different gradations of protection mandate identified by Laurence Helfer 
and Anne-Marie Slaughter are a description of the relative organisational powers of scrutiny 
over a state’s laws not a description of powers of compulsion.50 Eric Posner summarising the 
empirical literature on why states ratify treaties that lead to organizational membership, 
argues that the most plausible reason why states ratify these treaties is “the symbolic 
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importance of looking like a good global citizen”.51 Posner acknowledges that organisations 
are given few formal legal powers to provide an “effective system of enforcement” for 
international human rights law but also acknowledges that there is an overall hope that 
“positive pressure on human rights violators” will have some effect.52 It is this positive 
pressure, or more specifically the expectation that states ought to be human rights compliant, 
that actually gives a protection mandate force. However in order for this to have any effect at 
all a supranational organisation needs to be able to categorise a state as a human rights 
violating state.  
A human rights violating state is shorthand for a state that doesn’t comply with the terms of 
international human rights law as defined by a supranational human rights organisation. The 
idea of a rogue state or a state outside international law is, as Jacques Derrida argues, intrinsic 
to the structure of international law.53 International law Derrida argues, envisages, “the 
creation of an international juridico-political space” that aims to limit the sovereignty of nation 
states by reference to the ideal of human rights.54 The rogue state is like a beast “whose 
behaviour appears deviant or perverse” and threatens the entire like-minded community of 
states.55 Crucially Derrida notes the categorisation as a rogue is “a mark of infamy” which 
actively discriminates against states by “first banishing or exclusion” of a state which can lead 
to its “bringing before the law”.56 As detailed in chapter one external sovereignty, the 
recognition of a state as externally sovereign in international law (what Krasner calls 
international legal sovereignty) requires the notional respect of human rights which at least 
requires making a notional commitment to international human rights law.57 Slavoj Žižek 
observed in the early 1990s that the “triumphant liberal-democratic ‘new world order’” was 
marked by the separation of states into those “to whom the rules of human rights [apply]” and 
the “excluded” who go onto become “the main concern of the ‘developed’”.58 Within 
international politics human rights are characterised by attempts to civilize the excluded state 
in a manner that follows the framework of the negative universal reference outlined above.  
What protection mandates aim to do is harness these political forces to generate compliance 
                                                          
51 Eric Posner The Twilight of Human Rights Law (OUP 2014) 66. Some of the literature discussed by Posner is also 
discussed in chapter one.  
52 Ibid. 103-6.   
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with the decisions of human rights organisations.  It is important to understand that the 
human rights violating state not only serves as a practical tool to enable a human rights 
organisations protection mandate to function but it enables the organisation to define itself as 
the bearer of universal rights. 
Almost all countries have signed up to at least one human rights instrument and have as a 
consequence notionally agreed to have their human rights record scrutinised by an 
international organisation. 59  Several different studies have identified the process of 
acculturation creating incentives for states through the process of mutual interactions with 
other states, to become members of supranational human rights organisations.60  Given this 
the categorisation of a state as a human rights abuser is a mechanism for banishing or 
excluding the state from the community of human rights compliant states, in the manner 
described by Derrida above.  In the same way that the existence of a rogue state is necessary 
to bring a state before the law, the existence of a human rights violating state is essential to 
justify the ipsetic potential of a human rights organisation. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink 
in their description of the spiral model of human rights change, argue that the “normative 
process of shaming” a state and the “relegation [of a state] to an out-group” is an important 
mechanism for making a state question its “legitimacy” and potentially make them “willing to 
make human rights concessions.”61 James Lebovic and Erik Voeten in their study of shame 
politics in international organisations note that shaming practices and the expulsion of a state 
to the out-group can have a series of direct political and economic consequences on that state 
leading to domestic legal changes.62 Ryan Goodman and David Jinks note that stigma is 
important for international human rights law’s coercive effect especially in a “highly 
institutionalized environment”.63 Douglass Cassel notes that shaming is a crucial factor for 
encouraging compliance to international human rights law by both creating an increased 
expectation of compliance and a “stigma” upon non-compliant states.64 What all of these 
different arguments identify is that shaming a state has an effect on state compliance with 
human rights law. 
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Whilst the formal legal powers that human rights organisations have over states are relatively 
weak, the effect of relegating a state to an out-group is a way of delegitimizing their external 
sovereignty. Interaction between states is based on an “organic solidarity” between different 
state entities, Santiago Villalpando argues, and this solidarity is shaped by the 
acknowledgement of common values.65 When a state is categorised as a human rights 
violating state that state is seen as acting contrary to those common values and as a 
consequence their stigmatisation is justified. Oona Hathaway describes this process in terms 
of an organisation generating “collateral consequences” and directly links an organisations 
efficacy to its ability to create collateral consequences for states.66  By triggering a process of 
shaming within the confines of its legal framework, an organisation can harness the general 
normative expectation that states ought to be human rights compliant, to pressure it into 
compliance with the organisations decision.  
However this goes further than just stigmatising a state as the presence of an outsider or 
rogue state defines the universality of human rights law, by implicitly creating a subject of 
state which is compliant with the law (the human rights compliant state) and a category of 
state that has to be brought before the law (the human rights violating state). The human 
rights violating state is thus outside the law but is expected to be brought within the law in 
order to reduce or eliminate the shame or stigma of being in the ‘out-group’ of states. 
Occasionally a state may accept the consequences of being in the out-group of states but even 
their presence in the out-group is an indication of how human rights organisations use the 
negative universal reference of the human rights violating state in their protection mandates.  
The political process of shaming enables protection mandates to function but also by placing 
the organisation either as a conduit or instigator of the process of shaming means the 
universalism of a human rights regime is demarcated and defined. The justificatory 
universality of a protection mandate is therefore defined with reference to the human rights 
violating state. 
 Even though states have signed up to international human rights instruments, and therefore 
notionally consented to belong to the in-group of states, as argued in chapter one and noted 
above, there is a strong expectation that external sovereignty involves acceptance of the 
norms of international human rights law. The desire to appear human rights compliant allows 
the organization to harness this normative expectation within the juridical structure of a 
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protection mandate to encourage compliance which in turn justifies its ipsetic potential. The 
organisation’s claim to proscribe the content of a state’s laws becomes authoritative because 
it is an attempt to prevent that state falling into the category of human rights violating states. 
The existence of the category of human rights violating states justifies the seemingly 
expansionary nature of the legal powers contained in a protection mandate described in 
chapter one. Whilst compliance with a protection mandate involves a state recognizing the 
organisation as a source of authority over their laws and as a consequence weakening their 
domestic legal sovereignty it prevents that state becoming a human rights violating state and 
suffering a reduction of international legal sovereignty.67 
  It will be shown in the next section of this chapter why this process is inherently imperialist 
but first it is necessary to analyse how the negative universal referent presents itself within 
the structure of protection mandates by looking at some examples of protection mandates 
which have already been discussed in the preceding chapters of this study.  
(i) UN based institutions  
The UN Charter’s references to the protection of human rights are somewhat opaque. Because 
Article 2(7) precludes matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of states being the 
subject of the UN’s attention,  this would indicate that Article 6, which allows the expulsion of 
states that have “persistently violated” the terms of the UN charter is limited in scope.68 As 
Alison Duxbury notes, membership of the UN rarely was dictated by compliance with human 
rights standards.69  Whilst outlaw states are envisaged in the Charter - Article 5 allows for UN 
action against recalcitrant states - the instigation of these powers is political not juridical. The 
distinction between political and legal classification of a human rights violator is whether the 
organisational process of classifying a state as a human rights violator are initiated by the 
bureaucratic institutions of an organisation, by a legalistic procedure (receiving petitions etc.) 
or by political procedures which involve the votes of state parties to that organisation.  
This explains the significance of the 1503 procedure at the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
outlined in chapter three, as it created a legal mechanism for identifying a human rights 
violating state. The Commission’s original role was promotional and was intended to advance 
knowledge about the standards of human rights, not to operate a protection mandate. The 
1503 procedure empowered the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
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Protection of Minorities to consider “particular situations which appear to reveal a consistent 
pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights” with a view to referring these 
situations to the full Commission.70 The Sub-Commission was an expert body which under the 
resolution was tasked with establishing the facts about human rights violations– fulfilling the 
first and second stage of the negative universal reference concerned with establishing a 
universal knowledge and demarcating the abnormal. The resolution goes onto describe how 
the Commission should “strive for friendly solutions” and empowered the Commission to issue 
such “observations and suggestions as it may deem appropriate” to address a state’s human 
rights violations.71 Actions taken by the Commission could include steps such as appointing a 
special rapporteur, as happened in the Equatorial Guinea case, to make recommendations 
about “the full restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”72 This was an 
illustration of how the organisation could take steps to make a state human rights compliant, 
fulfilling the third and fourth steps of the negative universal reference by bringing it into the 
community of human rights compliant states. Whilst the 1503 procedure was weaker than 
other organisation’s protection mandates, it utilises the framework of the negative universal 
reference to construct its justificatory universalism. The UN Human Rights Council has a 
relatively similar framework under Council resolution 5/1 which allows the Working Group on 
Communications at the Council to receive and process complaints with a view to reporting “on 
consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights” allowing it “to 
make recommendations to the Council.”73 The Council then has at its disposal a series of 
measures, including ones that were similar to Commission, designed to make a state human 
rights compliant.  
Both the Commission and Council were political bodies as their processes and procedures 
were governed by state delegates acting in a representative capacity. Under Helfer and Marie-
Slaughter’s categorisation of organisations by their protection mandates judicial-review type 
organisations or treaty review bodies have more powerful protection mandates than the 
Commission and Council.74 Unlike political organisations, Yuval Shany argues, judicial-review 
type organisations and treaty bodies’ benefit from the “legitimacy capital” associated with 
courts more generally as their quasi-judicial procedures mean they are associated with norms 
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such as “fairness, justice, equality before the law [and] legal professionalism”.75 This means, as 
illustrated below, that they have greater freedom than political organisations to place a state 
party into the category of human rights violating states as their mechanisms are not subject to 
the political stances or policies of individual states.    
(ii) The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and regional bodies 
It is worth focusing on the ECtHR because it has often served as a template for other regional 
and sub-regional bodies. Towards the end of this section the African Commission is also 
assessed and the Inter-American Human Rights Court is considered in the concluding section 
of this chapter. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) specifically envisages the 
juridical classification of a state as a human rights violator. Article 34 of the ECHR allows the 
ECtHR to hear cases from individual alleged victims “of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties” and requires state parties not to “not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.”76 This allows the ECtHR to independently control the categorisation of 
states as human rights violators. Since 1998 membership of the Court and access to individual 
petition has been mandatory for the member states of the Council of Europe which has meant 
that not only has the number of petitions to the Court increased but the autonomous power it 
has to execute judgements under the ECHR has also increased.  
The first stage of the negative universal reference, which requires the unity of the species to 
be defined, can be seen in the text of the preamble which states that member states share a 
common “profound belief”  in human rights and this is the basis of “greater unity” amongst 
the Council of Europe.77 Winston Churchill addressing the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe in 1949 stated that a future human rights court should be able to bring the 
“judgement of the civilised world” to bear upon states “in our own body of twelve nations” 
that were committing human rights violations.78 Churchill’s speech specifically envisaged the 
creation of an outlaw state, with the Court acting independently from the political will of 
states. The second stage, which requires a universal knowledge, is a little more difficult to see 
directly in the text but when reading Article 32 asserting jurisdiction of the Court over “all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application” of the ECHR in tandem with other 
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provisions it becomes clear that the Court was meant to act as the ultimate authority over 
rights protection in the Council of Europe.79 
The third stage of the negative universal reference, which requires the universal to bring in the 
excluded, can be seen in the sections on remedies.  Whilst Article 39 gives the ECtHR power to 
encourage the friendly settlement of disputes, the merger of the ECtHR and the European 
Commission of Human Rights in the 1990s has made its dispute resolution function much less 
important.80 Provisions relating to remedies and enforcement are now much more important 
for the Court’s operation and these provisions explicitly envisage the Court creating a human 
rights violating state. Article 41 allows the Court in cases where “the internal law of the High 
Contracting Party...allows only partial reparation” to award “just satisfaction to the claimant” 
which vests considerable power in the hands of the Court to decide awards of compensation 
and rule on the merits of a member states’ legal and administrative systems.81 Equally Article 
46, which contains provisions on the execution of judgments, bestows considerable power on 
the Court and explicitly envisages recalcitrant states, both as the subject of the Court’s power 
and as a justification for its power. The fourth and final stage, where the anti-universal lies 
permanently in the universal, is not explicitly referenced in the text but the ECHR’s Travaux 
Préparatoires make it clear that the Court was created specifically to act against human rights 
violating states. Speaking in 1949 the Greek delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (which was about to start drafting the ECHR) warned that there was a 
permanent threat to European societies from “Caeserism, Nazism, Fascism [and] Communism” 
and the Council of Europe needed to create an “active instrument for the defence of human 
rights” in order to safeguard against this threat.82 At the same meeting the Italian delegate 
noted that the protection of human rights depended upon the Court enforcing human rights 
and democratic states collectively “taking joint responsibility” to enforce human rights and 
ended his address with a warning that states should not “remain indifferent in face of 
memories of such a recent past.”83  
The African Commission, as the previous chapter argued, had a much less clear protection 
mandate. Article 45 of the Charter states that Commission’s function is to “ensure the 
protection” of rights and “interpret all the provisions” of the Charter which does not clearly 
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define the existence of the out and in-group of states, in the way described above.84 This was 
in part because the Commission was intended to be a deliberative body to assist the 
diplomatic resolution of situations rather than an adversarial or inquisitive body with an overt 
protection mandate.85 The procedure contained in Article 55 allows the Commission to receive 
“other communications” which has allowed it to receive individual communications and it 
progressively developed its own rules on standing. Article 58 comes closest to outlining a 
protection mandate and identifying the human rights abusing state where it refers to the 
identification of “series of serious or massive violations” by state parties.86 The Charter is 
however silent on the third and fourth stages of the negative universal reference. This has 
been an area where the Commission has interpreted its powers in the broadest possible 
manner – in a 1995 statement the Commission argued that the communications procedures 
was “necessarily adversarial” and that it existed to remedy “some act or neglect of a 
government” that created human rights violations.87 This defined the human rights abusing 
state as a justification for the Commissions ipsetic power. The Commission’s capacity to issue 
remedies, fulfilling the third and four stage of the negative universal reference, was entirely 
dependent on its own decisions which led to it constructing a protection mandate in part 
through its own jurisprudence.  
(iii) Treaty Bodies 
For sake of brevity only three out of the six treaty bodies with individual petition mechanisms 
are analysed here but these three treaty bodies, which both receive state reports and hear 
individual complaints, all have similar frameworks to their protection mandates.  
The HRC is the Treaty Review body of the ICCPR and under Protocol 1 state parties are 
required to follow the HRC’s decisions and like the ECHR it specifically refers to “victims of a 
violation by [a] State Party.”88 Whilst the language of violations is explicitly used this is the only 
reference to the capacity of the HRC to designate a state as a human rights violator.89 The only 
meaningful sanctions afterwards are that the Committee includes a report about the case in a 
summary of its annual activities. In General Comment 33, where the HRC outlined the 
obligations of state parties under Protocol 1, the HRC specifically acknowledged that states 
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“do not always respect their obligation[s]” and refuse to comply with the HRC’s findings.90 
Even though the exact legal power of the HRC to compel states to follow its rulings is 
somewhat opaque under the terms of the document – it describes HRC decisions as “views” 
whilst at the same time stating that they possessed “some important characteristics of a 
judicial decision” - the General Comment specifically envisages the existence of human rights 
violating states.91 One crucial feature of the HRC since 1997 has been the appointment of a 
Special Rapporteur for the Follow-Up of Views.  The reports of the Special Rapporteur are 
specifically designed to designate states human rights abusers and publically shame the 
offending state for failing to comply with procedures. The 2011 report of the Special 
Rapporteur noted 37 countries where “further action” by the HRC was needed, named 13 
countries where further information about their human rights situation was required and 
noted that in the case of applications from Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
there was a need for “follow-up dialogue to be ongoing”.92  Later in the session, the HRC also 
condemned Uzbekistan for “unjustified restriction of freedom of movement to torture and 
death”.93 The gradated naming and singling out of states is indicative of how the organisation 
creates a universal knowledge with reference to the human rights violating other. When the 
HRC refers to previous or past decisions or treats them as precedents what it is doing is 
constructing a system of knowledge about how the ICCPR is to be applied which is constructed 
with reference to the states that fail to comply with the HRC’s findings.  
A similar formulation can be seen in the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICESCR has a weaker framework than the 
ICCPR - Article 2 of the ICESCR commits states to “achieving progressively” economic and 
social rights – and this is also reflected in its provisions on state reporting. Under Article 17 
states “may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations” 
under the ICESCR, indicating that state reports were not designed to give rise to the 
consideration of violations and other obligations on state reporting are similarly weakly 
phrased, aimed at promoting a dialogue on implementation rather than identifying 
violations.94 These, and other provisions of the ICESCR relating to enforcement, had long been 
cited as the reason why economic and social rights were either not taken seriously or 
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effectively promoted.95 Partly because of this the Committee on Economic and Social Rights 
(the ICESCR’s review body) spent many years been investigating the creation of an individual 
petition mechanism and in 2004 the UN Commission on Human Rights created a working 
group to draft an optional protocol on individual petition. The Optional Protocol clearly 
envisages a human rights violating state by envisaging “victims of a violation of any of the 
economic, social and cultural rights” who are at a “clear disadvantage” as a result of state 
action.96  The remainder of the protocol sets out, in an identical fashion to the ICCPR’s 
Optional Protocol, mechanisms for ensuring state compliance. Whereas the ICCPR’s Optional 
Protocol evolved alongside the treaty itself the ICESCR’s Optional Protocol emerged as a 
response to calls for these rights to be better implemented. Although some scholars doubt 
whether a violations model is necessarily the most effective model in this respect it is often 
associated with the realisation of rights within states.97  
Significantly there appears to be a distinct association between the violations based model of 
a protection mandate and an organisation being considered effective. In the debates over the 
UN Commission on Human Rights’ powers and the powers of the African Commission, 
described in chapters three and four, there was a distinct link drawn between an organisation 
being able to recognise violations and the universal realisation of human rights. This creates 
something of a paradox, for which international human rights law has yet to devise a 
satisfactory answer. On the one hand the protection of rights seems to be enhanced by the 
creation of more court like entities with stronger protection mandates conforming to the 
judicial-review-type model.98 Samuel Moyn notes that international courts emerged as an 
“oasis” in human rights law because the fight for rights and equality had become focused on 
“litigating past crime” and rather than explore new mechanisms aimed at tackling the “unfair 
divisions of wealth and power” activists sought to expand existing notions and institutions in 
international law.99  Yet, as the previous two chapters identified, these organisations often 
possess the strongest protection mandates and seem to trigger the highest levels of anti-
imperialist institutional opposition.  
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The Committee Against Torture was created at the same time as the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT). During the CAT’s there was some considerable disagreement drafting about 
whether all states, regardless of their explicit consent, should be subject to the Committee’s 
individual jurisdiction but the final text replicates that of Optional Protocol 1 to the ICCPR 
requiring state consent. 100  Crucially the CAT envisages a universal jurisdiction and in 
interpreting this Courts have held that it overrides other aspects of international law such as 
the immunity of heads of state. The CAT’s preamble recognises “the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family” and sets out its aims to eradicate torture 
“throughout the world” regardless of any national legislation.101 The CAT states that the 
Committee should be comprised of individuals of “high moral standing and recognized 
competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in their personal capacity” – along 
with the first part of this treaty, which details the behaviour constituting torture, these 
provisions create a universal knowledge, the second stage of universal negative referent, 
which is institutionalised in the Committee.102 Articles 20 and 21 of the CAT allow the 
Committee to make inquiries and conduct visits to states believed to be violating the CAT. The 
third and fourth stage of the negative universal referent can also be seen in Article 21 where it 
states that the Committee will make “available its good offices” to help states achieve 
solutions.103 Further on in the same provision however there are also references to the 
Committee referring matters to the UN Secretary General, indicating the existence of a wider 
power of stigmatisation to apply against a non-compliant state. The Committee also relies on 
the jus cogens status of torture in international law, to assist in encouraging compliance with 
their decisions.104 
Generally there is a relatively good compliance rate with the Committee’s decisions - over 50 
% of all of their decisions are positively complied with or accepted by the state party.105 This is 
in part indicative of the importance of prohibiting torture as an international norm and the 
cost of being categorised as a state that endorses torture. Empirical evidence suggests the 
Committee is able to utilize the pre-existing stigma in international law surrounding the state 
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practice of torture in the exercise of its protection mandate.106 Additionally, as Heather Smith-
Cannoy notes, there is some evidence that indicates that being categorised a human rights 
abusing state is more of a concern for autocratic states than democratic states.107 This is less 
true of other organisations such as the Committee for the Elimination of All Discrimination 
Against Women, which whilst identifying human rights abusing states in its reference to 
victims, does not have quite the same level of pre-existing political capital to draw upon.108 
This is in part because of the considerable divergence opinion on what constitutes a violation 
of certain rights protected by the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), which has in turn hampered the operation of its Committee.109 
(3) The inherent imperialism of a protection mandate  
The argument thus far is that in order to realise international human rights law within 
sovereign states an organisation’s protection mandate requires the negative universal 
reference of a human rights violating state. The first section of this chapter outlined how 
international law’s juridical universality was originally based upon a justificatory universality 
constructed using the colonial subject as a negative universal reference. The second section of 
this chapter argued in a similar vein that the human rights violating state provided the 
justificatory universalism for the protection mandates of human rights organisations.  This 
section argues that the process of categorising a state as a human rights violating state 
through a protection mandate is inherently imperialist juridical process.   
Imperialism, as the introduction to this study and chapter two argued, is characterised by a 
dominant relationship of power of one state/party over a weaker state/party, what Johan 
Galtung described as “as a dominance relation between collectivities”, which was either 
focused on direct material dominance or a more complex form of legal dominance, with 
indirect material gain. 110  Robert Zevin’s definition of imperialism as the “qualified or 
unqualified rights of sovereignty beyond the previous boundaries” that a dominant state 
exercises over a weaker state attempts to define imperialism in non-historically contingent 
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terms.111 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s definition of imperialism, which focuses on 
sovereignty extending beyond the boundaries of the nation state, is also premised on the idea 
of domination of weaker states by stronger states.112 Whilst Marxists, and latterly structural 
theorists of imperialism, attempted to define international law’s imperialism in terms of 
material relations of dominance and accumulation, dominance over sovereignty and sovereign 
decision making has also underpinned a large amount of the scholarship on the relationship 
between law and imperialism.113  
The dominance of international law over sovereign states features heavily in James Tully’s 
critique of international law. Tully contends that standard accounts of international law’s 
history fail to account for patterns of informal imperialism, which are rife in international law, 
and “presume that imperialism ends with decolonisation.”114  Rosa Brooks’ account of 
international law’s imperialism notes that promotion of external ‘rule of law’ initiatives   in 
states with weak governance leads to international organisations exercising a form of external 
juridical dominance over the state.115  Another line of critique has focused on the continuation 
of imperialist dominance in the postcolonial world. Barbra Bush in a recent study of 
imperialism argues that there was no “sharp hiatus” between the colonial and postcolonial 
periods.116 This conclusion, Jennifer Peters notes, is endorsed by many critics of international 
law and is important for understanding that the existence of a postcolonial era does not mean 
the absence of imperialism.117 Imperialism in this analysis transcends its formal periodization 
within the colonial era, as demarcated by the legal process of decolonisation that began in 
1960. The imperial context of international law, as detailed in chapter two, explains how the 
content and norms of international law either protected the interests of formerly colonialist 
states (residual imperialism) or facilitated states directly coercing other states (neo-
imperialism).   
However Tully, along with Fitzpatrick and Richard Joyce and Hardt and Negri all see the 
imperialism of international law as an instrument principally in the service of western 
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imperialism.118 This appears to describe how the USA used law in the period known as the 
‘New World Order’ where economic liberalism was treated as the default position for states 
which, as Manfred Bienefeld argues, was a form of imperialism as it envisaged a monolithic 
world defined almost exclusively by the USA.119 However, to understand the imperialism of 
protection mandates it is important to focus less on the origins and application of 
international law and more on the implications and consequences of legal structures. This will 
help explain why anti-imperialist opposition to a supranational human rights organisation can 
exist even when that organisation has not been shaped by the imperial context of 
international law.  
Inherent imperialism can exist in all forms of supranational organisation regardless of whether 
the organisation is regional or international in nature. Crucially inherent imperialism does not 
describe an organisation’s actions but rather describes the type of power that the legal text of 
its structure envisages the organisation possessing. Kal Raustiala described an organisation’s 
structure as being the organisational “rules and procedures created to monitor parties’ 
performance”.120 It is the relationship that the text of these rules envisages that is important. 
If it envisages an ongoing and open-ended control of aspects of a state sovereignty by the 
international organisation, fitting in with the components of both Zevin and Galtung’s 
definitions of imperialism which focuses on the notion of constricting of sovereignty, then it 
envisages an imperialist legal relationship, making it inherent to the organisation’s structure. 
This makes inherent imperialism is a fixed component of a given legal regime that is non-
ontologically contingent – the dominance it presupposes is not due to past association but due 
to organisational design.  
As identified in chapter one power over domestic law-making is a crucial aspect of sovereignty 
and as Richard Joyce notes modern sovereignty is dependent on law-making.121 As described 
in the previous section the expulsion to an outgroup of states is a mechanism specifically 
designed to have a normative effect on the state in question and trigger a process of change to 
that state’s laws. In chapter one it was argued that existing notions of state consent in 
international law do not adequately accommodate an organisations ipsetic potential, 
therefore whilst states might agree to vesting some form of authority in an organisation the 
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full nature of an organisations ipsetic potential cannot be fully accounted for within the 
existing parameters of state consent. Therefore membership of a human rights organisation 
involves a state envisaging some form of external pressure from the organisation to change 
their laws. When one accounts for Joyce’s point about the interdependence of law-making and 
sovereignty, this by implication involves a state being subject to a form of external dominance. 
This is inherent imperialism in a nutshell – it is where an organisation has a legal structure that 
involves an open-ended form of dominance over states. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), even were it not predominantly financed by western powers would be 
inherently imperialist as its legal structures have a variety of open ended discretionary powers 
to pressure states to change their laws that defy the notion of state consent.122 Given this 
basic definition of inherent imperialism, a protection mandate’s inherent imperialism comes in 
three distinct stages.  
Firstly the role of stigmatisation and relegation to the out-group of states in the operation of a 
protection mandate needs to be understood as a mechanism for facilitating what Simpson 
describes as existential sovereign inequality.123 To understand this concept it is necessary to 
understand existential equality. This differs from the formal equality of states under 
international law, which for example leads them each to receive one vote in the UN General 
Assembly and from legislative inequality, their right to participate in the making of 
international law.124 Existential equality, Simpson argues, arises out of “recognition by the 
international community” that an entity is entitled to sovereignty that exists in “a form of the 
state’s own choosing”.125  This includes the freedom to choose economic, cultural and political 
systems. As Simpson argues existential equality is a combination of three rights; the right to 
territorial integrity, the right to political independence and “the right to participate in the 
international system as a consequence of the first two rights.”126 The ICJ has explicitly 
condemned violations “of the freedom of choice of the political, economic, social and cultural 
system of states” by coercive measures such as armed intervention or economic coercion.127  
A protection mandate is not directly coercive in that sense, but by placing a state in the 
category of human rights abusing states it aims to directly assault the right of a state to 
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participate in the international system by virtue of the choices it makes about the conduct its 
domestic affairs. This directly affects what Krasner describes as a state’s international-legal 
sovereignty as the operation of a protection mandate, as described in the second section of 
this chapter, is aimed at making it difficult for a state to be seen as an equal in its relations 
with other states.128  This political process remains caught in the “savages-victims-savior” 
dynamic described by Mutua where victims of human rights abuses and the savages 
responsible for those abuses are identified by the savior of human rights law.129  The savage is 
not the state per say but the state that engages in a “cultural deviation from human rights 
law”.130 As the first section outlined the idea of a savage-other that law had to civilize was at 
the heart of colonial-imperial international law and a protection mandate appears to mimic 
this. Whether or not an individual protection mandate is automatically successful in 
undermining a state’s existential equality is not particularly important. Designating a state a 
human rights violator means that their ability to conform to the global script of legitimacy, 
conferred by notional compliance with human rights law is threatened. Therefore the 
potential designation of a state as a human rights violator represents an attempt from an 
organisation to deny a state external legitimacy.  
Secondly the process of delegitimising a state’s existential sovereignty is a precursor to 
actually controlling their sovereign decision making capacity.  What moving a state to an 
outgroup does is diminish the scope of their decision making as in order to regain their 
existential sovereignty they will need to undertake specific policy or legislative measures in 
order to gain admission to the in-group of human rights compliant states.  For example Article 
46 of the ECHR requires state parties to “abide by” final judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights and Article 2 of the CAT obliges state party’s to “take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures”.131 This follows a long tradition in international law 
that Tully identifies, where international law diminishes truly independent democratic decision 
making and the scope of sovereignty by using a variety of “descriptive-evaluative names” of 
particular concepts such as free trade and civilization to “legitimate them and put them 
beyond question.”132 As Pagden notes “all empires inevitably involve the exercise of imperium 
of sovereign authority” over a territory and as modern sovereignty is defined by the capacity 
to make positive law there is a fusion of the concept of lawmaker and sovereign authority.133 
                                                          
128 Krasner (n 3). 
129 Mutua (n 39).  
130 Ibid. 203.  
131 ECHR Art 46(1), CAT Art 2(1) .    
132 Tully ‘Modern Constitutional Democracy and Imperialism’ (2008) 46 Osgood Hall Law Journal 461, 478. 
133 Anthony Pagden ‘Imperialism, Liberalism & the Quest for Perpetual Peace’ (2005) 134 Deadelus 46, 47. 
209 | P a g e  
 
Constricting the scope of law-making by threating the existential sovereignty of the lawmaker 
is therefore constricting the capacity of the government of a state to act as a sovereign.134 This 
constraint often has an impact in areas of law-making critical to the state. As Sonia Cardenas 
notes security and security of the state is a core reason advanced by states as a defence of 
their human rights violations.135 This means that in order to become a human rights compliant 
state there is an expectation that a state classed or about to be classed as a human rights 
violating states desists from a policy that it has identified as important for the protection of its 
security. For example the ECtHR has prohibited states from deporting individuals they deem to 
be a security risk if that individual is at risk of torture in the receiving state and the African 
Commission of Human Rights has held that states cannot suspend rights in times of 
emergency.136 Both are decisions which a state may make in order to protect their security and 
in both cases a supranational organisation is effectively stating that unless the state complies 
with the organisations conception of what their laws ought to be they will attempt to 
delegitimise their existential sovereignty by utilizing their protection mandate.     
Finally the constraints on sovereignty described in the second stage have a distinct teleological 
element to them. As human rights violating states are explicitly bidden by the structure of 
protection mandates to transform themselves into human rights compliant states, there are 
genuine questions as to what human rights compliant states are, what they are expected to be 
and how the state is supposed to transform itself. States in the category of human rights 
compliant states are often described as western or located in the west. Emilie Hafner-Burton 
observed in a study of the empirical evidence on compliance that states where societies have 
been persuaded that international human rights organisations are legitimate are also most 
likely to be the states where people have been persuaded that “laws are legitimate.”137 The 
conclusion Hafner-Burton reaches is that compliance with international human rights law, and 
by logical extension compliance with the exercise of an organisation’s protection mandate, is 
at its greatest in western democracies, in particular European states.138 Beth Simmons in a 
similar vein also notes that international human rights law works best where  “conditions 
exist” for political stability and then goes onto list a series of illustrative features of a political 
system that generates stability which are particularly prevalent in western European states.139 
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The subtext of these conclusions is that human rights compliant states are predominantly 
western and therefore by implication human rights violating states, that are non-western, 
need to emulate western states in order to move out of the category of human rights violating 
states. This is a somewhat simplistic extrapolation of this empirical research and there are 
some broader reasons as to why there is a correlation between compliance with international 
human rights organisations and western states. For example Courtney Hillebrecht notes that 
states with an independent judiciary and an active civil society space for NGOs to operate are 
often necessary to ensure the decisions of human rights organisations are implemented 
domestically because of the lack of legal powers organisations have over domestic legal 
systems.140  However, the reason that states in the west predominantly possess these 
attributes is in part due to colonial-imperialism, which created weak legal institutions and left 
artificially constructed states in its wake.141 Even in the case of organisations that are distinctly 
non-western in origin, such as those discussed in chapter four, there is still the presumption 
inherent within the third and fourth stage of the negative universal reference that the 
excluded will become the universal and that the human rights violating state will progress 
towards a form of human rights compliant state.    
This three-step process shows how by placing a state within the out-group of states an 
organisation is an attempt to exercise control over that state’s law-making processes. This is a 
form of domination that conforms with the basic definition of imperialism set out above. 
Whether this is a precursor for wider domination by an actual imperialist state, is not 
particularly important. The important feature of inherent imperialism is that a legal instrument 
explicitly envisages the domination and demotion of sovereignty. Equally, the organisation 
does not have to be effective in exercising its protection mandate for its inherent imperialism 
to motivate state behaviour. In all of the cases of anti-imperialist opposition detailed in the 
last two chapters there was a general concern among states not to be categorised as a human 
rights violating state. In chapter three it was shown how anti-imperialist opposition arose 
through double standards from the Third World bloc when there was the possibility of states 
from the Third World bloc being categorised as human rights abusers by the UN Human Rights 
Commission. Concerns about judges being able to declare a state a human rights violating 
state was the cause of the anti-imperialist institutional opposition to the Southern African 
Development Community Tribunal detailed in chapter four and was also forefront of the 
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collective anti-imperialist ideological opposition to the International Criminal Court detailed in 
chapter two.  This also explains why states use pre-emptive opposition in the design of 
regional organisations. Cardenas notes in a study of domestic human rights organisations, that 
where there is considerable external pressure for organisations to be created, these 
organisations are often “relatively powerless.” 142  Creating an organisation without a 
protection mandate, or constructing a protection mandate that can be entirely controlled by 
states, enables states to present themselves as appearing to be human rights compliant 
without actually running the risk of being categorised as a human rights violating state. This 
was the case with the ASEAN human rights commission examined in chapter two and to an 
extent the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights examined in chapter four.  
The inherent imperialism of protection mandates arguably renders moot any attempt to 
decolonize the instruments of international human rights law containing protection mandates. 
Imperialism is part of the design of a protection mandate, as they require an organisation to 
take and make decisions about the content of a state’s laws. This is backed up by the implicit 
power to undermine a state’s existential sovereignty by placing it in the category of human 
rights violating states. Thus a protection mandate envisages a human rights organisation being 
in a dominant legal relationship over its member states.  
(4) The historical context of organisational design: diminishing the impact of 
protection mandate’s inherent imperialism 
Given the inherently imperialist nature of a protection mandate it seems inevitable that all 
human rights organisations will experience some form of anti-imperialist opposition. Yet in 
practice not all organisations face the same level of anti-imperialist opposition or any real anti-
imperialist opposition. In part this is because anti-imperialist opposition also stems from the 
imperial context of international law which causes juridical marginalization that some states, 
most notably those in the Western Europe and Other bloc at the UN, did not experience. 
There is however another dimension to this as organisations which experience only limited 
levels of anti-imperialist opposition have been able to legitimize their protection mandates as 
protecting human rights has aligned with some broader political objective shared by the 
member states of that organisation. Where the legitimisation of the inherent imperialism of a 
protection mandate has occurred this has reduced or eliminated anti-imperialist opposition.  
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 Legitimacy has a multitude of meanings and it is important to first understand different 
competing definitions of legitimacy before looking at the legitimisation of a protection 
mandate. Daniel Bodansky in his review of the international relations literature on institutional 
legitimacy observes that a variety of different features, such as transparency, public 
participation and deliberation, normally account for an adjudicative institutions legitimacy in a 
domestic constitutional system. 143  The extent to which supranational human rights 
organisations possess these attributes is unclear which is problematic for their wider claim to 
legitimate authority over states.144  Ingo Venzke argues that legitimacy is best understood as a 
form of authority which influences state conduct in a manner that is distinct from coercion 
and persuasion.145 There are three types of legitimacy, which are relevant to the consideration 
of a supranational organisation. Firstly “ideal-type” legitimate authority, Stephen Wheatly 
argues, is where an organisation is considered legitimate because its actions align with and 
anticipate the interests of those over who it has authority.146 A second form of legitimacy is 
what Tomas Franck describes as source legitimacy where the origins of the law come from a 
‘valid source’ and the law itself and the organisation applying the law are seen as legitimate.147 
Finally many theories of justice in society point to the importance of institutions possessing a 
content independent claim to legitimacy where the institution and not the results it produces 
lead to it being considered legitimate. Lynne Dobson notes that generally the legitimacy of 
adjudicative institutions is content-independent – a court can pass a judgment that people 
disagree with but the court is still considered legitimate.148 In relation to the legitimacy of 
protection mandates it is the first and third of these types of legitimacy which are important. A 
regional organisation, such as the African Commission of Human and Peoples rights may 
possess source legitimacy because of its origins but this would be insufficient to legitimise the 
inherent imperialism of its protection mandate. When trying to achieve compliance with 
contentious decisions, whether or not a state believes the organisation is protecting some 
wider long-term interest, even if it disagrees with the organisation over a specific case, is 
important for achieving both ideal-type and content independent legitimacy.  
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It is important at this point to remember the distinction between human rights organisations, 
formed solely for the purpose of protecting human rights from supranational organisations 
formed for another purpose that also have a protection mandate. Organisations in the latter 
category, such as the Regional Economic Communities described in the last chapter, have an 
alternate form of legitimacy outside of the protection of human rights. They intertwine the 
protection of human rights with economic advancement meaning that states have broader 
material incentives to comply with their protection mandates. Whilst these organisations are 
subject to opposition their integration of human rights and economic interaction provides a 
distinct material advantage to states. This not only provides a direct reason for compliance but 
in the longer term ongoing interaction with the organisation can generate a culture of 
compliance lessening anti-imperialist opposition by legitimising the inherent imperialism of a 
protection mandate. This was demonstrated in the previous chapter with the analysis of the 
Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which has faced 
limited opposition in part because it operates within the wider framework of economic 
interaction created by ECOWAS.  
 Organisations that exist purely to promote human rights do not have such direct benefits to 
states. These organisations confer benefits solely upon within individuals not the state itself, 
generating what Simmons terms the inverse legitimacy conundrum.149  This breaks down the 
assumption behind rational design theory that there is a transaction between states that 
organisations can in some way manage through organisational dispute resolution systems.150 
Rational design theories maintain that states are risk adverse when participating in 
international organisations but both realist and rational design theorists recognize that states 
are willing to accept these risks if the rewards for cooperation and compliance with an 
organisation are direct and clear.151  In an organisation solely designed to protect human rights 
the state bears all of the costs of the transaction and receives relatively few gains, which is 
why some states attempt to conform to the global script of legitimacy by signing up to human 
rights agreements with no protection mandate. This is a particular problem in judicial-review 
type organisations or treaty review bodies because their adjudicative function means that they 
have a much greater ipsetic potential.  
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Where supranational organisations have successfully achieved a degree of ideal-type and 
content-independent legitimacy is when they have reflected a coincidence of interests among 
a group of states. As Jackson and Posner note, this is hard to achieve and the most successful 
model of this - the ECtHR which has managed to achieve a reasonably high degree of 
acceptance and compliance – did so by the coincidence of interests being “already shared by 
the states”.152It was also accompanied by a high degree of economic integration among 
member states independent of the organisation’s existence. 153  This created a virtual 
community of European states where signing up to the ECHR was seen as a mechanism of 
locking in a particular form of benefits. Scholars in areas other than human rights have 
identified the tendency of states to join relatively powerful supranational organisations when 
they want to ‘lock in’ a set of policy preferences.154 Rational design theorists such as Jonas 
Tallberg argue that the construction of organisations to which states delegate powers enables 
them to lock-in policy preferences that affect a states future behaviour.155  The existence of a 
longer term set of interests helps explain how an organisation can command legitimate 
authority for its decisions. 
 Joseph Raz notes that a legitimate source of authority involves an individual suspending their 
own individual judgment in favour of that source of authority’s judgment.156 An individual 
would do this without recourse to their own reasoning and Raz is clear that this does not 
involve abandoning the idea of autonomy but instead reaching a conclusion that “all things 
considered” it is worth recognizing an external source of authority.157 Applying Raz’s reasoning 
to the situation posed by the protection mandate of a human rights organization; a state 
would consider the organization legitimate if all things considered there is a long term interest 
in accepting a protection mandate for the benefits that it locks in, even though there is the risk 
of their external sovereignty being delegitimized by them being categorized as a human rights 
violating state.  This would be true even under an interactional theory of international legal 
compliance which maintains that compliance with international law is achieved through state 
practice being guided and shaped by interaction with legal norms without recourse to 
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coercion.158 This theory still requires a framework of law which can be considered legitimate 
and can then provide what Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope describe as legal practices, 
where a series of interactions with the law encourages state compliance.159 At the heart of a 
supranational organisation’s claim to legitimacy therefore is the idea that there exists or can 
exist a common shared interest in locking-in a series of long term policy preferences.  
Crucially in the context of supranational organisations this inter-state shared interest must 
entail that a member state of an organisation can be classified as a human rights violating 
state. Membership of the ECtHR was in part driven by democratic idealism but equally as 
important was the concern that liberal-democratic European states faced a broader existential 
threat to their survival and that a human rights organisation, backed up by an activist court, 
was a mechanism for guaranteeing that they would not be subject to a totalitarian takeover.160 
This was a real threat in 1949-50; many of those directly involved in drafting the ECHR would 
have fled invading Nazi forces in the early 1940s and with Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia 
in 1947 and the Berlin blockade of 1948 there was a genuine panic about domination by 
another form of totalitarianism. Even though this subsided in the 1950s the idea of human 
rights as an ideological counterweight to the Soviet Union, for many years remained a 
powerful argument in favour of compliance with the ECtHR. The historical narrative of its 
formation was a means of inferring the set of benefits that states sought with organizational 
membership and served to legitimise the inherent imperialism of its protection mandate.  
After the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989-90 membership of the ECtHR became a 
means for states from the former eastern bloc to demonstrate their commitment to 
democratic transition.161 Most of the statistical research on compliance within the ECtHR’s 
judgments shows that its compliance rate is relatively high for a supranational human rights 
organisation although there is some evidence that indicates that countries with weaker 
domestic court systems, which for the most part include states from the former Soviet bloc, 
have higher instances of institutional opposition.162  The locking-in of liberal-democratic 
policies described above implicitly involves the state envisaging itself as a human rights 
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violating state as it is seeking to safeguard its domestic institutions from being used to commit 
human rights abuses. This is contingent upon a particular historical experience and it is 
noteworthy that states that joined the ECtHR later, and thus in a very different historical 
context from those who drafted the ECHR, appear, by virtue of their comparatively higher 
rates of opposition, to potentially have a different view on the legitimacy of the organisation’s 
protection mandate.   
This is a crucial difference between the ECHR and the ACHPR; the historical narrative of the 
former envisages member states becoming human rights violating states to legitimize its 
protection mandate, the historical narrative of the latter focuses on anti-colonialism as a 
source of legitimacy.  As outlined in chapter one, anti-colonialism describes the specific politics 
of opposing colonial-imperial rule in the mid-twentieth century and was associated with the 
General Assembly campaigns on decolonisation and ending apartheid. The problem with anti-
colonialism, as Jack Donnelly argues, was that it became “a self-liquidating venture, as colonies 
[became] independent countries” and as a consequence it did not build a basis for human 
rights protection beyond the foundation of new nation states.163  Anti-colonialism created a 
content-contingent set of reasons for viewing a protection mandate as legitimate (the content 
being the creation of an independent postcolonial nation state)  and crucially viewed an 
external force  (European colonialism) as being the principal source of human rights abuses. As 
noted in chapter three the Third World bloc were often in favour of organisations such as the 
CERD Committee and the UN Committee on Decolonisation, because the operation of their 
protection mandates supported decolonisation and predominantly identified colonial-
imperialism as the source of human rights abuses. Direct anti-imperialist opposition to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights started when it began exercising its protection mandate within 
postcolonial states.  
Commenting on the AU’s model of regional integration Anel Ferreira-Snyman noted that it was 
underpinned by a pan-Africanist philosophy that had determined “that the effects of 
colonialism, alienation, and marginalisation” could be “remedied by the forging of African 
unity.”164 This was very different to the political forces that motivated cooperation in the 
Council of Europe which as Luzius Wildhaber notes were initially driven by a desire to “defend 
democracy against its totalitarian enemies” and later to prescribe the limits “in terms of 
human rights” on the “exercise of public power in European liberal democracies committed to 
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the rule of law.”165 Wildhaber’s argument sees a shared common organisational approach to 
sovereignty in the two which as Niall MacCormick argues led to the creation of a form of “new 
and not-yet-well-theorized legal and political order” that sought to constrict the power of the 
sovereign state.166 As Ferreira-Snyman argues it was doubtful whether African states would 
meaningfully agree to “such a far-reaching limitation on their sovereignty” because it would 
be regarded “as neo-colonialism by some African states that still fiercely guard their new-
found sovereignty.”167 Even if this is a view held by a minority of states as noted in chapter 
four, anti-imperialism serves as a useful rhetorical mechanism to rally support from other 
states against an organisation with a protection mandate. The ACHPR pointed towards the 
external threat of colonialism and apartheid and the emphasis placed by many scholars on the 
Commission’s non-confrontational processes did not explicitly envisage the existence of a 
human rights violating state.168  Because anti-colonialism as an ideology was based on 
territories under colonial rule gaining independence and becoming postcolonial states it had 
to envisage formerly colonialist states as the source of human rights violations. As a matter of 
logic anti-colonialism could not envisage a postcolonial state as a human rights violating state 
because as chapter one argued, anti-colonialism was focused upon identifying colonialism as a 
human rights abuse.  
It is important to take a step back for a moment and acknowledge that the historical narrative 
of a human rights instrument is not something an organisation uses to ensure day to day 
compliance. Some commentators have noted that the reason the ECtHR has a relatively low 
level of opposition, is that it allows states a wide margin of appreciation in the implementation 
of rights under the ECHR and often achieves a lot through soft review processes, where it 
identified technical non-compliance with the ECHR.169 Shany notes that overtime this has 
allowed the Court to make “higher-cost” judgements imposing greater obligations upon 
member states as there is a relatively strong overall expectation of compliance.170 However, it 
is these high-cost judgments, which are statistically more likely to trigger institutional 
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opposition and call the legitimacy of a protection mandate into question.171 This does not 
morph into anti-imperialist institutional opposition if there is a consensus, reflected in a 
common historical narrative, which helps mitigate the inherent imperialism of a protection 
mandate. Empirical evidence presented by Smith-Cannoy shows, that in cases where there is a 
lack of consensus about organizational aims and strong pre-existing political factors 
encouraging opposition (such as sovereign inequality) that states either refused to become 
members of an organisation with a protection mandate, or engaged in pre-emptive opposition 
or engaged in extreme forms of institutional opposition, such as anti-imperialist opposition.172  
This can also apply to other extreme forms of institutional opposition, as was the case with US 
exceptionalism towards human rights organisations described in chapter one. There was no 
historical narrative to encourage compliance and reconcile the costs of membership of treaty 
bodies and there was a very strong counter narrative of US democratic exceptionalism to 
encourage extreme institutional opposition.  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights provides an interesting case study of this overall 
principle. The Inter-American Court has a weaker record of compliance than the ECtHR but, as 
Hillebrecht argues, relies on the common political narrative of organisational compliance being 
associated with the transition from military dictatorship.173 Shelton in her history of the Inter-
American Court noted that in the 1950s at regional meetings of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) various commitments were made that focused on human rights as the basis for 
inter-state cooperation among OAS member states.174 Whilst this was similar to the ECHR it 
was a slightly weaker foundational narrative due to differing regional and historical contexts, 
and did not quite give rise to a similar set of shared benefits. At the time the OAS consisted of 
a number of states that were military dictatorships and the commitment to using the Court as 
a vehicle for democratization was something that came with the wave of democratization in 
region in the 1980s, it was not a justification for the creation of the organizations protection 
mandate. Crucially the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Court’s jurisdiction 
to hear individual cases had not evolved as a mechanism for enabling litigation against state 
parties but was principally an information gathering mechanism.175 As Tom Farer notes during 
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the 1970s the Commission’s protection mandate principally relied on the process of political 
exposure and it lacked any form of institutional censure or sanction.176 When in the 1980s 
individuals wanted remedies such as injunctions and damages they began pursuing cases at 
the Inter-American Court which then acquired its democratizing role. Nevertheless this loose 
pro-democratic foundational narrative facilitated a comparatively high degree of compliance 
between the Court and state parties and its protection mandate was more powerful than the 
African Court of Human Rights.177  
As James Cavallaro and Stephanie Brewer noted the court was able to successfully align itself 
with political forces within states which were able to influence state policy.178 Compliance data 
shows a rough correlation between the rise of democratization in the region in 1980s and 
1990s and partial or full compliance with the Inter-American Court’s contentious decisions – 
decisions that go against state parties.179  Cases involving immunity laws for paramilitary 
forces or law enforcement agencies, for human rights abuses perpetrated under military 
regimes were often complied with by state parties.180  These cases directly related to the 
process of democratization within states. One interesting feature of the Court’s work was the 
system of allanamientos where states could acknowledge their role in human rights violations 
prior to the court making a ruling against the state. This voluntary declaration by a state that 
they had violated human rights again principally occurred in areas where the case accorded 
with the overall shared goal of democratisation.  
Institutional opposition to the Court and Commission started emerging as many states refused 
to adopt mechanisms to directly implement their decisions.181 This was the wider context 
behind what was described as an “implementation crisis” in 2009 when it was revealed that 
nearly 85% of Court judgments were not being implemented.182 The cases where there was 
the highest level of non-compliance were where the Court openly criticized societal 
institutions or members of the executive – indicating an increasingly defensive approach to 
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sovereignty. 183   There was also some anti-imperialist opposition towards the Court. 
Venezuela’s withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction in 2012 was overtly anti-imperialist with 
the government criticising the Court for engaging in “political manipulation” and accusing it of 
being a Trojan horse for US imperialism.184 When the Dominican Republic withdrew from the 
Court it was over a technical dispute over the interpretation of constitutional law but the 
background to it was the wider issue of domestic legal sovereignty, particularly in relation to 
the control of immigration and the Dominican courts had resisted implementing several 
judgements of the Inter-American Court.185 As Gerald Neuman concluded the Court risked 
expansive interpretations risked becoming “too divorced from the consensual aspect” of a 
regional human rights organization and absent “strategic institutional design” this risked 
undermining its broader legitimacy.186 The legitimising historical narrative of democratic 
transition from military dictatorship was broadly useful in securing a consensus among 
member states during the initial period of its operation but was insufficient to prevent more 
severe instances of institutional opposition and anti-imperialist opposition emerging over 
time.  
An important aspect of the rational design theory of international organisations is as Barbara 
Koremenos notes that “the value of future gains is strong enough” to support cooperation 
with other states and interaction with the organisation.187 The future gains of membership of a 
human rights organisation with a protection mandate are somewhat unclear for state parties 
because of the inverse legitimacy paradox identified earlier in this section. Therefore 
organisations require strong content-independent legitimacy, in the form of a legitimising 
historical narrative which can outline benefits to ongoing compliance, mitigate the costs of 
enforcement and is clear at the time of the organisation’s formation. This can in turn minimize 
extreme forms of institutional opposition, such as anti-imperialist opposition. The formation of 
the African Commission was undertaken without any clear consensus about the ongoing 
benefits of compliance for states or a sense of why a member state could become a human 
rights violating state. Protection mandates are not an inherently Eurocentric ideal but are 
often associated with states that have embarked on some form of historical transition 
                                                          
183 Ibid 503. 
184 Rachel Boothroyd ‘Chavez Announces “Immediate” Withdrawal from Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 26 
July 2012 available at http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7131 accessed 10 July 2015.  
185 Adison Morris ‘Dominican Republic leaves Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Jurist 6 November 2014 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/11/dominican-republic-leaves-inter-american-court-of-human-rights.php 
accessed 10 July 2015. 
186 Gerald Neuman ‘Import, Export and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 
EJIL 101, 123. 
187 Koremenos (n 152) 21. 
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involving human rights and the re-conception of their sovereign authority. The sense of 
democratic crisis among western European states in the late 1940s enabled a relatively clear 
consensus to be reached on the creation of a human rights court with a powerful protection 
mandate. What Brunnée and Toope term legal practice, the process of states in the ECHR 
regularly complying with relatively low-cost judgments, enabled the institution to increase its 
compliance power but its historical narrative also enabled it to maintain compliance rates 
when issuing contentious high-cost judgments. 188  Conceiving regional human rights 
organisations as a bulwark against colonialism did not engender such a process as it did not 
create a shared sense among member states of an organisation that they could also become 
human rights violating states.  
Conclusion  
This chapter showed how the process that an organisation’s protection mandate uses to try 
and engender compliance from states is inherently imperialist. Supranational human rights 
organisations have limited powers to directly pressure a recalcitrant member state into 
compliance therefore they try and exploit the broader international political concern among 
states to appear human rights compliant by creating juridical categories of human rights 
compliant and non-compliant states. Benhabib noted that juridically universal mechanisms 
require a justificatory universalism and in the case of protection mandates the justification is 
the negative reference of the rogue or outlaw state that defies international law.189 The 
existence of human rights violating states justifies the ipsetic potential of a protection 
mandate as the organization attempts to make states human rights compliant by directing 
them to change their domestic laws or face stigmatization. This process does not necessarily 
work but its presence in the legal structure of a protection mandate is significant as it shows 
that the organization is attempting a form of dominance over a states lawmaking powers. 
Additionally as the first section demonstrated, the construction of universality via a negative 
reference was how international law’s universality was developed during the process of 
colonial imperialism. Thus a protection mandate not only mimics a process associated with 
colonial-imperialism but it also envisages a form of dominance over states which is 
inherently imperialist.  
The inherent imperialism of protection mandates should make anti-imperialist institutional 
opposition a near inevitability for all organisations and the prevalence of anti-imperialist 
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institutional opposition among postcolonial states reflects their sovereign inequalities, 
described in chapter one. In practice however it is possible for states to consider a protection 
mandate legitimate. But this requires a shared consensus among states as to the benefits of 
entering into an organisation which risks them being categorised as human rights violating 
states and requires the organisation’s design to reflect this consensus.  Anti-colonialism, unlike 
the historical narrative that reflected the shared consensus behind the ECHR’s formation, did 
not provide this. As discussed in chapter one and illustrated in chapters three and four, the 
Third World bloc’s anti-colonialism maintained that colonialism was the source of human 
rights violations, meaning that only formerly colonialist states could be human rights abusing 
states. 
Inherent imperialism explains the persistence of forms of direct and pre-emptive anti-
imperialist opposition within the regional organisations created by postcolonial states. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, whilst it is possible to decolonize human rights law, removing 
it from its imperialist context, it has not proved equally possible to decolonize the 
enforcement of human rights law by a supranational organization. This is because absent the 
capacity to harness the political stigma associated with the designation of a state as a human 
rights violating state there is no direct mechanism for an organization to pressure states into 
engaging in domestic legal reform. Absent an effective alternative legal structure, protection 
mandates will continue to be designed with an inherently imperialist structure.  
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Conclusion 
“Simple solutions do not work” Katarina Tomaševski argues noting that the legalisation of 
human rights into has resulted in a criminal-law mentality where there is a clear victim and 
violator, who must be eventually punished by the law.1 This, as noted in the last chapter of this 
study, helps generate claims from postcolonial states that human rights organisations are in 
and of themselves imperialist. International law was created in the era of colonial-imperialism 
with the image of the subordinated colonial territory in mind. Even in the postcolonial era 
international law generated juridical inequalities between postcolonial and formerly colonial 
states. Mukau Mutua’s analysis of the savages-victims-saviour dynamic of international human 
rights law illustrates how the need to establish the existence of a human rights violator 
invariably results in the utilisation of a legal formulation rooted in colonial era thinking.2 Given 
this context it is hardly surprising that a legal mechanism which depends on marginalising 
states, relegating them to the out-group of human rights violating states, is likely to be viewed 
by postcolonial states as a continuation of their historic marginalisation under colonial-
imperialism. This is inherent imperialism, as these legal instruments envisage imperial 
dominance independent from the colonial-imperial context of international law’s creation.  
Absent a legal structure that allows direct coercion to protect human rights, supranational 
human rights organisations rely on the framework of customary international law and the law 
of treaties to enforce human rights within states. This is problematic because international 
human rights law offers rights to the citizens of states to use against their governments and 
because in international law the government of the state remains the recognised actor, there 
is an implicit tension within the relationship between compliance with international human 
rights law and state sovereignty.3 This creates a complicated politico-juridical landscape in 
which there exist strong incentives to demonstrate human rights compliance, by signing up to 
human rights agreements, but relatively weak incentives to make that compliance concrete. 
As Sonia Cardenas notes there are three central reasons states give for not fully complying 
with international human rights law – national security, appeasing a domestic constituency or 
                                                          
1 Katarina Tomaševski Responding to Human Rights Violations, 1946-1999 (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) xi. 
2 Makau Mutua ‘Savages, victims and saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’(2001) 42  Harvard Journal of 
International law 202.  
3 See Beth Simmons Mobilizing for Human Rights International Law in Domestic Politics (CUP 2009) 126. 
224 | P a g e  
 
cultural exceptionalism.4  These are all in some way related to democratic sovereignty or to 
the biopolitical control of individuals within the modern nation state.  
Organisational protection mandates, described in the beginning of this study as the collection 
of legal powers governing the enforcement of human rights by an organisation in one of its 
member states, are as a juridical form inherently imperialist. As chapter five argues the only 
option for an organisation that seeks to protect human rights within states but lacks direct 
coercive powers, is to utilise the general political incentive that links a states’ external 
sovereignty to human rights commitments and for organisations to frame that within a 
juridical structure to encourage compliance with its decisions. This is a juridically constructed 
form of shaming to encourage compliance and its effectiveness varies. Whilst there is some 
evidence available that shaming has an effect on state parties’ behaviour within an 
institutionalised environment there is no direct evidence of the effect that the growth or 
development of protection mandates has upon instances of opposition. This would be an area 
for further empirical research to test some elements of the theoretical hypothesis advanced in 
this study.  
Protection mandates are inherently imperialist as they envisage an organisation attacking a 
states existential sovereignty and the creation of uniform laws within states.5  This is 
imperialist, no matter the context, as it juridically envisages an international organisation 
having a degree of control over the lawmaking process within a state and as modern 
sovereignty is contingent upon control of the lawmaking process this is a form of control over 
a state’s sovereignty. The extent to which this actually encourages anti-imperialist opposition 
from a state is to an extent dependent on the impact that the attempted denigration of a 
state’s existential sovereignty has on other aspects of their sovereignty and on whether their 
sovereignty was juridically unequal in the first place. Equally, as discussed in chapter one, 
standard notions of state consent in international law, which can be used to justify the 
restriction of sovereign powers by an international instrument, are more difficult to apply to 
human rights organisations because of their ipsetic potential. This compounds the problem of 
inherent imperialism resulting in anti-imperialist opposition. Pre-emptive anti-imperialist 
opposition can be understood using rational design theories of organisations. According to 
rational design theory states construct organisations to both reflect their interests and whilst 
                                                          
4 Sonia Cardenas Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2010) 27-9. 
5 Existential sovereignty is the states capacity to govern their domestic political system. For an explanation of the 
concept see Gerry Simpson Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order 
(2. ed CUP 2006) 53-54.  
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willing to potentially delegate aspects of their sovereignty are risk averse in doing so. The 
construction of organisations with intentionally weak or non-existent protection mandates 
was states attempting to design the organisation in anticipation of future anti-imperialist 
opposition.  
If the juridical form of the protection mandate is at the root of anti-imperialist opposition it is 
worth taking the issue raised at the end of chapter four one step further; is possible to 
decolonise international human rights law fully by removing protection mandates from 
international organisations? This effectively would end the enforcement of human rights by 
supranational human rights organisations was we know it. As Tomaševski argues “the price” 
for not having a legal regime to enforce human rights is that human rights becomes “emptied 
of contents” transforming it into “it into a weasel-word” that can be “filled with new contents 
with every change of the political fashion of the season”.6 Human rights as Joseph Raz argues 
exist to be enforced as they are meant to acknowledge that some laws passed by the 
governments of some states are incompatible with protections and guarantees that are owed 
to individuals as of right.7 In the Origins of Totalitarianism when Arendt castigates the failings 
of the rights of man to offer any meaningful protections to refugees feeling persecution her 
target is in part the failings of natural rights to offer enforceable guarantees of citizenship and 
protection.8 In many ways the concept of a ‘right to have rights’ can be read as a guarantee for 
the protection of human rights, a step which logically presages their enforcement.9 The idea 
behind the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was to enforce 
human rights. Lawyers such as René Cassin and Hersch Lauterpacht who were influential in the 
mid-1940s in shaping the ideas behind the UDHR wanted a system of universal rights in order 
to prevent Nazism and fascism from ever occurring again.10 In the late 1940s when the 
declaration was being drafted postcolonial states and states that had not engaged in colonial 
rule were in favour of the creation of mechanisms that would be able to enforce human rights 
in order to resist colonial rule.11 What both of these ideas have in common is the sense that 
human rights require enforcement. Throughout the 1970s in Africa various sub-regional 
seminars and meetings met to discuss human rights and the role of human rights in the one 
                                                          
6 Tomaševski. (n. 1)  
7 Joseph Raz ‘Human Rights in the Emerging World Order’ (2010)1 Transnational Law Review 31, 46. 
8 Hannah Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest Books 1976) 291-3. 
9 What concerned Arendt, Kesby argues was the capacity to lose rights all together and her argument was for the 
existence of a community which could guarantee rights, which as Kesby demonstrates later is in part linked to the 
enforcement of legal rights. Alison Kesby The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law 
(OUP 2012) 4-8.  
10 Francesca Klug A Magna Carta for all humanity: homing in on Human Rights (Routledge 2015) 20-22. 
11 See chapter 2. 
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party state and almost all ended with agreement that there was a need for an organisation to 
enforce human rights within African states.12 In fact in both chapters three and four it was 
shown that there was an incentive towards constructing human rights institutions and 
organisations in order to guarantee enforcement, even though this was subsequently 
tempered by anti-imperialist opposition. 
If the project of international human rights law requires enforcement this then raises the 
ancillary question of whether it is possible for human rights enforcement to escape from a 
juridical form which is inherently imperialist. The short answer is that this is unlikely for some 
of the reasons stated above as enforcement entails making some type of claim as to whether a 
state’s laws are incompatible with an organisation’s interpretation of international human 
rights law. Even if this is something that rarely occurs, it requires the organisation to possess 
the capacity to make some kind of normative statement about a state’s laws with a view to 
those laws being changed. When coupled with the pressure that an organisation can bring to 
bear on a state to change it laws, this cumulatively represents the potential to interfere with a 
state’s domestic legal sovereignty. This could be an issue with the very nature of the juridical 
form of international law itself which, as Peter Fitzpatrick and John Hobson have 
independently argued, is intertwined with historical practices of imperialism.13 As Emmanuel 
Jouannet argues that if one accepts that imperialism is the “domination and the imposition on 
others of one’s own legal” system over another this means that the very idea of international 
law has an imperialist element to it as not only did it facilitate colonialism it enabled the 
ongoing process of material and legal domination.14 As Jouannet goes onto caution, even 
though colonial-imperialism may have formally ended the persistence of what this study has 
termed residual imperialism, means that it is impossible to act as though “imperialism of the 
legal values embodied in international law ha[s] been disposed of.”15  
This can be expanded to a general theory of juridical forms. In Truth and Juridical Forms, 
Foucault argues that the structures of power in society produce knowledge using the juridical 
forms of the state and creating right and wrong courses of actions.16 The construction of 
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(Routledge 2013).  
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16 Michel Foucault ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ in James Faubion (ed)  Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 
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knowledge by juridical processes means that there is not a “relationship of assimilation” with 
the object of knowledge in society but “rather a relation of distance and domination” and that 
the creation of a universal knowledge has created a “precarious system of power.”17  Systems 
of universal knowledge, as the analysis of ‘Society’ Must be Defended in the previous chapter 
demonstrated, can be used to construct a system of universality that is inexorably intertwined 
with colonial imperialism. It is the system of universal knowledge and the expulsion of those 
outside of universal knowledge that defines colonialism. Inherent imperialism may well 
therefore be inescapable within international juridical forms, such as protection mandates, as 
their dependence on a negative universal reference to construct and maintain justificatory 
universality envisages the marginalisation of states. Also, as chapter one argued, given that the 
international system characterised by significant sovereign inequalities between states the 
process of marginalisation is never going to be equal, the denigration of a postcolonial state’s 
existential sovereignty by a protection mandate is likely to have a much greater impact.  
It is possible that an alternative juridical form of enforcement, one which is truly decolonised 
and escapes inherent imperialism could exist. However, theorising the conditions that would 
have to be present for this to occur is beyond the scope of this study, which sought to 
diagnose the theoretical foundations of anti-imperialist opposition. If I were to offer a 
tentative sketch of one, the model of the Universal Periodic Review process at the Human 
Rights Council (HRC) appears to escape the direct problem of having a juridical mechanism 
that denigrates sovereignty. However, as chapter three demonstrated this was no bar to anti-
imperialist opposition. The wider context of the UN, and its residual imperialist structures 
along with the need to create a broader framework of follow up recommendations, has meant 
that a legal framework dependent on powers of condemnation is being progressively 
developed by the HRC. It is also arguable that the lack of existence of an alternate juridical 
mechanism is not particularly important as imperialism is simply a ‘fixed cost’ of a system of 
international organisations. If it were not for the consequences of anti-imperialist opposition 
this would be a pragmatic, if not particularly palatable, conclusion to draw, given the 
seemingly insurmountable sovereign inequalities affecting the operation of all international 
organisations. However, one thing I have tried to emphasise throughout this study is that anti-
imperialist opposition weakens the protection of human rights and enhances the power of 
state governments.  
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In conclusion it is worth noting that whilst international law and the imperialist juridical forms it 
creates are responsible for generating anti-imperialism this does not in my view automatically 
invalidate the project of attempting to protect human rights at the supranational level. In the 
introduction to this study a pragmatic defence of human rights organisations was offered as they 
often operationalise human rights and can provide a place of refuge, albeit an imperfect one, to 
those under the most persecution from their government. Additionally human rights law can be 
substantively decolonised, as chapter four demonstrated, answering many of the criticism raised 
by anti-imperialist ideological opposition and protecting interests that human rights law did not 
previously protect in its original Euro-centric model. The critique from those such as Ilan Rua Wall, 
that the very juridical structure of human rights law may preclude further radical politics is one 
that is worthy of close attention as it points to broader structural problems with the nature of 
human rights and their juridical codification.18 However, in this study I have chosen to focus on 
human rights law as it is practiced currently by nation states within supranational organisations. 
Within this framework claims to reprioritise or re-imagine human rights law have more often than 
not advanced a vision of human rights that is de-radicalised even further than the status quo and 
has been used to enhance the entrenched constituted power of state governments over their 
constituted and subject populations. Given that as Foucault said state governments “arrogate to 
themselves the right to pass off as profit or loss the human unhappiness of their decisions” 
international human rights law as enforced by human rights organisations offers some form of 
check upon that. 19  
  
                                                          
18 Illan rua Wall Human Rights and Constituent Power: Without Model or Warranty (Routledge 2012) 27-34. 
19  Foucault ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’ from Faubion (n 16) 474. 
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